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Abstract
Financial markets are of vital importance to the overall economy: many market move-
ments and phenomena have deep roots in and profound influences on macroeconomic
activity. It is thus essential for policymakers seeking to maintain a healthy economy to
understand the information conveyed by financial markets. Using both theoretical and
empirical approaches, essays in this thesis study the pricing and trading of financial as-
sets, with a particular emphasis on policy and regulatory implications.
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Introduction
This thesis has three essays that study financial markets with the goal of informing pol-
icymaking and regulatory design. I examine salient patterns and notable events in U.S.
stock market, and demonstrate their relevance to important policy discussions.
In the first essay, I assess the overall supply of public sector capital in the U.S. through
the lens of asset prices. Using a two-sector general equilibrium model, I demonstrate how
the supply of public sector capital may become a source of priced risk, for which the price
of risk changes sign as public sector capital becomes over- or under-supplied. Taking two
complementary empirical approaches, I find consistent evidence suggesting that assets
with higher sensitivity to variations in public investment have higher average returns.
Together my findings imply that public sector capital is undersupplied, and greater public
investment is viewed favorably by investors.
In the second essay (joint with Dejanir Silva and Felipe Iachan), we study the effects of
idiosyncratic uncertainty on asset prices, investment, and welfare. We consider an econ-
omy with two main ingredients: i) investors are constrained to hold under-diversified
portfolios; ii) idiosyncratic risk is endogenous and countercyclical. We show that the equi-
librium is constrained-inefficient, being subject to underinvestment and excessive aggre-
gate risk-taking. Inefficiencies stem from the presence of an idiosyncratic risk externality, a
form of pecuniary externality, as firms do not internalize the effect of their investment de-
cisions on the risk borne by others. We provide a sufficient statistic for the magnitude of
risk externalities that depends on an idiosyncratic risk premium and a variance risk pre-
mium, and assess its magnitude empirically. We characterize the optimal allocation and
show it can be implemented by financial regulation using a combination of a tax shield
on debt and risk-weighted capital requirements.
In the third essay (joint with Adam Clark-Joseph and Mao Ye), we study two inde-
pendent technological glitches that forced two separate trading halts on different U.S. ex-
changes during the week of July 6, 2015. During each halt, all other exchanges remained
open. We exploit exogenous variation provided by this unprecedented coincidence, in
conjunction with a proprietary data set, to identify the causal impact of Designated Mar-
ket Maker (DMM) participation on liquidity. When the voluntary liquidity providers
1
on one exchange were removed, liquidity remained unchanged; when DMMs were re-
moved, liquidity decreased market-wide. We find evidence consistent with the idea that
these DMMs, despite facing only mild formal obligations, significantly improve liquidity
in the modern electronic marketplace.
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Chapter 1
Is There A Shortfall in Public Sector
Capital? An Asset Pricing Appraisal
Public sector capital is an essential underpinning of the economy; its maintenance and
enhancement require a significant amount of public investment. 1 2 In recent years,
as stories of crumbling infrastructure abound, there seems to be a growing notion that
public sector capital is undersupplied and greater public investment is needed. However,
existing studies provide little evidence of a shortfall in public sector capital, and there is
a lot of controversy on the potential impact of increasing public investment.
In this paper, I take a novel approach to this question: I infer from asset prices in-
vestors’ opinion on the overall supply of public sector capital. The basic idea is as follows.
If public sector capital is undersupplied, then investors may view the declines in public
investment as a source of risk; hence, ceteris paribus, assets that covary positively (nega-
tively) with public investment would be valued lower (higher) and have higher (lower)
average returns. I formalize this idea using a two-sector general equilibrium (GE) model
in which public sector capital (as a share of aggregate capital) enters the pricing kernel;
its price of risk turns positive (negative) when it becomes too low (high). Prompted by
this GE theory, I propose a factor pricing model with shocks to the public sector invest-
ment share (henceforth, “PUB shocks”) as a risk factor. I confront the factor model with
a variety of test assets and find that exposure to PUB shocks is priced and carries a ro-
bustly positive price of risk; this finding suggests an undersupply of public sector capital.
1In this paper, I use the terms “public investment” and “public sector investment” interchangeably, both
of which refer to government spending on public sector (nondefense) capital such as highways, roads, air-
ports, mass transit systems, water and sewer systems, electric and gas facilities, public schools and hospitals
facilities; the precise empirical definition is provided later. In the literature, such spending is also referred
to as “infrastructure spending or investment”, “public capital or fixed investment”, and so on.
2Munnell, ed (1990) surveys some early studies on the importance of public sector capital as well as the
(in)adequacy of public investment.
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In addition, I find supporting evidence from the analysis of a sample of U.S. govern-
ment contractors. Specifically, I find that firms with heavier reliance on government as
a customer are more sensitive to changes in public investment and provide higher stock
returns on average. I also find that the spread in average returns between firms with high
and low government dependency has widened as the public sector investment share de-
clines. Together these findings are consistent with the view that public sector capital is in
short supply, and greater public investment is favorable.
For starters, I briefly review the evolution of public sector investment in the United
States, comparing it with that of private sector (nonresidential) investment. On aver-
age, national investment (private plus public sector investments) represents about 12% of
gross domestic product (GDP) in the postwar U.S. economy, of which roughly one third
is public sector investment. The latter ratio, which I refer to as the public sector invest-
ment share, has witnessed significant variations: as shown in Figure 1.1, it increased in the
1950s, peaked in the early 1960s, and has since been trending downward. The most recent
reading shows a new record low of less than 15%, meaning that the size of public sector
investment is merely one sixth of that of private sector investment. 3
Figure 1.1: Public sector investment share. The solid line represents the public sector invest-
ment share, that is, the ratio of public sector (nondefense) investment to the sum of public and
private sector (nonresidential) investments; Shaded areas indicate U.S. recessions identified by
NBER. Related variables are more precisely defined in Section 1.3.
3Alternatively, one can use GDP as the denominator when defining the public sector investment share,
the behavior of which turns out to be very similar (see Figure A.3).
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Looking at these variations, one might naturally ask whether they have any bearing
on the economy, and in particular, whether the level of public investment is appropriate
or not. A priori, it is hard to answer these questions because, although public investment
provides many benefits (Munnell, ed, 1990), it incurs nontrivial costs as well—whether
it is the crowding-out of private sector investment (Aschauer, 1989a) or a heavier fiscal
burden (Baxter and King, 1993). The fact that public investment has declined relative
to the rest of the economy does not in itself indicate that it is inadequate. Hence more
evidence is required to make a judgement. Existing studies take various approaches to
this problem, but there is little consensus among them. 4
So I propose a distinctive approach by letting investors speak to this matter. In stan-
dard asset pricing theory, investors dislike risks that reduce their utility and value claims
that hedge them. I hypothesize that investors care about public investment and would
like to hedge against its declines (increases) if public sector capital is undersupplied (over-
supplied); that translates to higher (lower) risk premia for assets that covary with public
investment. I begin by providing theoretical support for this hypothesis.
To theoretically link public investment to investors’ utility and thus to asset prices,
I develop a parsimonious GE model. I consider a two-sector production economy with
the following ingredients. First, I postulate a neoclassical aggregate production function
with constant elasticity of substitution (CES); it takes private and public sector capital
as inputs. Second, I incorporate time-varying uncertainty as a driver of business cycles
and posit a risk-mitigating role for the public sector. As a result of these two features,
expanding public sector capital has influence on the aggregate output as well as its vari-
ability. Finally, living in this economy is a representative agent who I assume has recur-
sive preferences. Her utility is directly driven by economic prospects, which in turn are
determined by aggregate productivity and volatility. So if without any friction, the agent
would always hold the supply of public sector capital to an optimal level at which the
best economic prospects are achieved.
However, as I introduce two types of frictions, the agent can no longer maintain this
optimum. One friction is capital adjustment costs, which prevent instantaneous capital
reallocation. Another friction is a constant public investment rule, which renders the
public sector investment rate irresponsitve to changing economic conditions. 5 Due to
4For example, Haughwout (2002) estimates the marginal benefit of public capital from local wages and
housing prices and find it to be small relative to the cost. However, Albouy and Farahani (2017) reinterpret
Haughwout (2002)’s estimates through the lens of a more general model and find public capital to be much
more valuable.
5This public investment rule is motivated by the fact that, though the public sector investment share has
varied considerably, the growth rate of public sector investment is fairly stable over time (see Figure A.4).
Gali (1994) considers a similar rule.
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these frictions, public sector capital can deviate from its optimal level, becoming over- or
under-supplied.
In this setting, I examine the asset pricing role of a crowding-out shock that increases
public sector capital but crowds out private sector capital. 6 When public sector capital is
oversupplied, this shock pushes the capital allocation away from the optimum and thus
decreases the agent’s utility. This results in a negative price of risk for crowding-out
shocks. When public sector capital is undersupplied, however, a crowding-out shock
pushes the capital allocation toward the optimum and thus increases the agent’s utility.
This leads to a positive price of risk for crowding-out shocks. Therefore, a key implication
from this GE model is that the over- or under-supply of public sector capital is associated
with different signs for the price of risk for crowding-out shocks. This insight underpins
my empirical investigation in which I try to identify the sign for the price of crowding-out
risk.
Admittedly, there are other mechanisms as to how public investment may affect the
economy and thus investors’ utility. But I focus on the productivity effect and the risk-
mitigating effect for good reason. I consider the productivity effect for its predominance
in the literature as well as its practical relevance. As pointed out by Blanchard (2016),
“U.S. government borrowing costs are very low... the relevant opportunity cost of public
investment would not be the rate on government bonds but the marginal product of the
private capital that would be crowded out.” I incorporate the risk-mitigating effect to
match the countercyclicality of the public sector investment share, a salient pattern shown
in Figure 1.1. Underlying this pattern is the fact that private sector investment is much
more procyclical than public sector investment. It is important to have the risk-mitigating
effect to endogenously generate enough procyclicality for private sector investment.
The equilibrium pricing kernel in this GE model is driven by shocks to the share of
public sector capital, economic uncertainty, and the aggregate capital growth. Prompted
by this pricing kernel, I propose a three-factor asset pricing model with PUB shocks, un-
certainty shocks, and the market excess return as risk factors. PUB shocks—which is a
proxy for crowding-out shocks—may stem from, for example, unforeseen fiscal develop-
ments. Uncertainty shocks represent news that alter the variability of economic condi-
tions. The market excess return captures standard technology shocks that affect general
economic growth. 7 This factor model underpins my empirical investigation. 8
6This shock is motivated by Aschauer (1989a)’s finding that an increase in public capital accumulation
induces an almost dollar-for-dollar reduction in private capital accumulation. Cohen, Coval and Malloy
(2011) provide another study documenting the crowding-out effect of government spending.
7He, Kelly and Manela (2017) also use the market excess return as a proxy for the Total-Factor-
Productivity-style persistent technology shocks.
8It is worth emphasizing that this factor model is actually more general than the GE framework pre-
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Guided by the GE model, I go on to investigate whether, in practice, investors really
care about the supply of public sector capital to the extent that they might demand hedges
against unfavorable changes in public investment, and if yes, what changes are consid-
ered unfavorable, increase or decrease? To answer these questions, I empirically estimate
the price of risk for PUB shocks. Equipped with the factor pricing model derived from the
GE theory, I perform standard two-pass asset pricing tests using a variety of well-known
equity portfolios. My main finding is that assets’ exposure to PUB shocks possess signif-
icant explanatory power for cross-sectional differences in average asset returns, and that
the estimated price of risk for PUB shocks is positive. This finding points to increases in
public investment as good news.
To strengthen and extend this finding, I propose a characteristic-based measure to
capture firms’ sensitivity to PUB shocks, and I form portfolios based on that. 9 I ex-
amine a sample of U.S. government contractors. I postulate that the extent to which a
firm depends on government for revenue is a relevant proxy for its covariation with pub-
lic investment. I form stock portfolios based on firms’ government dependency, which
is measured by the average fraction of sales to government over the past three years.
I find that high-dependency firms are more sensitive to changes in public investment
and provide higher stock returns on average compared with low-dependency firms. A
zero-investment portfolio that is long stocks in the highest dependency quintile and short
stocks in the lowest dependency quintile provides an average return of 7.4% annually. I
confirm that this return spread is not driven by differential loadings on classic risk factors.
Lastly, I conduct a subsample analysis and find that the spread in average returns between
high- and low-dependency firms was small, or even negative, in the 1980s and 1990s, but
it has widened considerably in recent years and looks to continue. Together these find-
ings support the view that there is a shortfall in public sector capital, and greater public
investment is favorable; this appears particularly true in recent years.
Related literature. This paper contributes to a substantial literature studying the eco-
nomic effects of public investment. Since the seminal work by Aschauer (1989a,b), a lot
of research has been dedicated to understanding the mechanisms by which public invest-
ment influences the economy and, in particular, whether the overall impact is positive or
negative. Some studies examine public investment at the aggregate level, while others
focus on specific types of investments. 10 In any case, the common goal of these stud-
sented here. One may come up with alternative frameworks in which the equilibrium pricing kernels are
determined by the same set of state variables.
9It is well known that characteristics often give a better proxy for firms’ risk exposure (Adrian, Etula and
Muir, 2014).
10For example, Haughwout (2002) and Albouy and Farahani (2017) study the value of public goods and
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ies is to estimate the value of public sector capital, which together with the information
on its potential costs help answer the normative question of whether government should
increase or decrease public sector investment. Compared with existing studies, I take a
novel approach to this question, inferring investors’ opinion on this matter from asset
prices. 11 I demonstrate that shocks to the public sector investment share are a source of
risk that is priced in the cross section of expected returns and carries a positive price of
risk. It suggests that investors’ utility declines when public investment dwindles; assets
that pay off in this case are considered valuable hedges and hence deliver lower average
returns.
My work also relates to Belo and Yu (2013), who made the first attempt to link public
investment to the stock market. I extend their work and demonstrate how public sector
capital may enter the pricing kernel in general equilibrium. The model in this paper
stems from a strand of macro-finance literature that studies the joint dynamics of macro
quantities and asset prices in a GE framework. Pioneering work by Jermann (1998) and
Tallarini (2000) examines time-inseparable preferences (habit formation preferences and
recursive preferences, respectively) in this framework and has achieved some success in
reconciling business-cycle regularities with asset pricing facts. Their models are extended
in various ways to address many issues, among which Eberly and Wang (2011)’s two-
sector model is the most similar to mine. Our main difference is that, in their model,
capital from the two sectors are perfect substitutes, whereas in my model, they bear a
certain degree of complementarity.
Outline. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 1.1 introduces
a two-sector general equilibrium model that demonstrates the asset pricing role of PUB
shocks. Section 1.2 discusses the main implications of the model. To investigate how
public investment is reflected in asset prices, Section 1.3 takes to data a factor pricing
model derived from this GE theory, and Section 1.4 conducts a portfolio analysis using
a sample of U.S. government contractors. Section 1.5 concludes. Appendix A and A
provide supplementary details and results.
infrastructure in particular. Cellini, Ferreira and Rothstein (2010) study public school facilities investment.
Allen and Arkolakis (2019) examine transportation infrastructure. McGraw (2018) focuses specifically on
airline hubs.
11This approach has been used to study various issues, including globalization (Barrot, Loualiche and
Sauvagnat, 2019), inequality (Johnson, 2012), market-wide liquidity (Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003), financial
intermediary leverage (Adrian, Etula and Muir, 2014; He, Kelly and Manela, 2017), macro uncertainty and
volatility (Dew-Becker, Giglio and Kelly, 2019), and technological growth (Garleanu et al., 2012).
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1.1 Model
In this section, I lay out a two-sector general equilibrium model that establishes the link
between the over- or under-supply of public sector capital and asset prices. I also outline
the main steps in deriving the solution.
1.1.1 Setup
I consider a two-sector production economy cast in continuous time with an infinite hori-
zon. An infinitely lived representative agent with recursive preferences presides over
this economy, whose objective is to maximize her expected lifetime utility. The private
and public sectors—denoted by p and g, respectively—accumulate capital independently.
A single type of good is produced via an aggregate production technology with capital
from both sectors as inputs. This produced good can be either consumed right away or
transformed into capital and installed in either sector. Figure 1.2 provides a schematic
representation of the basic model structure. Details on each element are provided next.
Figure 1.2: Schematic model structure.
Aggregate production. I consider an aggregate production technology that employs
private and public sector capital as separate inputs. It produces a final good at a rate of Yt
















in which Kpt and K
g
t denote the stocks of private and public sector capital, respectively.
The parameter α determines the output-maximizing allocation of capital between the pri-
vate and public sectors, m the scale, and s the elasticity of substitution. 12
12If s → 0, private and public sector capital become perfect complements. If s → 1, this function con-
9
It is worth mentioning that, to model government’s contribution to production, exist-
ing studies consider either the current flow of government spending (e.g., Barro, 1990)
or the accumulated stock of public sector capital (e.g., Baxter and King, 1993) as an addi-
tional input into the production function. Because the government input considered here
is intended to represent productive capital such as infrastructure, I adopt the accumulated
stock approach.
For the convenience of exposition as well as equilibrium characterization, I conduct a
change of variables. I define Kt ≡ (Kpt +K
g
t ) as the aggregate stock of capital, and χt ≡
Kgt
Kt
as the fraction accounted for by public sector capital. Accordingly, the output rate Yt can












M(χt) has an interior maximum—that is, ∃χ∗ such that M(χ∗) ≥ M(χ) for ∀χ ∈
(0, 1). At the maximum, the marginal products of private and public sector capital, which
are given by
rpt = −χtM
′(χt) + M(χt) r
g
t = (1− χt)M
′(χt) + M(χt), (1.3)
are equalized. 13 Thus, for a given amount of aggregate capital Kt, the maximum output
is attained when a certain fraction χ∗ of capital is allocated to the public sector; having
either too much or too little public sector capital would lead to less output.





























t are investment-capital ratios, and δ is the depreciation
verges to the popular Cobb-Douglas function. If s → ∞, private and public sector capital become perfect
substitutes.












= −χt M′(χt) + M(χt)
which is rpt . A similar calculation gives r
g










rate. 14 As is standard in the literature, I assume that capital investment incurs adjustment
costs: investing in sector i ∈ {p, g} at a rate of ιitKit per unit of time can sustain an expected
capital growth rate of φ(ιit) before depreciation. Function φ(·), which satisfies φ′(·) > 0
and φ′′(·) < 0, represents a classic investment technology with adjustment costs. 15 It
imposes higher costs on rapid changes to capital.
I consider two mutually independent Wiener processes, Z and W, as sources of exoge-
nous shocks that drive capital accumulation and allocation. Without loss of generality, I
assume that: (1) σp1,t = σ
g
1,t = (1− χt)σt; (2) σ
p
2,t = χtς and σ
g
2,t = (1− χt)ς. As a result, I
obtain the processes for Kt and χt:
dKt
Kt
= [(1− χt)φ(ιpt ) + χtφ(ι
g
t )− δ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
µK,t
dt + (1− χt)σt︸ ︷︷ ︸
σK,t
dZt
dχt = χt(1− χt)[φ(ιgt )− φ(ι
p
t )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
µχ,t




I allow uncertainty σt to vary over time according to
dσt = κ(σ̄− σt)dt + ν
√
σtdZσt , (1.6)
where κ controls the speed of mean-reversion, σ̄ is the long-run mean, and ν governs the
variability of σt. I introduce another Wiener process Zσ to generate uncertainty shocks. I
assume dZt · dZσt = ρKσdt with ρKσ < 0 in all cases; this is in accordance with the sugges-
tion of Bloom et al. (2018), who argue that recessions are best modeled as a combination
of negative first-moment shocks (dZt) and positive second-moment shocks (dZσt ).
This setting permits a clear interpretation of the shock processes. Innovations in pro-
cess Z capture standard technology shocks that affect general economic (capital) growth.
Innovations in process Zσ are uncertainty shocks that alter the variability of economic
conditions. Innovations in process W represent capital (re)allocation shocks that drive
the relative shares of private and public sector capital. In particular, a positive realization
of dW increases public sector capital accumulation while leads to an equivalent reduc-
tion in private sector capital accumulation; it accords with Aschauer (1989a)’s finding of
a complete crowding-out of private by public sector capital. The asset pricing role of
W-shocks is my primary interest; I will refer to them as PUB shocks hereafter.
14I use the same depreciation rate for private and public sector capital because data are generally unavail-
able to produce a comprehensive measure of government inventory depreciation (U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis, 2019). Besides, this parameter has little impact on my results.





Preferences and resource constraint. The representative agent has recursive preferences
with the time discount β, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) ψ, and the rela-















where Et is an expectation operator conditional on time-t information. As is well known,
recursive preferences allow a separation between the EIS and the RRA. The agent’s objec-





t = M(χt)Kt. (1.8)
Discussion. Two critical assumptions of the model merit further discussion. First, I
assume that augmenting the stock of public sector capital raises the marginal product
of private sector capital, and vice versa. This assumption, which underpins the CES
production function (1.1), stems from a substantial literature on the productivity effect
of public investment. In particular, the seminal work by Aschauer (1989a,b) finds that
public sector capital has nontrivial influence on aggregate productivity: increasing the
stock of public sector capital contributes to the marginal product of private sector capital.
His finding has gained traction in the literature, and subsequent studies generally come
to the same conclusion (despite some disputes on the magnitude of the effects). 16 17
Second, I postulate a risk-mitigating role for the public sector. Under this assumption,
an expansion in the share of public sector capital (χt) reduces the aggregate volatility,
(1− χt)σt. This risk-mitigating assumption is motivated by the literature on government
size and macroeconomic stability (Gali, 1994; Fatas and Mihov, 2001). In particular, Fatas
and Mihov (2001) document a strong negative correlation between government size and
macroeconomic variability; the results hold regardless of the measures and are robust
both for OECD countries and across states in the U.S.. With these two assumptions, the
model captures two important considerations—that is, the influence on productivity and
stability—in determining the appropriate supply of public sector capital.
16See, for example, Munnell (1992); Holtz-Eakin (1994); Arslanalp, Bornhorst, Gupta and Sze (2010).
17Anecdotal evidence suggests that the productive role of public sector capital continues to be relevant.
For example, Gopalswamy and Rathinam (2018) propose a new approach to autonomous driving that in-
volves upgrading the road infrastructure. They argue that, by taking some responsibility off the shoulders
of car manufacturers, this approach can “accelerate the deployment of autonomous driving and corre-
spondingly reap its benefits.”
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1.1.2 Solution
I solve the model in two steps. First, I obtain the optimal consumption-investment policy
by working out the central planning problem. Then I derive equilibrium conditions that
connect macro quantities to prices. Substituting the optimal policy into the equilibrium
conditions enables me to express all quantities and prices as functions of the state vari-
ables. The following summarizes the key solution steps; omitted details and proofs are
given in Appendix.
Central planning. In this model, the state of the economy can be summarized by three
variables: the aggregate capital stock Kt, the share of public sector capital χt, and the
level of economic uncertainty σt. The first variable merely controls the scale of the econ-
omy, while the last two are the effective state variables that determine economic prospects
(or, equivalently, investment opportunities). Providing the current state of the economy,
the representative agent chooses the consumption-investment policy to maximize her ex-
pected lifetime utility








subject to (1.5) and (1.6) as well as (1.8). The model is homogeneous in scale, so I conjec-
ture that the representative agent’s value function takes the form of
V(χt, σt, Kt) =
(ξtKt)1−γ
1− γ , (1.9)
where ξt ≡ ξ(χt, σt) is a function to be determined. I interpret ξt as a welfare multi-
plier that gauges the influence of future economic prospects on the ex ante lifetime utility.
Good economic prospects—that is, an optimal allocation of capital and low economic
uncertainty—contribute to a large ξt, meaning that the agent expects to derive a higher
lifetime utility given the current stock of capital. The process followed by ξt can be ob-
tained using Ito’s lemma:
dξt
ξt











2,t} are determined in equilibrium. The HJB equation associated with
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the central planning problem is given by
β






+ µK,t + µξ,t −
γ
2





+ (1− γ)[ρKσ(1− χt)σtσξ1,t],
(1.11)
where I define ct ≡ [M(χt) − ιpt (1 − χt) − ι
g
t χt] as the consumption-capital ratio. The










ξt − χt ∂χξt
.18 (1.12)
In the benchmark case, I posit a constant public investment rate, ιgt = ι
g, which renders the
expected growth of public sector capital irresponsive to changing economic conditions.
This is motivated by the fact that the average growth of public sector investment has been
fairly stable over time (see Figure A.4). 19 Combining (1.11) and (1.12) gives a system of
partial differential equations on ξ(χt, σt) that is solved using an iterative method. The
details of this procedure are given in Appendix A. With the solution for ξ(χt, σt), the
optimal private investment policy ιp(χt, σt) can be obtained.
Lastly, the equilibrium pricing kernel is a function of the state variables (its exact ex-
pression is in Appendix A)
Λt ≡ Λ(χt, σt, Kt), (1.13)
and its law of motion is given by
dΛt
Λt
= −rtdt− ηKt dZt − ησt dZσt − η
χ
t dWt, (1.14)




t } represent the risk prices for process
18The partial derivative ∂
nY
∂X1X2...Xn
is denoted by ∂X1X2...XnY.
19As a comparison, I also solved the model under the Pareto-optimal public investment policy, which is






































Consider an asset that is priced by this equilibrium pricing kernel, its expected excess
return can be broken down into three components:












dt (PUB risk premium)
+ Et[dRt · dσt]
−∂σΛt
Λt
dt (uncertainty risk premium)
+ Et[dRt · dKt/Kt]
−Kt ∂KΛt
Λt
dt (productivity risk premium)
(1.16)
The first component captures the PUB risk premium that stems from the over- or under-
supply of public sector capital. Intuitively, if public sector capital is undersupplied, then
PUB shocks would push the capital allocation toward optimum, thereby decreasing the
agent’s marginal utility (that is, ∂χΛt < 0). In this case, an asset with higher loadings
on PUB shocks (that is, higher Et[dRt · dχt]) would be considered risky and thus have
to deliver a higher risk premium as compensation. The second and third components
capture the uncertainty and productivity risk premiums, respectively. They arise because
both uncertainty shocks and aggregate technology shocks are drivers of the agent’s utility.
In sum, this equilibrium pricing kernel Λt implies a three-factor structure that embeds
PUB shocks, uncertainty shocks, and general economic growth shocks.
1.2 Model Implications
In this section, I analyze the equilibrium behavior of the model and discuss its main im-
plications. In a nutshell, the model demonstrates that (1) the supply of public sector
capital affects the agent’s utility; (2) the price of risk for PUB shocks changes sign when
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public sector capital becomes over- or under-supplied; (3) the public sector investment
share is positively correlated with its capital share; (4) the Pareto-optimal public invest-
ment policy dictates a higher public sector investment rate when public sector capital is
undersupplied.
Value function. For a given amount of aggregate capital Kt, the agent’s value function,
as shown in (1.9), is driven by ξt. As meontioned before, one can interpret ξt as a wel-
fare multiplier that reflects the agent’s perception of future economic prospects: good
(bad) economic prospects correspond to a higher (lower) ξt. Panel (a) in Figure 1.3 plots
ξ as a function of the public sector capital share χ. One can see that ξ is hump-shaped
with respect to χ, meaning the agent considers economic prospects to be better when the
public sector capital share is neither too high nor too low. This property mainly stems
from the assumption that private and public sector capital bear a certain degree of com-
plementarity in the aggregate production. As a result of this assumption, the maximum
production is achieved when the supply of public sector capital is at an optimal level with
its marginal product equal to that of private sector capital; any deviation from this level
(e.g., having too much or too little public sector capital) would lead to lower output for
a given amount of aggregate capital. In addition, varying uncertainty can also affect the
agent’s perception of economic prospects and alter her preferred level of public sector
capital. In particular, higher uncertainty would hurt economic prospects and increase the
agent’s demand for public sector capital. In any case, from the agent’s perspective, public
sector capital is undersupplied when ∂χξt > 0, and oversupplied when ∂χξt < 0.
Price of risk for PUB shocks. Knowing the property of ξ, it becomes easier to under-
stand the behavior of the risk prices. In particular, panel (b) in Figure 1.3 plots ηχt , the
price of risk for PUB shocks, as a function of the public sector capital share χ. Clearly, ηχ
turns positive (negative) when χ becomes too low (high). This change-of-sign behavior












Under the baseline calibration (i.e., γ = 9 and ψ = 2), the sign of ηχ is primarily deter-
mined by ∂χξt: loosely speaking, when public sector capital is undersupplied (∂χξt > 0),
the price of risk for PUB shocks (ηχ) becomes positive, and vice versa. The intuition is as
follows. When public sector capital is undersupplied, a PUB shock, which expands the
share of public sector capital (χ), would lead to better economic prospects as perceived
by the agent. So in this case, assets with high loadings on PUB shocks are considered
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(a) ξ , welfare multiplier (b) ηχ , price of risk for PUB shocks
Figure 1.3: Value function and the price of risk for PUB shocks. This figure plots against
the public sector capital share (χ) the welfare multiplier (ξ) and the price of risk for PUB
shocks (ηχ) while holding the level of uncertainty (σ) at σ̄ (solid line), and 0.05 (dashed
line). The solid vertical line indicates the steady-state value of χ.
risky and have to provide higher risk premia. When public sector capital is oversupplied,
however, a PUB shock would lead to worse economic prospects. Assets with high load-
ings on PUB shocks, in this case, provide valuable hedges and hence should have lower
risk premia.
Public sector investment. Panel (a) in Figure 1.4 displays the public sector investment
share ( I
g
Ip+Ig ), which is positively correlated with the share of public sector capital. This is
mainly driven by capital adjustment costs, which tie the movements of these two ratios
together. This property underpins my empirical investigation in which I use innovations
in the public sector investment share as a proxy for shocks to the share of public sector
capital. Finally, panel (b) in Figure 1.4 compares the constant public investment rule with
the Pareto-optimal rule. Clearly, the Pareto-optimal rule dictates a higher (lower) public
sector investment rate when public sector capital is undersupplied (oversupplied). So in
the context of my model, welfare can be improved if the government varies its investment
policy in response to changing economic conditions, targeting a higher (lower) expected




Ip+Ig , public sector investment share (b) ι
g , public sector investment rate
Figure 1.4: Public sector investment. This figure plots against the public sector capital
share (χ) the public sector investment share ( I
g
Ip+Ig ) and the public sector investment rate
(ιg). The model is solved under the constant public investment rule (solid line) as well
as the Pareto-optimal rule (dashed line). The solid vertical line indicates the steady-state
value of χ.
1.3 Empirical Investigation: Regression-Based Approach
In this section, I empirically investigate whether and how PUB shocks are priced. The
GE theory developed above has demonstrated how the share of public sector capital may
enter the pricing kernel and thus become a risk factor relevant to asset pricing. Guided
by this theory, I propose a three-factor asset pricing model with PUB shocks, uncertainty
shocks, and the market excess return as risk factors; they represent innovations to those
three state variables that govern the GE pricing kernel (1.13). In what follows I confront
this factor model with a variety of test assets.
1.3.1 Primary variables and risk factors
I start by defining main variables and explaining the construction of risk factors. Other
variables are introduced later when they enter my analysis.
Investment. The measurements of private and public sector investments come from the
National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) data provided by the U.S. Bureau of Eco-
nomic Analysis (BEA). I follow Belo and Yu (2013) in defining private sector investment as
the seasonally adjusted private fixed nonresidential investment (NIPA: Table 1.1.5, line
9), and public sector investment as the seasonally adjusted government nondefense invest-
18
ment (NIPA: Table 3.9.5, line 3 minus line 19). I define national investment as the sum of
private and public sector investments per Aschauer (1989a), and the public sector invest-
ment share as the ratio of public sector investment to national investment. All variables
are in real terms (deflated by corresponding price indexes) with quarterly observations
that span the period 1947Q1 to 2018Q4.
Economic uncertainty. The measure of economic uncertainty is from Jurado, Ludvigson
and Ng (2015). They construct comprehensive and model-free macroeconomic uncer-
tainty indexes that capture the common variation in uncertainty among a variety of eco-
nomic indicators. 20 This measure is well-suited for the study of aggregate uncertainty
and its comovement with other variables. I pick their 1-month-ahead macro uncertainty
index and aggregate it to a quarterly frequency (by simple average). The resulting mea-
sure spans the period 1960Q3 to 2018Q4.
It is worth mentioning that economic uncertainty is difficult to quantify. Researchers
have taken various approaches to measure it, resulting in a variety of uncertainty indica-
tors yet little consensus on which one is the best (Caldara et al., 2016). The only agreement
on this matter is probably that uncertainty is countercyclical (Bloom, 2014). That said, I
choose the JLN measure for good reason: it has relatively long sample period and also
possesses more predictive content than other measures. 21
Constructing risk factors. Figure 1.1 plots the public sector investment share as well
as the JLN uncertainty index. From these two variables, I construct two risk factors, de-
noted by PubFac and UncFac, as shocks to the public sector capital share (PUB shocks)
and economic uncertainty, respectively. They are defined as innovations in the AR(1) rep-
resentation of the public sector investment share and the JLN uncertainty index. For con-
venience, I standardize PubFac and UncFac to unit variance. Together with the market
excess return, these factors constitute the three-factor model that underpins my subse-
quent analysis.
Figure 1.5 displays the time series of PubFac and UncFac. Both factors seem counter-
cyclical because they often witness sizeable positive spikes during recessions. Most no-
tably, in the Great Recession, UncFac reached its nadir at the height of the crisis. PubFac
also showed a big increase, especially at the passage of the American Recovery and Rein-
20Specifically, Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng (2015) define individual uncertainty as the conditional volatility
of the forecast error for each indicator. They estimate the forecast error by fitting a diffusion index model
to the time series of these indicators. Then, with the estimated forecast error, they infer its conditional
volatility using a stochastic volatility model. The final products, the macroeconomic uncertainty indexes,
are constructed by aggregating together these individual uncertainty measures.
21Caldara, Fuentes-Albero, Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2016) conduct a “horse race” exercise, demonstrating
that the JLN measure is more informative about future economic activity.
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vestment Act (ARRA), a fiscal stimulus bill that includes large public sector investment.
Figure 1.5: Risk factors. This figure plots two risk factors denoted by PubFac and UncFac,
which are defined as innovations in the AR(1) representations of the public sector investment
share and economic uncertainty, respectively. PubFac and UncFac are standardized to unit vari-
ance. Shaded areas indicate U.S. recessions defined by NBER.
Table 1.1 documents the correlations of PubFac and UncFac with a selection of eco-
nomic indicators. Both PubFac and UncFac are negatively related to GDP growth and
positively related to changes in the unemployment rate, confirming the countercyclicality
of the public sector investment share and economic uncertainty. PubFac positively cor-
relates with government consumption and the fiscal deficit (relative to GDP), suggesting
that a higher public sector investment share tends to coincide with increased government
consumption and a larger deficit.
1.3.2 Empirical approach
To examine the asset pricing role of PUB shocks, I follow a standard two-pass regression
approach. The first pass estimates the betas (that is, exposure to risks) for each test asset i
via a time-series regression of the asset’s excess returns, rei,t, on the risk factors:
rei,t = ai + f
′
t βi + ξi,t , t = 1, ..., T
where f is a vector of risk factors, and βi is a vector of betas (to be estimated) for asset i.
The second pass estimates the risk prices via a cross-sectional regression of assets’ (time-
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Table 1.1: Risk factors’ correlations with common economic indicators. This table
presents the correlations of two risk factors, PubFac and UncFac—which are defined as innova-
tions in the AR(1) representations of the public sector investment share and economic uncertainty,
respectively— with a selection of economic indicators including: the market excess return (from
Ken French’s website); the growth (log change) of GDP (NIPA: Table 1.1.5, line 1) and government
nondefense consumption (NIPA: Table 3.9.5, line 2 minus line 18), both of which are in real terms;
and the changes in civilian unemployment rate (from FRED) and the deficit-to-GDP ratio (NIPA:




Market excess return 0.16 -0.23
GDP (log change) -0.16 -0.37
Unemployment rate (change) 0.36 0.20
Govt. consumption (log change) 0.13 0.06
Deficit/GDP (change) 0.26 0.14
series) average excess returns on their estimated betas:
rei = α + β
′
i λ + εi , i = 1, ..., N
where rei is the unconditional mean excess return for asset i, βi denotes the estimated
betas from the first pass, and λ is a vector of risk prices to be estimated. My primary
factor model consists of PubFac, UncFac, and the market excess return ( f = [PubFac,
UncFac, MktR f ]), while I also consider the Fama and French (1993) model ( f = [SMB,
HML, MktR f ]) as a comparison.
This regression approach is standard and widely commended for its transparency, but
like any other approach, it has limitations. A well-known one is that betas are estimated
via time-series regressions and hence are inaccurate by definition. This is particularly
relevant when nontraded factors are used (as is the case here), because, if a nontraded
factor contains substantial noise, the estimated betas will be understated while the corre-
sponding risk prices overstated. To assess the extent to which this limitation bites, I use
Shanken (1992)’s correction to adjust standard errors, checking if it makes a big difference.
Another limitation is that implicit in this approach is a presumption of constant betas for
each asset, whereby the estimated λ gives the time-series averages of risk prices. One can
reasonably argue that this presumption is untenable, but relaxing it requires more sophis-
ticated estimators or granular data; both seem beyond reach at this point. So I leave for
future research the exploration of alternative approaches.
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Test assets. For test assets I consider a wide range of standard equity portfolios formed
on size, BM, momentum, investment, and profitability. These portfolios are known to
exhibit sizeable differences in average returns (Fama and French, 2015). 22 Besides, I
also consider portfolios formed on past exposure to PubFac. Specifically, at each quarter
end, I sort stocks in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database 23 by
their past exposure to PubFac (or βPub) and then stratify them into decile portfolios. I
obtain the pre-formation βPub for each stock via a rolling regression of its excess returns
on PubFac, UncFac, and the market excess return with a 40-quarter trailing window (I
require at least 32 quarters of data); the pre-formation βPub is measured by the coefficient
on PubFac. These portfolios are rebalanced every quarter, and their returns are computed
as the value-weighted averages of their constituent stocks’ returns.
1.3.3 Results
I start by pricing 25 size and value sorted portfolios with my primary factor model, com-
paring it with the Fama and French (1993) model; Table 1.2 presents the results. Panel
(a) reports the mean excess returns and the estimated betas for all portfolios. Consistent
with the literature, average return generally falls from small stocks to big stocks while
rises from growth stocks to value stocks. As for betas, an interesting observation is that
exposure to PUB shocks seems to negatively correlate with size: small stocks tend to be
more sensitive to variations in the public sector investment share. Similar patterns can be
found in almost every investment, profitability, and momentum quintile, as shown in Ta-
ble A.5. This implies that augmenting public sector capital is likely to benefit small firms
more than big firms. 24
Panel (b) reports the estimated risk prices and several test diagnostics. The price of
risk for PUB shocks (λPub), which is my main focus, is positive and statistically significant.
The t-statistics, whether based on Fama and MacBeth (1973) standard errors adjusted for
autocorrelation or ordinary least squares (OLS) standard errors adjusted for beta estima-
tion errors per Shanken (1992), are both above 2. The economic magnitude of λPub is also
sizeable at 1.06% per quarter. With PUB betas ranging from -0.43 to 0.95 for this group
22I do not consider other asset classes like corporate bonds and derivatives because, according to Adrian,
Etula and Muir (2014) and He, Kelly and Manela (2017), financial intermediaries tend to be the marginal
investors in these more sophisticated asset markets rather than households.
23I only include stocks with share codes 10 or 11 and listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ.
24Anecdotal evidence also supports the idea that small firms may benefit more from greater public sector
investment. A good example is the construction industry, an undoubted beneficiary that has “the largest
small business concentration of any industry” (Mills, 2014). According to The Economist (2017), the con-
struction industry has highly fragmented structure: “less than 5% of builders work for construction firms
that employ over 10,000 workers.”
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of assets, this amounts to a roughly 6(≈ 1.38× 1.06× 4) percent differential in expected
annual returns. (As a reference point, the range of the mean excess returns across these
assets is about 9 percent per year.) This result points to PUB shocks as good news from
investors’ perspective, as they demand higher returns from assets that load more posi-
tively on PUB shocks. Thus an expansion in public sector investment (relative to private)
is likely to accompany a favorable shift in investors’ welfare.
The pricing performance of my factor model is modestly strong. The mean absolute
pricing error (MAPE) is low at 0.28% per quarter, while the adjusted R2 is moderate at
51%. The χ2 statistic is at a particularly low level of 20.50, indicating that the hypothesis
of zero joint pricing errors across assets is not rejected. These statistics are close to that
for the Fama and French (1993) model reported in panel (c), which is pretty impressive
given the fact that the Fama and French (1993) model is statistically tailored to price this
cross section while my factor model is theoretically motivated. However, I do not want
to stretch too far because the estimation also reveals a large intercept (α) that indicates a
certain degree of misspecification. (The same problem attends the Fama-French model.)
So I conduct more tests to check the robustness of these findings.
Robustness: other assets. Next, I confront my primary model with more test assets
and see how it fares. The results, reported in Table 1.3, echo and strengthen the previous
findings. The risk price for PubFac remains positive and statistically significant across
different sets of test assets. This is true even when all portfolios are included in the tests.
Interestingly, in an unreported result, I find in this larger cross section that my primary
model provides a better fit (in terms of higher R2) relative to the Fama and French (1993)
model. This finding is also mirrored in Figure 1.6, which plots the realized mean excess
returns on all portfolios against their model-implied counterparts. When priced by my
primary model, these assets line up closer to the 45-degree line.
In summary, a theoretically founded factor model that includes PubFac, UncFac, and
the market excess return performs fairly well in pricing a wide range of standard equity
portfolios. The estimated risk price for PUB shocks is consistently positive and significant.
This finding suggests that increases in the share of public sector investment tend to concur
with better welfare for investors.
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(a) Primary model (b) Fama and French (1993) model
Figure 1.6: Realized versus model-implied mean excess returns. This figure compares
the realized versus the model-implied mean excess returns for all test assets including 25 size
and value sorted portfolios, 10 βPub sorted portfolios, 10 momentum portfolios, 10 investment
portfolios, and 10 profitability portfolios. Two factor models are considered: the primary model
displayed in panel (a) consists of PubFac, UncFac, and MktR f ; the Fama and French (1993) model
displayed in panel (b) consists of SMB, HML, and MktR f . The sample is quarterly and spans the
period 1969Q1 to 2018Q4.
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Table 1.2: Two-pass asset pricing analysis: 25 Size-BM equity portfolios. This table
presents the results of a two-pass asset pricing analysis. Panel (a) reports the test assets’ mean
quarterly excess returns (rei ) and estimated betas. The latter are obtained by running a time-series
regression specified as rei,t = ai + f
′
t β i + ξi,t for each asset i, where r
e
i,t is the asset’s excess return,
f t represents a vector of risk factors, and βi denotes a vector of beta estimates. Panel (b) reports
the risk prices estimated from a cross-sectional regression of test assets’ mean excess returns on
estimated betas, that is, rei = α + β
′
i λ + εi. The t-statistics are based on either Fama and MacBeth
(1973) standard errors with Newey and West (1987) correction (one lag) or ordinary least squares
(OLS) standard errors with Shanken (1992) correction. Also reported are test diagnostics includ-
ing mean absolute pricing error (MAPE), adjusted R2, and a χ2 statistic along with the p-value
that tests whether the pricing errors are jointly zero. The primary factor model comprises PubFac,
UncFac and the market excess return. The test assets include 25 size and value sorted equity port-
folios. The sample is quarterly and spans the period 1960Q4 to 2018Q4. As a comparison, panel
(c) reports the analogous statistics for the Fama and French (1993) model.
(a) Mean excess returns and betas by asset
Size
Small Big Small Big
rei βPub
BM
Growth 0.89 1.41 1.45 1.83 1.50 0.63 0.43 0.32 0.33 -0.02
2.25 2.26 2.34 1.83 1.64 0.77 0.95 0.13 0.26 -0.04
2.26 2.52 2.16 2.11 1.71 0.54 0.52 0.20 0.01 -0.43
2.93 2.71 2.57 2.51 1.50 0.86 0.93 0.38 0.26 0.01
Value 3.20 2.93 2.95 2.48 2.05 0.68 0.23 0.83 0.50 -0.38
βUnc βMkt
BM
Growth 0.50 0.52 0.30 0.50 -0.06 1.57 1.49 1.37 1.27 1.00
0.06 0.03 -0.19 -0.16 0.15 1.32 1.21 1.13 1.07 0.90
-0.49 -0.28 -0.11 -0.54 -0.16 1.16 1.09 1.01 0.99 0.79
-0.07 -0.22 -0.38 -0.30 -0.70 1.08 1.03 0.98 0.96 0.85
Value -0.84 -0.27 0.15 -0.77 0.35 1.14 1.11 1.02 1.07 0.95
(b) Risk prices and test diagnostics
λPub λUnc λMkt α Test diagnostics
Coefficient 1.06 -0.35 -1.61 3.52 MAPE 0.28 χ2 20.50
[t-FMNW] [3.80] [-1.55] [-1.61] [3.98] Adj. R2 0.51 p-value 0.55
[t-Shanken] [2.16] [-0.92] [-1.03] [2.33]
(c) Comparison with the Fama and French (1993) model
λSMB λHML λMkt α Test diagnostics
Coefficient 0.39 1.06 -1.74 3.41 MAPE 0.22 χ2 58.12
[t-FMNW] [1.08] [2.64] [-1.67] [3.71] Adj. R2 0.67 p-value 0.00
[t-Shanken] [1.08] [2.83] [-1.61] [3.65]
25
Table 1.3: Two-pass asset pricing analysis: other portfolios. This table presents the results
of a two-pass asset pricing analysis. The procedure and relevant statistics are described in more
detail in Table 1.2. Panel (a) summarizes the test assets’ mean (quarterly) excess returns and es-
timated betas. µ[·] and σ[·] denote the cross-sectional mean and standard deviation, respectively.
Panel (b) reports the estimated risk prices. The factor model comprises PubFac, UncFac and the
market excess return. The test assets are 25 size and value sorted equity portfolios (Column 1)
plus 10 βPub sorted portfolios (Column 2), or 10 momentum portfolios (Column 3), or 10 invest-
ment portfolios (Column 4), or 10 profitability portfolios (Column 5), or all 65 portfolios together
(Column 6). The sample is quarterly and spans the period 1969Q1 to 2018Q4; the start is dictated
by the βPub portfolios.
(a) Mean excess returns and betas by asset
SZBM25 PUB10 MOM10 INV10 OP10 All
µ[re] 2.16 2.24 1.41 1.69 1.45 1.74
σ[re] 0.58 0.24 0.97 0.41 0.39 0.63
µ[βPub] 0.36 0.21 0.16 0.06 -0.01 0.25
σ[βPub] 0.38 0.40 0.39 0.40 0.24 0.46
µ[βUnc] -0.12 -0.03 -0.25 -0.07 0.00 -0.08
σ[βUnc] 0.38 0.30 0.51 0.15 0.22 0.37
µ[βMkt] 1.10 0.99 1.04 0.99 1.02 1.05
σ[βMkt] 0.19 0.12 0.20 0.16 0.13 0.17
µ[R2] 0.77 0.85 0.81 0.88 0.90 0.83
Quarters 200 200 200 200 200 200








λPub 0.81 0.67 0.80 0.72 0.82 0.67
[t-FMNW] [3.18] [3.04] [2.83] [2.81] [3.14] [2.88]
[t-Shanken] [2.11] [2.22] [1.79] [1.96] [2.09] [2.03]
λUnc 0.01 0.07 0.64 -0.17 -0.09 0.51
[t-FMNW] [0.05] [0.27] [2.37] [-0.86] [-0.44] [2.12]
[t-Shanken] [0.04] [0.21] [1.70] [-0.66] [-0.32] [1.66]
λMkt -2.59 -2.31 -3.14 -2.09 -2.37 -2.60
[t-FMNW] [-2.32] [-2.27] [-3.00] [-2.04] [-2.28] [-2.72]
[t-Shanken] [-1.74] [-1.83] [-2.15] [-1.61] [-1.69] [-2.14]
α 4.35 4.20 4.92 3.79 4.02 4.36
[t-FMNW] [4.38] [5.01] [5.59] [4.45] [4.64] [5.84]
[t-Shanken] [3.02] [3.75] [3.59] [3.19] [3.11] [4.11]
MAPE 0.25 0.26 0.38 0.24 0.26 0.36
Adj. R2 0.56 0.39 0.42 0.59 0.57 0.38
χ2 28.43 74.51 44.53 38.59 38.81 160.71
p-value 0.16 0.00 0.07 0.20 0.19 0.00
26
1.4 Empirical Investigation: Portfolio-Based Approach
The regression-based approach has its limitations (as already mentioned) that might raise
concerns about the validity of its results. So in this section, I provide additional evidence
via a portfolio-based approach using a sample of U.S. government contractors. The idea
is as follows. I postulate that firms with heavier reliance on sales to the U.S. govern-
ment load more positively on PUB shocks. Thereby if the price of risk for PUB shocks
is positive, high-dependency firms should carry higher risk premiums compared to low-
dependency firms. This is exactly what I find.
1.4.1 Sample construction and portfolio formation
From the CRSP/Compustat Merged (CCM) database, I collect a sample of U.S. govern-
ment contractors. Using their stocks I form portfolios based on the extent of their depen-
dency on government customers for revenue.
Identifying government contractors. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (1997)
requires firms to report their sales to major customers including the U.S. government
(federal, state, and local). 25 This information, which is in the Compustat Customer Seg-
ment file, together with other accounting information from the Compustat Fundamental
Annual file allows me to compute for each firm-year the fraction of sales accounted for
by government customers (denoted by StG). Every year I define government contractors
as firms that reported positive sales to government at least once over the past three years.
I exclude firms in the healthcare and pharmaceutical industries, the consumer goods and
services industries as well as the defense industry, because transactions between these
firms and government, if any, are more likely to stem from other types of government
spending than public sector investment. For example, healthcare and pharmaceutical
companies have business connections with government mainly because of their involve-
ments in social security programs such as Medicaid and Medicare (Goldman, 2019). Gov-
ernment purchases from consumer goods and services firms are more likely to be cate-
gorized as government consumption rather than investment. As for firms in the defense
25The Financial Accounting Standards Board (1997) dictates that “an enterprise shall provide information
about the extent of its reliance on its major customers. If revenues from transactions with a single external
customer amount to 10 percent or more of an enterprise’s revenues, the enterprise shall disclose that fact,
the total amount of revenues from each such customer ... For purposes of this Statement, ... the federal
government, a state government, a local government (for example, a county or municipality), or a foreign
government each shall be considered as a single customer.” (para. 39)
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industry, their transactions with government apparently come from defense spending.
After this exclusion (and other standard filters), I find 1,242 government contractors with
9,944 firm-year observations spanning 1980 to 2017; these firms are mainly from the con-
struction and manufacturing industries (with SIC between 1500 and 3999). 26
Panel (a) in Table 1.4 provides summary statistics for this sample of government con-
tractors. As shown, there is substantial variation in StG. The median government con-
tractor has 18.5% of its sales generated by government customers. About a quarter of
government contractors derive more (less) than 45% (5%) of their sales revenue from gov-
ernment. For a tenth of government contractors, sales to government account for more
than 75% of their total sales. Regarding other firm characteristics, the average govern-
ment contractor has a book-to-market ratio of 0.72 and market leverage of 0.21; its book
value of assets (total sales) grows 14.7% (14.1%) year-on-year; its profitability ratio and
return on assets are 0.16 and 0.3%, respectively. These numbers are similar to those in
Goldman (2019), who reported, for a sample of government contractors in 2005 and 2006,
an average sales growth of 19%, return on assets of -3.1%, and leverage of 0.23.
Forming portfolios on government dependency. Using these government contractors’
stocks (which are ordinary common shares listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ), I
form portfolios based on the extent to which they depend on government customers for
revenue. Every year I measure a firm’s government dependency by StG−2,0 , a three-year
trailing average of StG. 27 Following the convention in the literature, I form stock port-
folios at the end of June in each year t based on the quintiles of government dependency
computed for the previous year (that is, StGt−3→t−1). I also consider a zero-investment
portfolio that is long stocks in the highest-dependency quintile and short stocks in the
lowest-dependency quintile. These portfolios are held from July of year t to June of year
t + 1, by which time the next formation happens. The first set of portfolios were formed
in 1981, and the last in 2018.
Panel (b) in Table 1.4 compares firms in different government dependency portfo-
lios. Unsurprisingly, high-dependency firms tend to have high StG in the year before
formation. In other aspects, however, firms are similar across portfolios. Although firms
with the highest dependency are somewhat smaller and have slightly lower leverage and
26Appendix A provides more details on the sample construction.
27I choose this moving-average measure for good reason. First, a firm only needs to report its sales to
government customers when that accounts for more than 10% of its total sales in a fiscal year. For years
with no reported sales to government, StG is zero though the real value can be larger than that. Also,
there are some data errors as noted by Goldman (2019). For example, occasionally foreign governments are
mistaken for the U.S. government, and the U.S. government agencies are mistaken for private companies.
Using a moving average can help smooth out, at least in part, some of these data omissions and errors.
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higher asset growth and operating profitability compared to firms with the lowest depen-
dency, the differences are minor. This is confirmed by Figure A.1, which uses box plots
to compare the distributional properties of firm characteristics across portfolios; it shows
that other firm characteristics are not systematically related to government dependency.
1.4.2 Portfolio analysis
Given these government dependency portfolios, I first establish the link between gov-
ernment dependency and exposure to public sector investment. Then I infer investors’
opinion on public sector investment by comparing the average returns on different de-
pendency portfolios.
Is government dependency a relevant proxy? I hypothesize that the extent of a firm’s
dependency on government is a relevant proxy for its exposure to changes in public sector
investment. Now I provide support for this hypothesis. First, I show that government de-
pendency is persistent. Specifically, I examine whether past dependency predicts future
dependency via a predictive regression specified as
StGi,t+h = αh + βh StGi,t−2→t + εi,t+h (1.17)
where h is the forecast horizon, and StGi,t−2→t is the average fraction of sales to govern-
ment over the past three years ending in year t. If government dependency is persistent,
then βh would be positive and close to one. This is exactly the case. As shown in Table
1.5, at the one-year horizon, a one percentage point increase in StG−2,0 is associated with
a 0.93 percentage point increase in StG; this figure remains high at 0.86 even for the three-
year horizon. It suggests that a firm with high government dependency in the past also
tends to have a large fraction of sales contributed by government in the near future.
Second, I show that high-dependency firms are more sensitive to changes in public
sector investment. I examine the relation between firms’ performance and public sector
investment, and more importantly, whether the magnitude of this relation is greater for
high-dependency firms. I consider the following regression
∇[sales/earnings]i,t+1 = α + β1 StGi,t−2→t + β2 ∇i
g
t+1 + β3 ∇i
g
t+1 × StGi,t−2→t + εt+1
(1.18)
where ∇[sales/earnings]i,t+1 is the sales or earnings (EBITDA) growth for firm i in year
t + 1, and ∇igt+1 is the contemporaneous public sector investment growth. The last two
columns of Table 1.5 report the results. To understand, consider two average firms: one
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from the lowest dependency quintile and another from the highest. The estimated co-
efficients indicate that, for the former (StG−2,0 = 0.03), a one percentage point increase
in the growth rate of public sector investment accompanies a 0.29 (0.10) percentage point
increase in its sales (earnings) growth; whereas for the latter (StG−2,0 = 0.74), the same in-
crease in public sector investment growth is associated with a 1.01 (0.87) percentage point
increase in its sales (earnings) growth. 28 It clearly suggests that firms with higher gov-
ernment dependency are more sensitive to variations in public sector investment. Later,
I also show that high-dependency portfolios have higher βPub, which again supports that
government dependency is a relevant proxy.
Comparing returns on government dependency portfolios Having established the link
between government dependency and exposure to public sector investment for this sam-
ple of government contractors, I then turn to examining the average returns on depen-
dency portfolios. I obtain stock-level data from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) Monthly Stock file. 29 I consider both value- and equal-weighted portfolios.
Panel (a) of Table 1.6 reports the mean excess returns along with the Sharpe ratios
and βPub for value-weighted portfolios over the full sample period (1981-2018). One can
see that stocks in high-dependency portfolios tend to provide higher average returns.
The long-short portfolio (long the highest-dependency portfolio and short the lowest-
dependency portfolio) delivers an average return of 0.62% per month (that is, 7.43% per
year) and has a Sharpe ratio (annualized) of 36.14%. Moreover, this return pattern line
up well with the differences in βPub. Using the estimated price of risk for PUB shocks
(λPub) from Section 1.3, the spread in βPub between the highest- and lowest-dependency
portfolio translates to a return spread of about 8.55% (≈ 3.19× 0.67× 4) per year.
A similar pattern emerges from panel (a) of Table 1.7, where I consider equal-weighted
portfolios; it also reveals a positive relation between government dependency and av-
erage return. The long-short portfolio provides an average return of 0.35% per month
(that is, 4.21% per year) and has a Sharpe ratio of 31.70%. The difference in βPub be-
tween the highest- and lowest-dependency portfolio translates to a return spread of 4.29%
(≈ 1.60× 0.67× 4) per year. These dependency patterns in average returns are graphi-
cally shown in Figure 1.7.
Given these sizable spreads in average returns, a natural question is whether they are
driven by government contractors’ differential loadings on classic risk factors regardless
28The results for earnings growth are not statistically significant at conventional levels, which may be
caused by the fact that earnings growth is much more noisy than sales growth: there are a lot more instances
of missing or negative values for EBITDA than for sales.
29Monthly stock returns are corrected for delisting (Shumway, 1997) and winsorized at 1st and 99th
percentiles. But these adjustments make little difference.
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of their exposure to public sector investment. I address this question by estimating the
portfolio alphas with respect to a set of standard risk factors in the literature, including
the market factor (MKT), the size factor (SMB), and the value factor (HML) from Fama
and French (1993) as well as the momentum factor (MOM) from Carhart (1997) and the
liquidity factor (LIQ) from Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). The results for value-weighted
portfolios are shown in panel (b) of Table 1.6; it confirms that the spread in average returns
between high- and low-dependency firms is not accounted for by loadings on these risk
factors. The long-short portfolio’s alpha is 0.82% monthly with a t-statistic of 2.42. For
equal-weighted portfolios the conclusion is the same: the dependency premium cannot
be explained by exposure to classic risk factors. The long-short portfolio’s alpha, shown
in panel (b) of Table 1.7, is 0.56% monthly with a t-statistic of 2.40. Figure 1.7 provides a
clear picture of this pattern in portfolio alphas.
Time variation in PUB risk premium. If the spread in average returns between high-
and low-dependency firms is driven by a PUB risk premium, then, as the GE theory sug-
gests, its sign and magnitude reflect investors’ opinion on whether public sector capital
is underinvested. If yes, high-dependency firms should provide higher expected returns
compared to low-dependency firms. Following this logic, the results above seem to sug-
gest that investors perceive an overall shortfall in public sector investment during the
1981-2018 period. But a natural question is whether this shortfall is getting better or
worse over time. This question is particularly relevant because policymakers are recently
considering potential increases in public investment. If, for example, the PUB risk pre-
mium was high in earlier years but had diminished in more recent years, then the case for
greater public sector investment would be weakened by such observation. Nevertheless,
what I find is the opposite.
I split the sample into two subperiods of equal length: 1981 to 1999 and 2000 to 2018,
and repeat the analysis above for these two subperiods separately. The results are re-
ported in Table 1.8 and graphically displayed in Figure 1.8 and 1.9. I find that the dif-
ferences in average returns across government dependency portfolios are small for the
1981-1999 period, but they become large in the 2000-2018 period. In particular, when us-
ing equal weight, the long-short portfolio actually has a slightly negative average return
of -0.03% per month for the 1981-1999 period. In comparison, for the 2000-2018 period,
the long-short portfolio provides a notably higher average return: 0.87% per month (that
is, 10.44% per year) when using value weight and 0.73% per month (that is, 8.76% per
year) when using equal weight. And again I confirm that these return spreads cannot be
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explained by exposure to classic risk factors. 30 So the results of this exercise suggest that
the inadequacy in public investment, if any, is minor in the 1980s and 1990s, but it has
become more severe in recent years.
This finding accords with the notion that the cost of government spending was high in
the 1980s and 1990s, so the net benefits of public investment were probably low. As noted
by Furman and Summers (2019), the fiscal consolidation efforts at that time might have
been beneficial and contributed to higher economic growth. Also, this finding is con-
sistent with the declining trend in the public sector investment share. Intuitively, if the
optimal capital allocation between the private and public sectors remains constant, then
the declining share of public sector investment implies that a shortfall in public invest-
ment is more likely to exist in more recent periods. Indeed, Figure 1.10 demonstrates an
evident negative correlation between the public sector investment share and the average
future return (over the subsequent seven years) on the equal-weighted long-short depen-
dency portfolio; the correlation coefficient is -0.56 and highly significant. It reveals that
a lower public sector investment share tends to precede a larger return spread between
high- and and low-dependency firms.
30Table A.3 and A.4 along with Figure A.2 show that the results remain unchanged when I include the
profitability and investment factors from Fama and French (2015).
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Table 1.4: Summary statistics. Panel (a) summarizes a selection of firm characteristics
for a sample of U.S. government contractors. Every year government contractors are de-
fined as firms with positive sales to government over the past three years. The reported
characteristics include StG ratio (sales to government divided by total sales), market cap-
italization (in billions of 2012 dollars, deflated by GDP price index), book-to-market ratio,
market leverage, asset growth, sales growth, operating profitability, and return on assets.
Panel (b) compares the means of these characteristics across portfolios formed on govern-
ment dependency (that is, the extent to which a firm depends on government customers
for revenue). Government dependency is measured by StG−2,0 , a three-year trailing
average of StG. This government contractor sample consists of 9,944 firm-year observa-
tions spanning 1980 to 2017. The first portfolio formation was at the end of June in 1981,
and it was based on government dependency computed for 1980; the same procedure
are repeated every year thereafter until 2018. Detailed sample construction and variable
calculations are in Appendix A.
(a) Government contractors
Percentiles
Characteristics Mean S.D. 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
StG 0.284 0.283 0.000 0.059 0.185 0.442 0.758
Market capitalization 1.435 4.604 0.010 0.029 0.110 0.588 2.790
Book-to-market 0.715 0.539 0.187 0.345 0.590 0.935 1.391
Market leverage 0.212 0.212 0.000 0.032 0.151 0.331 0.530
Asset growth 0.147 0.386 -0.164 -0.034 0.066 0.208 0.512
Sales growth 0.141 0.358 -0.182 -0.035 0.084 0.235 0.478
Operating profitability 0.163 0.488 -0.222 0.049 0.196 0.346 0.543
Return on assets 0.003 0.180 -0.177 -0.015 0.044 0.086 0.137
(b) Government dependency portfolios
Govt. dependency portfolios
Characteristics 1(low) 2 3 4
5
(high)
StG 0.030 0.099 0.197 0.371 0.726
Market capitalization 1.786 1.401 1.593 1.028 1.368
Book-to-market 0.707 0.708 0.721 0.731 0.707
Market leverage 0.220 0.216 0.227 0.197 0.201
Asset growth 0.140 0.136 0.133 0.145 0.181
Sales growth 0.147 0.152 0.128 0.130 0.149
Operating profitability 0.156 0.141 0.172 0.146 0.199
Return on assets 0.009 -0.007 0.003 -0.003 0.016
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Table 1.5: Government dependency is a persistent proxy for exposure to public sec-
tor investment. This table reports the estimation results of a predictive regression:
StGi,t+h = αh + βh StGi,t−2→t + εi,t+h, where StGi,t+h is the fraction of sales to government
in year t + h for firm i, StGi,t−2→t is the average fraction of sales to government from year
t− 2 to t, and h is the forecast horizon. It also reports the results of the following regres-




t+1× StGi,t−2→t + εt+1
where ∇[sales/earnings]i,t+1 is the sales or earnings (EBITDA) growth for firm i in year
t + 1, and ∇igt+1 is the contemporaneous public sector investment growth. The sample
consists of 9,944 firm-year observations spanning 1980 to 2017. Industries are classified
by two-digit SIC code. In parentheses are robust standard errors clustered at the firm
level. Attached stars (*, **, ***) indicate (1, 5, 10%) statistical significance.
StGi,t+h ∇salesi,t+1 ∇earningsi,t+1
h = 1 h = 2 h = 3
StGi,t−2→t 0.93*** 0.89*** 0.86*** -0.05*** -0.05
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
∇igt+1 0.26* 0.07
(0.15) (0.28)
∇igt+1 × StGi,t−2→t 1.01*** 1.08
(0.38) (0.70)
Fixed effects Year Year Year Industry Industry
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(a) Mean excess returns (v.w.) (b) Five-factor alphas (v.w.)
(c) Mean excess returns (e.w.) (d) Five-factor alphas (e.w.)
Figure 1.7: Government dependency portfolios: average returns and alphas. Panel (a)
and (c) display the mean excess returns on government dependency portfolios as well
as the mean return on a zero-investment portfolio that is long stocks in the highest-
dependency quintile and short stocks in the lowest-dependency quintile. Panel (b) and
(d) display the alphas estimated from fitting a five-factor model to these portfolio re-
turns; the five risk factors are the market, size, and value factors from Fama and French
(1993); the momentum factor from Carhart (1997); and the liquidity factor from Pastor
and Stambaugh (2003). Also displayed are 90% and 95% confidence intervals (indicated
by the grey bar and the whiskers, respectively) computed with heteroskedasticity- and
autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) standard errors following the routine of Newey and
West (1987, 1994). Returns are monthly. Portfolios are value-weighted in panel (a) and
(b), and equal-weighted in panel (c) and (d). The first portfolio formation was at the end
of June in 1981, and it was based on government dependency (StG−2,0) computed for
1980; the same procedure are repeated every year thereafter until 2018.
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Table 1.6: Government dependency portfolios: value-weighted portfolios. Panel (a) re-
ports the mean excess returns on government dependency portfolios as well as the mean
return on a zero-investment portfolio that is long stocks in the highest-dependency quin-
tile and short stocks in the lowest-dependency quintile. Also reported are Sharpe ratios
calculated from monthly returns but expressed in annualized percentages, and βPub ob-
tained from time-series regressions of portfolio returns on PubFac, UncFac, and the mar-
ket excess return. Panel (b) reports the estimation results of regressing these portfolio re-
turns on five classic risk factors including the market, size, and value factors (MKT, SMB,
HML) from Fama and French (1993); the momentum factor (MOM) from Carhart (1997);
and the liquidity factor (LIQ) from Pastor and Stambaugh (2003). In square brackets are
t-statistics computed with heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) stan-
dard errors following the routine of Newey and West (1987, 1994). Returns are monthly.
Portfolios are value-weighted. Risk factor data are obtained from Kenneth French’s and
Lubos Pastor’s websites. The first portfolio formation was at the end of June in 1981, and
it was based on government dependency (StG−2,0) computed for 1980; the same proce-
dure are repeated every year thereafter until 2018.









(monthly %) 0.43 0.69 0.67 0.90 1.06 0.62
Sharpe ratio
(annualized %) 22.01 38.11 35.57 45.55 65.50 36.14
βPub -1.23 -0.42 -0.53 0.38 1.96 3.19
(b) Controlling for classic risk factors
α -0.40 0.07 -0.11 0.37 0.43 0.82
[-2.06] [0.69] [-0.63] [1.89] [1.89] [2.42]
βMKT 1.19 1.11 1.18 0.95 0.89 -0.30
[23.59] [22.09] [19.88] [17.48] [15.96] [-3.93]
βSMB 0.29 0.18 0.15 0.45 0.18 -0.10
[3.65] [2.01] [1.72] [2.54] [2.74] [-0.92]
βHML -0.05 0.01 0.18 -0.22 0.23 0.28
[-0.62] [0.08] [1.49] [-1.33] [1.49] [1.60]
βMOM -0.03 -0.18 -0.13 -0.07 0.07 0.10
[-0.51] [-2.84] [-2.23] [-1.63] [0.70] [0.90]
βLIQ 0.20 0.01 0.12 0.02 -0.12 -0.32
[2.35] [0.19] [1.49] [0.26] [-1.36] [-2.73]
Adj. R2 0.67 0.68 0.66 0.51 0.47 0.13
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Table 1.7: Government dependency portfolios: equal-weighted portfolios. Panel (a) re-
ports the mean excess returns on government dependency portfolios as well as the mean
return on a zero-investment portfolio that is long stocks in the highest-dependency quin-
tile and short stocks in the lowest-dependency quintile. Also reported are Sharpe ratios
calculated from monthly returns but expressed in annualized percentages. Panel (b) re-
ports the estimation results of regressing these portfolio returns on five classic risk factors.
Portfolios are equal-weighted. Other specifics are the same as in Table 1.6.









(monthly %) 0.41 0.53 0.66 0.57 0.76 0.35
Sharpe ratio
(annualized %) 22.49 29.44 37.72 32.02 45.45 31.70
βPub 1.86 1.74 1.63 3.30 3.46 1.60
(b) Controlling for classic risk factors
α -0.26 0.06 0.12 0.05 0.30 0.56
[-2.04] [0.52] [0.67] [0.29] [1.40] [2.40]
βMKT 1.03 0.93 0.95 0.86 0.81 -0.22
[32.63] [24.28] [30.79] [19.31] [15.98] [-3.90]
βSMB 0.81 0.88 0.83 1.02 0.76 -0.06
[12.85] [11.20] [10.52] [20.75] [8.11] [-0.89]
βHML 0.03 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.04 -0.07
[0.39] [-0.46] [-0.28] [-0.62] [-0.42] [-1.10]
βMOM -0.14 -0.26 -0.17 -0.16 -0.09 0.05
[-3.09] [-6.87] [-2.98] [-5.82] [-1.41] [1.16]
βLIQ 0.09 -0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.09 -0.18
[1.30] [-0.64] [-0.44] [0.88] [-1.81] [-3.40]
Adj. R2 0.80 0.79 0.80 0.78 0.67 0.10
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(a) Mean excess returns (1981-1999) (b) Mean excess returns (2000-2018)
(c) Five-factor alphas (1981-1999) (d) Five-factor alphas (2000-2018)
Figure 1.8: Government dependency portfolios: value-weighted portfolios; subperi-
ods: 1981 to 1999 vs. 2000 to 2018. Panel (a) and (b) display the mean excess returns
on government dependency portfolios as well as the mean return on a zero-investment
portfolio that is long stocks in the highest-dependency quintile and short stocks in the
lowest-dependency quintile. Panel (c) and (d) display the alphas estimated from fitting a
five-factor model to these portfolio returns. Also displayed are 90% and 95% confidence
intervals indicated by the grey bar and the whiskers, respectively. The sample period is
1981 to 1999 in panel (a) and (c), and 2000 to 2018 in panel (b) and (d). Portfolios are
value-weighted. Other specifics are the same as in Figure 1.7.
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(a) Mean excess returns (1981-1999) (b) Mean excess returns (2000-2018)
(c) Five-factor alphas (1981-1999) (d) Five-factor alphas (2000-2018)
Figure 1.9: Government dependency portfolios: equal-weighted portfolios; subperi-
ods: 1981 to 1999 vs. 2000 to 2018. Panel (a) and (b) display the mean excess returns
on government dependency portfolios as well as the mean return on a zero-investment
portfolio that is long stocks in the highest-dependency quintile and short stocks in the
lowest-dependency quintile. Panel (c) and (d) display the alphas estimated from fitting a
five-factor model to these portfolio returns. Also displayed are 90% and 95% confidence
intervals indicated by the grey bar and the whiskers, respectively. The sample period is
1981 to 1999 in panel (a) and (c), and 2000 to 2018 in panel (b) and (d). Portfolios are
equal-weighted. Other specifics are the same as in Figure 1.7.
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Table 1.8: Government dependency portfolios: 1981-1999 vs. 2000-2018. Panel (a) re-
ports for two subperiods, 1981-1999 and 2000-2018, the mean excess returns on govern-
ment dependency portfolios as well as the mean return on a zero-investment portfolio
that is long stocks in the highest-dependency quintile and short stocks in the lowest-
dependency quintile. Panel (b) reports the corresponding alphas estimated by regressing
these portfolio returns on five classic risk factors. Portfolios are either value-weighted or
equal-weighted. Other specifics are the same as in Table 1.6.




(low) 2 3 4
5
(high)
(a) Mean excess return (monthly %)
Value weight
1981-1999 0.71 0.60 0.55 0.81 1.09 0.38
2000-2018 0.15 0.79 0.80 1.01 1.02 0.87
Equal weight
1981-1999 0.61 0.50 0.48 0.38 0.58 -0.03
2000-2018 0.21 0.56 0.84 0.77 0.94 0.73
(b) Alphas w.r.t. five classic risk factors
α (v.w., 1981-1999) -0.05 0.06 -0.12 0.13 0.49 0.55
[-0.21] [0.31] [-0.49] [0.44] [1.53] [1.14]
α (v.w., 2000-2018) -0.56 0.23 0.08 0.58 0.55 1.11
[-2.71] [1.64] [0.33] [2.64] [1.90] [3.08]
α (e.w., 1981-1999) 0.11 0.11 0.01 -0.08 0.09 -0.02
[0.74] [0.62] [0.03] [-0.44] [0.39] [-0.08]
α (e.w., 2000-2018) -0.49 0.04 0.28 0.19 0.52 1.01
[-2.68] [0.23] [1.24] [0.73] [1.76] [3.30]
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Figure 1.10: Expected return on long-short government dependency portfolio and the
public sector investment share. The solid line represents the average future return (over
the subsequent seven years) on a zero-investment portfolio that is long stocks in the highest-
dependency quintile and short stocks in the lowest-dependency quintile. The dashed line rep-
resents the public sector investment share, that is, the ratio of public sector investment to the sum
of public and private sector investments. The magnitude of the former (in monthly percent) is
indicated on the left axis while the latter (in percent) on the right axis.
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1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I assess the overall (in)adequacy of public sector capital through the lens
of asset prices. I develop a parsimonious two-sector GE model that links the supply of
public sector capital to investors’ utility. In particular, I demonstrate how investors may
view the risk to public investment differently when public sector capital is under- or over-
supplied, and how their views may be reflected in asset prices. Backed by this GE theory I
propose a factor pricing model and confront it with a wide range of test assets. The results
indicate that shocks to the public sector investment share are priced in the cross-section
of stock returns with a consistently positive price of risk. This finding points to increases
in public investment as good news for investors. To strengthen and expand this finding,
I conduct a portfolio analysis using a sample of U.S. government contractors. I find that
firms with heavier reliance on the U.S. government for revenue are more sensitive to
changes in public investment and provide higher stock returns on average. I also find
that the spread in average returns on high- and low-government-dependency stocks has
widened in recent years, implying a bigger shortfall in public sector capital.
That said, one should not use my findings to guide the investment decision on a par-
ticular public sector project, which ought to be based on specific cost-benefit analyses. My
results should instead be interpreted as an indicator of an overall undersupply of public
sector capital, and that expanding public investment may generate a net benefit.
An unanswered question in this study is why the public sector is underinvested. In
theory, an inadequate supply of public sector capital should attract more investment for
its high marginal product (as well as other benefits). But even though the public sec-
tor investment share has been declining since the 1960s, the public investment growth
remains pretty steady with no sign of a pickup whatsoever (see A.4). What is missing
here? I can think of two possible drivers. One is political factors. Public investment
decision-making is often influenced by political considerations that dominate economic
ones in many cases, if not all. For one thing, when it comes to winning votes, tax cuts
are arguably more appealing than infrastructure spending. Another reason is that inef-
ficiencies and perversities attending the existing public sector projects may stymie any
attempt to increase spending. One can reasonably argue that resolving these problems
should take priority over passing big spending bills. In any case, the evidence provided
in this paper suggests that augmenting public sector capital, by either investing more or





A large body of literature documents under-diversification of idiosyncratic risk.1 While
idiosyncratic risk plays no role in frictionless asset markets, frictions in diversification
allow it to affect asset prices, to distort investment and corporate decisions, and to gen-
erate economy-wide fluctuations.2 Moreover, idiosyncratic uncertainty displays a well-
documented countercyclicality, so the importance of such effects varies over the business
cycle. Nonetheless, little is known about whether and how policymakers could alleviate
the inefficiencies created by idiosyncratic risk or respond to its cyclical properties.3
In this paper, we study the effects of idiosyncratic uncertainty on asset prices, invest-
ment, and welfare. In particular, we consider the (in)efficiency of the equilibrium alloca-
tion and its policy implications. We analyze this question in the context of a production
asset-pricing model with two main ingredients: (i) under-diversification and (ii) endoge-
nous and countercyclical idiosyncratic risk. In the presence of under-diversification, id-
iosyncratic risk affects the economy’s pricing kernel and, ultimately, investment. More-
over, the quantitative importance of these effects depends on the degree of diversification
1Underdiversification is pervasive for entrepreneurs and outside investors. Himmelberg et al. (2000),
e.g. documents that entrepreneurs hold a large fraction of wealth invested in their own companies. Under-
diversification in investor’s portfolios has been documented by Blume and Friend (1975), Kelly (1995),
Polkovnichenko (2005), and Calvet et al. (2007).
2See, e.g. Herskovic et al. (2016) for the effects on asset prices, Angeletos and Calvet (2006) and Panousi
and Papanikolaou (2012) for the effects on investment, Chen et al. (2010) for the impact on capital structure,
and Chen and Strebulaev (2018) for the implications for idiosyncratic risk-taking. Idiosyncratic risk also
plays an important role in business cycle research on uncertainty shocks (Bloom 2009), granularity (Gabaix
2011), and networks (Acemoglu et al. 2012). Christiano et al. (2014) identifies uncertainty shocks as the
main driver of business cycles.
3For instance, the former president of the Dallas Fed, Richard Fisher, highlighted the importance of
these issues for policymaking, and the limited attention received until then, in a speech called "Uncertainty
Matters" in 2013.
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in the economy. The endogeneity of the countercyclicality of risk plays an important role,
as the degree of risk responds to investment decisions and regulation.
Our main result is that the economy is subject to a new form of pecuniary externality,
to which we refer as idiosyncratic risk externalities: firms do not internalize how their in-
vestment decisions affect the level of idiosyncratic risk borne by others. Two implications
of these risk externalities are underinvestment and excessive aggregate risk-taking in a laissez-
faire economy. Moreover, we derive sufficient statistics for the risk externalities based on
asset-price data and quantify the importance of these inefficiencies. Finally, we show
how financial regulation can be used to address the inefficiencies caused by idiosyncratic
uncertainty.
We consider a two-period model with a unit-mass of firms, investors, and workers. In-
vestment can be allocated across a riskless and a risky technology. The payoff of the risky
technology is the only source of aggregate risk and can take two values, either high or
low payoff. In the second period, firms combine capital with labor using a Cobb-Douglas
production function subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Capital cannot be reallo-
cated once it is installed. Following Gârleanu et al. (2015), investors and firms are located
on a circle. Productivity shocks are correlated across firms, with a correlation that decays
with the distance between the firms’ locations. Average productivity across all locations
is non-stochastic, so shocks remain idiosyncratic despite being locally correlated.
Investors choose in the first period how much to consume and an equity portfolio
subject to a limited-participation constraint. Investors have access only to firms located in
a neighborhood of their location. This friction can be interpreted as capturing the fact
that investors’ portfolios are concentrated geographically, as documented by Ivković and
Weisbenner (2005), or "nearby" firms can be interpreted as those the investor knows about,
as in Merton (1987). The important aspect is that investors have access to limited subset
of firms. Moreover, the size of the neighborhood, or the length of the arc in the circle,
investors have access to acts as a diversification parameter. For example, if an investor
has access to the whole circle, she would be able to perfectly diversify the idiosyncratic
risk. At the other extreme, if an investor can invest only in a firm at her own location, she
would fully bear the idiosyncratic risk of the firm, as, for example, in the entrepreneurship
model of Chen et al. (2010). If the investor has access to a positive mass of firms, but less
than the full circle, then the investor bears a fraction of the idiosyncratic variance, as the
risk is only partially diversified.4
4Note the importance of the correlation structure to capture the notion of partial diversification. If pro-
ductivity were independently distributed across firms then, by the exact law of large numbers (Sun 2006),
investors would be able to completely eliminate idiosyncratic risk by investing in any subset of the unit
circle with a positive measure.
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Workers play only a role in the second period, when they inelastically supply labor
and consume. The significance of having workers in the economy lies in the fact that
variations in the cost of labor lead to variations in a firm’s operating leverage, induc-
ing endogenous movements in idiosyncratic return volatility. The volatility of returns de-
pends on two factors: i) dispersion in the volume produced, determined by the exoge-
nous volatility of productivity, and ii) the profit margin, which is endogenous and varies
with economic conditions. For example, in bad times there is weaker demand for labor
and lower labor costs, leading to higher profit margins and higher idiosyncratic volatility.
Therefore, return risk becomes countercyclical, consistent with the evidence in, for exam-
ple, Campbell et al. (2001). Moreover, our channel connecting variations in firm-level risk
to variations in labor costs is consistent with the recent cross-sectional evidence presented
in Donangelo et al. (2019).
This mechanism has important asset-pricing implications. First, the model is able
to generate the synchronization of idiosyncratic volatility observed in Herskovic et al.
(2016), even without assuming state-dependent productivity dispersion.5 Second, the
model generates a negative premium for exposure to states where idiosyncratic volatility
is high, consistent again with the evidence reported in Herskovic et al. (2016). This neg-
ative premium results from the stochastic discount factor (SDF) for the economy being
the product of a SDF for a representative-agent economy and a term that is increasing
with the level of idiosyncratic volatility. This is analogous to the SDF in Constantinides
and Duffie (1996), but here the extent of consumption dispersion is related to volatil-
ity in firms’ returns and the degree of under-diversification in the economy. Given that
the SDF increases with idiosyncratic risk, assets that pay off more in states with high
volatility command a negative premium. For essentially the same reason, we obtain a
positive idiosyncratic variance risk premium, that is, a positive difference between expected
idiosyncratic variance under the risk-neutral and physical probabilities. A large literature
documents a positive aggregate variance risk premium and, in Section 2.3, we provide
evidence of a positive premium for idiosyncratic variance.6 Moreover, the variance risk
premium plays an important role in the analysis of the effects of regulation.
The expected return on the firm can be decomposed in an aggregate risk premium
that is proportional to the covariance of returns with aggregate consumption, and an id-
iosyncratic risk premium that is proportional to the level of idiosyncratic variance. As in
5The model is also consistent with the evidence in Herskovic et al. (2016) that the synchronization of
volatility happens both for return volatility and fundamental volatility, measured using the idiosyncratic
component in sales.
6See, e.g. Bollerslev et al. (2009) and Drechsler and Yaron (2010) for an analysis of the (aggregate) vari-
ance risk premium and Zhou (2018) for a recent review of the literature.
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the original model of Merton (1987), we find that idiosyncratic risk commands a positive
premium in equilibrium. The price of idiosyncratic risk then depends on the degree of
under-diversification. In particular, the price of risk is zero if investors are fully diver-
sified and it is maximized if investors are unable to diversify. Exploring this connection
with the idiosyncratic risk premium, we are able to empirically estimate the degree of
under-diversification in the economy, a necessary step for our empirical assessment of
the welfare implications of idiosyncratic uncertainty.
The asset-pricing implications of uncertainty are transmitted to the real economy through
investment decisions that firms make. Idiosyncratic risk leads to a reduction in aggregate
risk-taking compared with what occurs under perfect markets. This is because investors
value the bad state of the world relatively more in the under-diversified economy, given
the countercyclicality of volatility and the fact that the SDF is increasing with consump-
tion dispersion. Therefore, idiosyncratic risk leads firms to value the risky technology to
a lesser extent, as it is an asset that performs worse in bad times, reducing the amount
of aggregate risk-taking. The effect on investment is ambiguous. On the one hand, id-
iosyncratic risk increases precautionary savings, which translates into an increase in in-
vestment. On the other hand, idiosyncratic risk reduces aggregate risk-taking, which
reduces precautionary savings. Hence, investment in laissez-faire can be above or below
its first-best level.
We next consider the policy implications of the inefficiencies created by idiosyncratic
risk. We maintain the assumption that a social planner cannot directly control the degree
of diversification of private portfolios. The planner can, however, affect the economy
by regulating investment and risk-taking decisions. This constraint reflects the fact that
under-diversification may result from limited information or frictions that cannot be di-
rectly addressed by the planner.7
Our main result is that, in the absence of interventions, the economy is constrained-
inefficient. In other words, even a planner that is constrained not to directly increase
diversification can induce welfare improvements. The inefficiency results from a pecu-
niary externality in investment decisions. Firms do not internalize the fact that, as they
(collectively) increase investment, variable costs rise and operating leverage drops. This
effectively reduces the idiosyncratic risk borne by others. A social planner internalizes
this additional benefit of investment and perceives underinvestment in the absence of
intervention. Similarly, there is excessive aggregate risk-taking, as firms do not internal-
ize how an increase in risk-taking, by shifting resources from bad to good states of the
7Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010) shows that under-diversification may result from an infor-
mation acquisition problem. Admati et al. (1994) and DeMarzo and Urošević (2006) study how the costs of
under-diversification should be balanced against the benefits of better monitoring.
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world, increases operating leverage and amplifies idiosyncratic risk when it is especially
pronounced. A social planner would then take on less risk than agents in the laissez-faire
equilibrium. Note how a planner would like to reduce aggregate risk-taking, despite it
being already below the first-best level, and increase investment, regardless of it being
above or below the first-best. The direction of the intervention is dictated by the external-
ity, not by a comparison with the first-best. Given that the externality operates through
changes in idiosyncratic risk, we refer to this effect as idiosyncratic risk externalities.
We consider the effects of small interventions around the laissez-faire equilibrium and
show how the degree of inefficiency in the economy, or equivalently the gains resulting
from regulating investment decisions, can be estimated using asset-price data. In partic-
ular, we provide a sufficient statistic for the magnitude of the risk externality in terms of
two risk premia. Consider first the impact of increasing investment. We show that the
welfare gains depend on the product of the price of idiosyncratic risk and the risk-neutral
expectation of the idiosyncratic variance. This quantity can be estimated by combining
the idiosyncratic risk premium and the idiosyncratic variance risk premium. Similarly,
consider the impact of reducing aggregate risk-taking. We show that the gains of reduc-
ing risk-taking depend on the idiosyncratic variance risk premium and the risk-neutral
probabilities.8
We implement these formulas empirically and show that there are significant welfare
gains from correcting risk externalities. We document that investors do not internalize
a welfare gain of three cents on each dollar invested. This is equivalent to the social
discount rate for the riskless technology being three percentage points lower than the
corresponding discount rate for the private sector. We also estimate the gains for reduc-
ing aggregate risk-taking. We find that reducing the standard deviation of investment by
one unit leads to a welfare gain of 1.2%. This is equivalent to the social planner facing
a Sharpe ratio on the risky technology that is four percent smaller than the one for the
private sector. In both cases, the magnitude of the idiosyncratic risk externality is sig-
nificant, suggesting the importance of distortions created by the under-diversification of
idiosyncratic risks.
We also consider the design of optimal financial regulation in our environment. We
introduce a financial intermediary and show that a tax shield on debt combined with risk-
weighted capital requirements are able to increase investment and reduce aggregate risk-
taking. This effectively reduces the cost of capital for safe projects and increases the cost of
capital for risky ones. Moreover, the magnitude of the optimal tax shield and the optimal
8By connecting our sufficient statistics to asset prices, our results show that risk-neutral probabilities are
the relevant ones for guiding the design of policy in our environment, consistent with the ideas in Feldman
et al. (2015).
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risk weights can be related directly to asset prices, analogously to our measurement of
the risk externalities.
Literature. Our paper is related to the classical work on under-diversification of Levy
(1978), Merton (1987), and Hirshleifer (1988) as well as recent work on the asset-pricing
implications of idiosyncratic uncertainty under imperfect risk-sharing, such as Gârleanu
et al. (2016), Dou (2016), Di Tella (2017), Silva and Townsend (2019) and Khorrami (2019).
Another strand of the literature has focused on the corporate finance implications of id-
iosyncratic risk, including Chen et al. (2010), Wang et al. (2012), and Chen and Strebulaev
(2018). We share with the first strand our focus on how asset prices are affected by id-
iosyncratic uncertainty and with the second the characterization of how frictions affect
investment and risk-taking. In contrast to both lines of work, we emphasize the efficiency
properties of the equilibrium and the appropriate regulatory response.9 In this sense, our
approach is similar to that of Di Tella (2019). He considers, however, an environment
without endogenous idiosyncratic risk, abstracting from the risk externalities we study
here.10 Our work is also related to the literature on uninsurable income risk, as Constan-
tinides and Duffie (1996), Brav et al. (2002), and Constantinides and Ghosh (2017). Like
them, we consider a SDF that depends on countercyclical consumption risk, but we focus
instead on the policy implications of endogenous risk in a production economy.
2.1 A model of under-diversification and investment allo-
cation
In this section, we study the implications of under-diversification of idiosyncratic risk
for asset pricing and investment decisions. First, we present the environment and then
discuss the characterization of the equilibrium. In Section 2.2, we study the efficiency
properties of this economy.
2.1.1 Environment
We study a finite-horizon economy with two dates, t = 0, 1. The economy is populated
by workers, investors, and firms, with agents located on a circle of circumference one.
Workers play a relevant role only on the last date, when they supply labor and consume.
9In this respect, we are close to Gromb and Vayanos (2002), who also focus on the issue of constrained
inefficiency.
10Similarly, by abstracting from investment adjustment costs, we ensure that our effects are not caused
by the variations of Tobin’s Q studied by Di Tella (2019).
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The population of investors consists of a unit-mass of ex-ante identical agents, indexed by
i ∈ [0, 1), who are active in both periods. At date t = 0, these agents make consumption
and portfolio decisions. There is a unit-mass of ex-ante identical firms indexed by j ∈
[0, 1). Firms raise equity to finance investment on date zero and pay dividends in period
one from the proceeds of the production of final goods.
Uncertainty has both an aggregate and an idiosyncratic component. In particular, at
t = 1, before production takes place, the aggregate state s ∈ S = {l, h} is revealed,
with ps > 0 representing the probability that each state occurs. We refer to h as the
high state, in which production will be endogenously higher, and to state l as the low
state. Firm j also learns its idiosyncratic productivity parameter θj ∈ R+, which is given
by θj = Θe−0.5σ
2
θ +σθεj , where εj is normally distributed with a mean of zero and unit
variance. The productivity shocks εj are identically distributed across firms, but are not
independent. Their correlation structure is described below. The aggregate state as well
as idiosyncratic productivity are public information once realized.
Investment technologies
Firms have access to two investment technologies, k ∈ {0, 1}. Technology k = 0 delivers
ϕ0s = 1 units of capital irrespective of the aggregate state, s ∈ S . We refer to technology
k = 0 as the riskless investment technology.11 Technology k = 1 is a risky investment tech-
nology and delivers more capital in the good state, that is, its payoff satisfies ϕ1h > 1 > ϕ
1
l
and E[ϕ1s ] > 1. The riskless investment technology corresponds to the standard technol-
ogy in investment problems without adjustment costs (see e.g. Gomes, 2001), where one
unit of investment generates one unit of capital in the following period. The risky tech-
nology is subject to capital quality shocks, as in the recent macro-finance literature (see,
e.g., Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014, and Di Tella, 2017). Importantly, we assume that
firms can decide how much to invest in each technology, so the exposure of the economy
to aggregate risk is endogenous and determined by firms’ portfolio choices.
Investment allocation problem
On date t = 0, firms must choose how much to invest in each investment technology
(I0j , I
1
j ). The payoff of this investment equals the amount of capital available to the firm in
the next period, Ks,j = ∑1k=0 ϕ
k
s Ikj . The return on assets (ROA) in period 1 will be given by
Ras,j ≡ 1− δ + πs,j, where δ is the depreciation rate and πs,j is the profit per unit of capital
11The riskless investment technology is not exposed to risk in the number of effective units of capital it
delivers, but the return on each of these units will depend on the firm’s idiosyncratic productivity, which is
unknown on date t = 0.
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generated by the firm, a function of the idiosyncratic productivity θj and the aggregate
state of the economy s. Let Ms,j denote the (average) stochastic discount factor of the






























for k = 0, 1.
Profit maximization in period 1
Capital cannot be reallocated across firms in period 1, so firm j will operate Ks,j units of
capital, regardless of its productivity level. This lack of capital reallocation could reflect
a financial friction, where the most productive firms are unable to borrow to expand pro-
duction, or a technological constraint, where capital must be installed in advance, and
therefore before the productivity is known. A firm with productivity θj and Ks,j units
of capital hires L workers at wage Ws and produces final goods according to the Cobb-
















showing that effective (productivity-adjusted) capital-labor ratios are equalized across
firms.
As a consequence of constant returns to scale, the profit function becomes linear in








Two aspects of expression (2.3) are worth mentioning. First, profitability is hetero-
geneous across firms. In a frictionless environment, πs,j should equal the rental rate of
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Correlation vs. distance
The panel on the left describes the participation constraint, where investors can invest only in firms located
within distance 0.5φ from their location. The panel on the right shows how the correlation varies with the
distance.
capital for all active firms. As capital does not flow to the most productive firm, firms
earn heterogeneous economic rents. Second, the level and dispersion of firms’ profitabil-
ity are endogenous. For instance, a reduction in wages reduces variable costs and increases
operating leverage, amplifying the effects of changes in productivity.12
Correlation structure and the participation constraint
To capture the consequences of under-diversification, we follow Gârleanu et al. (2015)
and assume that εj can be correlated across firms and that the correlation declines with
the distance between them. More explicitly, let d(j, j′) = min{|j− j′|, 1− |j− j′|} denote
the distance between j and j′. εj and εj′ are then jointly normal with covariance given by
Cov(εj, εj′) = 1− 6d(j, j′)(1− d(j, j′)). Because the maximum distance in the unit-circle
is 0.5, the correlation is decreasing with the distance. An important implication of this
correlation structure is that productivity shocks are purely idiosyncratic, in the sense that
a fully diversified portfolio of these shocks can eliminate the productivity risk, such that
h Var(
∫ 1
0 εjdj) = 0.
13
To capture the effects of under-diversification, we assume that investors are subject
to limited participation in financial markets. Investor i is allowed to invest only in firms
12Formally, variable costs and production are proportional to productivity, VCs,j = VCsθj and Ys,j = Ysθj,
so the dispersion in profits is σs,π = (Ys −VCs)σθ . Lower wages increase the margin Ys −VCs, amplifying
the effect of σθ .
13Formally, let Zj denote a Brownian motion in the interval [0, 1] and Bj = Zj − jZ1 denote a Brownian








. We show in
the appendix that εj has a mean of zero, unit variance, the covariance structure described in the text, and
that the variance of
∫ 1
0 εjdj is zero.
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located within distance 0.5φ of her location, so investors have access to firms on an arc of
length φ, as indicated in figure 2.1. The parameter φ ∈ [0, 1] controls the degree of under-
diversification in this economy. If φ = 1, there is full participation and idiosyncratic risk
can be perfectly diversified. If φ = 0, investors are fully invested in a single firm, as in
the entrepreneurial models of Chen et al. (2010) and Panousi and Papanikolaou (2012), so
they bear all of the idiosyncratic risk. In the case where 0 < φ < 1, investors are able to
partially diversify the idiosyncratic risk and φ measures the degree of diversification.
Formally, a limited-participation constraint takes the following form. Let Ωij denote
a cumulative distribution function (cdf) over j ∈ [0, 1) describing the asset holdings of
investor i, that is, the mass of shares of firm j bought by investor i is dΩij. We do not
require Ωij to be continuous.
14
Let P i = {j : d(i, j) ≤ 0.5φ} denote the participation set for investor i. The limited
participation constraint for investor i is then∫
P i
dΩij = 1. (2.4)
Investor’s problem
On date t = 0, investors have an endowment of E0 units of the consumption good and
choose how much to consume and how many shares of the various firms to buy, subject


























where Pj is the price of a share in firm j.























for all j ∈ P i.




1−γ , i f γ ∈ R+\ {1}
log C , i f γ = 1
,
where γ represents the constant coefficient of relative risk aversion.
Workers and equilibrium definition
Workers inelastically supply one unit of labor on date 1 and consume their income, i.e.
Cws = Ws.












j , Ll,j, Lh,j
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for j ∈ [0, 1), and workers’ consumption, (Cwl , C
w
h ). A
competitive equilibrium is defined as an allocation, asset prices Pj for each firm j, and wages
Ws for each state s such that:






, solve problem (2.5) for each
i ∈ [0, 1).






demand is given by (2.2).15
3. Worker consumption in each state s ∈ S is given by Cws = Ws.








jdi denote the demand for the
shares of firm j. Then, for each j ∈ [0, 1),
Sj = 1.
15For ease of exposition, we assume here that Ms,j is a simple average of the shareholders’ stochastic
discount factor. We show in the appendix that our results hold under more general ways of aggregating the
investor’s SDFs.
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(θjKs,j)αL1−αs,j dj + (1− δ)Ks,
where Ks,j = ∑1k=0 ϕ
k




We consider next the characterization of the equilibrium. We focus on a symmetric equi-
librium, where Ci0 = C0, I
k
j = I
k, and Pj = P. An exact closed-form solution is not
available even in the symmetric equilibrium case, but we are able to obtain asymptotic
expressions for the case with small idiosyncratic risk.16 In particular, we consider a first-
order perturbation of the equilibrium objects around σ2θ = 0. The use of perturbation
methods is crucial for managing in a tractable way in our CRRA environment the corre-
lation structure of Gârleanu et al. (2015), originally applied in the context of a model with
CARA utility. In particular, we obtain expressions that are analogous to those given by
Ito’s lemma in continuous time.17 For instance, we show in appendix B.1.3 that, for any










= F′(0)2σ2θ + o(σ
2
θ ).
and all the higher-order central moments are of order o(σ2θ ).
16See Judd and Guu (2001), for a discussion of asymptotic methods applied to an incomplete markets
model.
17For a recent application of an under-diversification friction in a continuous-time CRRA model, see
Khorrami (2019).
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Moreover, the covariance between functions of shocks satisfies
Cov(F(σθεi), F(σθεj)) = F′(0)2σ2θ Cov(εi, εj) + o(σ
2
θ ).
Applying these Ito-like formulas, we find, for example, that idiosyncratic risk vanishes
even for aggregates of non-linear functions of the shocks εj. In particular, we show that
Var[
∫ 1




Aggregate production, wages, and returns
Taking the ratio of labor demand (2.2) for a firm with productivity θj and the average
labor demand, we obtain Ls,j =
θj




(θjKs)αL1−αs,j dj = (ΘKs)
α.
Given the Cobb-Douglas production function, the wage is proportional to output
Ws = (1− α) (ΘKs)α.
Plugging the wage into equation (2.3), we obtain the return on assets
Ras,j = 1− δ + αθj (ΘKs)
α−1 , (2.8)
which varies with θ and it is decreasing with Θ and Ks.
In equilibrium, the stock price satisfies P = ∑1k=0 I
k, that is, it equals the replacement
cost of capital. Therefore the ratio between those two quantities, Tobin’s Q, is one.18 The








18The fact that Q is equal to one allows us to distinguish the inefficiencies we find from those based on




We now consider the investor’s portfolio choice. In a symmetric equilibrium, the expected
return is the same across all investors. Intuitively, the investor can then choose her port-
folio to eliminate idiosyncratic risk to the extent possible, given the limited-participation
constraint. Proposition 1 shows that, in the small-risks case, investors indeed find it opti-
mal to minimize variance.19
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subject to the participation constraint













k is given by Cov(ε
i,∗, εj) =
(1− φ)3.
Proposition 1 illustrates how the participation constraint affects the level of idiosyn-
cratic risk the investor bears in equilibrium. If φ = 1, the investor holds a fully diversified
portfolio, eliminating all of the idiosyncratic risk. If φ = 0, then there is only one firm
in the participation set and the investor holds the entirety of the idiosyncratic risk. For
0 < φ < 1, the investor effectively bears only a fraction (1− φ)3 of the risk. Hence, we
refer to φu ≡ (1 − φ)3 ∈ [0, 1] as the under-diversification parameter. Moreover, this pa-
rameter determines how the investor’s portfolio, and ultimately consumption, co-moves
with shocks to any firm in the participation set. For this reason, φu plays a key role in
determining the idiosyncratic risk premium, which we study next.
Idiosyncratic risk premium










j is the average ROA on investor i’s portfolio and ks ≡ log Ks.
Define the (log) stochastic discount factor (SDF) for investor i as
mis = log β− γ(cis − c0),
19The proofs for all propositions are provided in the appendix.
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where c0 ≡ log C0.
Given the SDF, we can compute the (shadow) riskless rate. Up to second-order terms,
the interest rate is given by the standard expression,20















where r f does not vary with i as the distribution of cis is the same for all investors.
Let rs,j ≡ log Rs,j denote the log return on firm j. From the pricing equation for shares













where σ2r is the variance of the log-returns.
We can decompose the consumption risk in terms of aggregate and idiosyncratic com-
ponents. Let rs = Es[rs,j] and cs = Es[cis] denote the conditional mean of log-returns in
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where σ2s is the idiosyncratic variance of log-returns in state s.
The risk premium has two components. The first component, which is related to ag-
gregate risk, reflects the usual compensation for the co-movement between aggregate
consumption and returns. Given the under-diversification friction, however, investors
are also subject to idiosyncratic return risk. This risk requires compensation, which is
captured by the second term above. The premium depends on the magnitude of risk
E[σ2s ] as well as the price of risk γφu. The price of risk is a function of risk aversion and
the under-diversification parameter φu. When φu = 0, investors are fully diversified (φ = 1)
and the price of idiosyncratic risk is zero. When φu = 1, there is no diversification (φ = 0)
and the price of risk is at its maximum. Hence, φu provides not only a measure of under-
diversification of investors’ portfolios, but also a measure of the required compensation
for holding idiosyncratic risk in equilibrium.
Importantly, while the price of idiosyncratic risk is a function of structural parameters,
and hence is not directly affected by economic policy, the magnitude of idiosyncratic risk
has both endogenous and exogenous components. Given ras,j ≈ −δ + θjα (ΘKs)
α−1, it
20This holds for a riskless financial claim to a single unit of t = 1 consumption in zero net supply.
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follows that
log σs ≈ log ασθ︸ ︷︷ ︸
exogenous component
− (1− α) log (ΘKs)︸ ︷︷ ︸
endogenous component
. (2.10)
Notice that a procyclical quantity of capital generates countercyclical idiosyncratic
return risk. The dependence of idiosyncratic return volatility on aggregate variables is
consistent with relevant results found in the empirical literature. Campbell et al. (2001)
document that idiosyncratic risk is countercyclical. Bekaert et al. (2012) show that average
idiosyncratic volatility is correlated across countries and that more than 50% of its varia-
tion is explained by aggregate variables. Herskovic et al. (2016) identify a common com-
ponent in idiosyncratic volatility across firms.21 These facts can all be explained by our
operating-leverage channel, without having to assume shocks to idiosyncratic variance
that are correlated across countries or across firms.22 Moreover, given the endogenous
link between idiosyncratic return volatility and aggregate variables, policy interventions
can affect the magnitude of idiosyncratic return risk in the economy.
Aggregate risk-taking and investment
We now characterize the magnitude of aggregate risk-taking in the economy, captured by
the share invested in the risky technology, χ ≡ I1I0+I1 , and the total level of investment,
denoted by I ≡ I0 + I1. We focus on how idiosyncratic risk affects the overall level and
composition of investment. Formally, we write χ and I as
χ = χ∗ + χ̂σ2θ + o(σ
2
θ ), I = I
∗ + Îσ2θ + o(σ
2
θ ).
The terms (χ∗, I∗) represent the amount of aggregate risk-taking and investment in an
economy without idiosyncratic risk, or alternatively with φu = 0. The terms (χ̂, Î) capture
how idiosyncratic risk affects these variables in an economy subject to a diversification
friction.
The next proposition describes the sign of the response of idiosyncratic risk on risk-
taking and investment. The appendix provides closed-form expressions for both χ̂ and
Î.
Proposition 2 (Aggregate Risk-Taking and Investment) Suppose γ > 1. Then, χ̂ < 0 and
the sign of Î is ambiguous. If firms are constrained to keep χ̂ = 0, then Î > 0.
21Herskovic et al. (2016) document that a similar pattern holds for the idiosyncratic volatility of sales
growth, consistent with our result that aggregate variables affect the idiosyncratic volatility of firms’ cash
flows.
22For the relationship between return risk and operating leverage, see Lev (1974). For evidence on this
channel, see Novy-Marx (2010) and Donangelo et al. (2019).
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The result that χ̂ < 0 implies that there is less risk-taking in the economy that is subject
to idiosyncratic risk than in an economy without such risks or with perfect markets. To











where ϕes ≡ ϕ1s − ϕ0s .

















The term above acts as a pricing kernel for the investment payoff ϕes and it has two
components. The first component, C−γs R
a
s , represents the pricing kernel that would pre-
vail in an economy with complete markets. The second component captures the effects
of a precautionary savings motive and, for γ > 1, it is increasing with the amount of
idiosyncratic risk investors effectively bear, φuσ2s . This structure of the pricing kernel is
analogous to the one found in Constantinides and Duffie (1996), whose SDF also consists
of a representative-agent term and a term that increases with the (state-dependent) con-
sumption dispersion. As in their work, here the countercyclicality of consumption risk
plays an important role.23
Because the idiosyncratic return risk is countercyclical, σ2l > σ
2
h , the pricing kernel is
particularly high in bad times in the case φu > 0, so investors dislike risky assets even
more in an under-diversified economy. Therefore, idiosyncratic risk reduces aggregate
risk-taking under imperfect risk sharing.
The effect on investment Î is ambiguous, as there are two forces at play. Suppose first
that investors cannot adjust the extent of risk-taking. In this case, investment actually in-
creases compared with what occurs in a complete markets economy, as idiosyncratic risk
increases precautionary savings. The fact that χ̂ < 0 implies, however, that the magnitude
of aggregate risk is reduced, pushing savings and investment in the opposite direction.
Even though investment may be above or below the first-best benchmark, we show in the
next section that there are clear predictions about how a planner should intervene in this
economy.
23An important distinction between our study and Constantinides and Duffie (1996) is that the consump-
tion countercyclicality is endogenous in our setup, so it potentially responds to policy interventions.
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2.2 Idiosyncratic Risk Externalities
An important aspect of the laissez-faire equilibrium is that the distribution of risk faced
by an investor is endogenous, being influenced by both the level and composition of in-
vestment. Firms, however, do not internalize how their investment decisions collectively
affect the risk born by others. In this section, we illustrate the nature of such effects, which
we call idiosyncratic risk externalities. Furthermore, we provide sufficient statistics for the
welfare gains achieved by regulating investment and aggregate risk-taking. The sufficient
statistics are based on two risk premia, an idiosyncratic risk premium and a variance risk
premium, which connects the magnitude of risk-sharing inefficiencies in the economy to
observable quantities.
2.2.1 Assessing constrained efficiency
We focus now on the question whether the economy is constrained-efficient, that is, whether
there are no possible welfare-improving interventions, given the constraints in the eco-
nomic environment.24 The economy is obviously inefficient, as risk is not optimally
shared across agents, so a planner who could eliminate the under-diversification friction
would generate welfare gains. It is much less clear, however, whether interventions that
respect the underlying frictions are able to improve welfare. For example, could a plan-
ner improve welfare by simply altering the investment decisions, even in the presence
of the same degree of under-diversification? In this section, we show indeed that such
welfare gains are possible and we provide a characterization of the welfare-improving
interventions.
We consider two forms of intervention. The first form increases the overall investment
level, while the second form reduces the share invested in the risky technology. We as-
sume that the level and composition of investment can be directly controlled by a social
planner and defer the discussion of the implementation of these investment outcomes
through financial regulation to Section 2.4.1.
We characterize a set of Pareto-improving interventions in investment, focusing on
their efficiency gains, without the need to assume an explicit social welfare function. To
obtain a Pareto improvement, we introduce a fiscal instrument that allows us to keep the
utility of workers constant while we search for welfare gains for investors.25 This instru-
24Constrained efficiency has been the standard way to assess the welfare property of economies with
frictions since the original work on the efficiency of incomplete markets economies appeared; see Hart
(1975), Stiglitz (1982), and Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986).
25As the optimal policy analysis from Section 2.4.2 shows, the constrained inefficiency results do not
hinge on a particular sharing of the surplus from the intervention between workers and investors.
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ment consists of a per-unit subsidy on capital, analogous to a depreciation allowance,
that is financed by a tax on workers. In the absence of such an instrument, an interven-
tion that, for instance, increases the average capital stock would raise wages and reduce
profits, benefiting workers and making investors worse off. Instead, we are interested in
the question whether there are net gains after the winners of the intervention compensate
its losers, isolating the efficiency gains and avoiding the need to specify preferences for
redistribution.
Let ∆ parametrize the magnitude of the intervention and let τks (∆) be the subsidy on
capital that is required to maintain workers at their initial consumption level in state s. A
general perturbation of investment takes the form
I0 (∆) = I0 + κ0∆, I1 (∆) = I1 + κ1∆,
for some pair of parameters (κ0, κ1), and implies a capital at date t = 1 given by
Ks (∆) = Ks + (κ0 + κ1ϕ1s )∆.
Notice that we are able to control the expected value and the riskiness of Ks by adjust-
ing κ0 and κ1. The tax that keeps worker’s consumption at the laissez-faire level solves
Cws = (1− α)(ΘKs (∆))α − τks (∆)Ks(∆) =⇒ τks (∆) =
(1− α)(ΘKs (∆))α − Cws
Ks (∆)
,
where Cws denotes their consumption in laissez-faire. The ROA for firm j before the subsidy
is
Ras,j(∆) = 1− δ + αθj(ΘKs(∆))α−1.
























subject to the limited-participation constraint (2.4).
If the economy is (constrained) efficient, then V′(0) = 0 for any (κ0, κ1), so it is not
possible to improve welfare by regulating aggregate investment. In contrast, if V′(0) 6= 0




For our first main result, we consider a perturbation that increases the expected value of
Ks by ∆, while keeping the variance of Ks constant, that is, we set κ0 = 1 and κ1 = 0.
Proposition 3 Suppose κ0 = 1 and κ1 = 0. The marginal gain of increasing ∆, in terms of initial


























id. variance risk premium
 > 0, (2.12)
up to first order in σ2θ .










Proposition 3 shows that there is underinvestment in the unregulated economy, that is,
the gains obtained by increasing investment are positive. The intuition for this result is
the following. An increase in capital stock intensifies competition for labor in the econ-
omy, reducing the average profitability of firms. Moreover, this increase in costs affects
especially the most productive firms, which are larger and demand more labor. Hence,
an increase of the capital stock reduces the dispersion of firms’ profitability ex-post and
the amount of return risk ex-ante, as can be seen in equation (2.10). Firms, however, take
prices as given when making their investment decisions, so they do not account for the
impact of their actions on the others’ risk, generating a (pecuniary) externality. Because
the externality operates through changes in the magnitude of idiosyncratic risk, we refer
to these effects as idiosyncratic risk externalities.
As seen in Section 2.1.2, the laissez-faire level of investment may be above or below the
first-best allocation. Despite this fact, it is always optimal to raise investment in the second-
best compared with what occurs in the laissez-faire economy. This is because firms do not
internalize a potential benefit of investment, the external effect on the risk of others, so
there is underinvestment in the economy from the perspective of a social planner. Hence,

















it is possible that the laissez-faire level of investment is above the first-best level and it
remains the case that a further increase in investment achieves a welfare gain.27
The magnitude of the inefficiency depends on two distinct risk premia. First, it de-
pends on the magnitude of the idiosyncratic risk premium. Given that the idiosyncratic risk
premium measures the required compensation an investor demands for taking on id-
iosyncratic risk, it is intuitive that the magnitude of the welfare gains from reducing such
risks, here achieved indirectly through the intervention, is related to the magnitude of this
premium. However, one important distinction is that, while we use physical probabili-
ties to compute the expected excess return, the Q-measure is the relevant one with which
to compute expected welfare gains. By definition, one dollar in a high-probability state
under the Q-measure has a larger impact on welfare than one dollar in a low-probability
state. Therefore, risk-neutral probabilities exactly encode the necessary information to
perform welfare calculations.
The idiosyncratic variance risk premium measures the difference between the expected
variance under the risk-neutral and physical probabilities. If idiosyncratic risk were con-
stant across states, this distinction would not be necessary, but given the countercyclical-
ity of return risk, important deviations between the physical and the risk-neutral measure
of expected variance can occur. In particular, because the idiosyncratic variance is larger
in high marginal utility states, expected variance is higher under the Q-measure, implying
a positive idiosyncratic variance risk premium.28 Notice that the variance risk premium
is multiplied by the price of idiosyncratic risk, γφu, so its impact on welfare also depends
on the degree of diversification. Therefore, the magnitude of the risk externality is pro-
portional to the sum of the idiosyncratic risk premium and an idiosyncratic variance risk
premium, adjusted by the degree of diversification.
An alternative way to write expression (2.12) is (1− α)γφuEQ[σ2s ], that is, the welfare
gain of the intervention is proportional to the product of the price of idiosyncratic risk,
γφu, and a term that could be called an idiosyncratic squared VIX. Under certain conditions,
the squared VIX gives the risk-neutral expectation of the variance for the market as a
whole.29 In contrast, the welfare gains of the intervention are related to the risk-neutral
27The fact that it may be welfare-improving to move further away from the first-best in one dimension is
typical of second-best applications, as originally pointed out by Lipsey and Lancaster (1956) in their general
theory of second-best.
28Much of the literature on the variance risk premium relies on exogenous shocks to the volatility-of-
volatility process; see e.g. Bollerslev et al. (2009). In contrast, we are able to endogenously generate the
variation in return volatility as well as a positive variance risk premium, despite assuming a constant ex-
ogenous volatility of firms’ productivity.
29The conditions such that the squared VIX equals the risk-neutral expectation of variance, or equiva-
lently the fair strike on a variance swap, likely do not hold in practice, though. See, for example, Martin
(2017) for a discussion.
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expectation of the idiosyncratic component of firm-level variance.
Another important aspect of formula (2.12) is that it depends on the labor share 1− α.
Moreover, the inefficiency disappears when α = 1. A corollary of this formula is that the
economy is constrained-efficient when capital is the only factor of production.
Corollary 1 (Constrained efficiency of the exogenous risk economy) Suppose α = 1. Then,
the economy is constrained-efficient, i.e. there is no small intervention on investment or risk-taking
that generates a net welfare gain.
We can explain this result by noting that return risk is completely exogenous when
α = 1, as can be seen from (2.10). Investment decisions have no impact on the risk
borne by others, so the externality is eliminated and the economy becomes constrained-
efficient. Moreover, the economy is also (constrained-) efficient if φu = 0. Therefore, our
constrained-inefficiency result relies on two key ingredients: i) endogenous return risk,
and ii) under-diversification. It is precisely the interaction of these two ingredients that
opens the door to welfare-improving interventions.30
2.2.3 Excessive aggregate risk-taking
Our second perturbation consists of an intervention that reduces the share invested in the
risky technology. In particular, we choose κ0 and κ1 such that the (risk-neutral) standard
deviation of capital decreases by ∆, while we keep the total investment unchanged.
Proposition 4 Suppose κ0 = 1√VarQ[ϕ1] and κ1 = −
1√
VarQ[ϕ1]
. The marginal gain of increasing
∆, in terms of date t = 0 consumption, is given by
V′(0)
u′ (C0)












id. variance risk premium
ζ > 0, (2.13)
up to the first order in σ2θ , with ζ ≡
√
qhql
ql−pl , where qs denotes the risk-neutral probability of state
s ∈ S .
Proposition 4 shows that there is excessive risk-taking in the unregulated economy. The
inefficiency is related to the fact that the risky technology performs poorly when idiosyn-
cratic volatility is high, that is, CovQ(σ2s , ϕes) < 0. By shifting resources from bad to good
30The fact that our results come from this interaction allows us to isolate our channel from previous work
on constrained inefficiency in the context of economies with either linear technology, as in Di Tella (2019),
or economies without idiosyncratic risk, as in Lorenzoni (2008).
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states, risk-taking effectively reduces volatility in good times and increases it in bad times,
given the operating-leverage effect. Because bad times are periods in which idiosyn-
cratic risk is already high, aggregate risk-taking imposes a welfare cost on all investors.
Hence, private agents take on more aggregate risk than is socially optimal. Note that,
even though the risky technology is exposed directly only to aggregate risk, the combina-
tion of idiosyncratic risk on profitability and under-diversification leads nevertheless to
an inefficient level of risk-taking.
The magnitude of the above effect depends on the price of idiosyncratic risk, γφu, and
the idiosyncratic variance risk premium. The inefficiency then depends on the counter-
cyclicality of idiosyncratic risk, as we would not obtain a positive variance risk premium
in the absence of the countercyclicality of risk. We also need the scale factor ζ, which
depends on the risk-neutral probabilities, to be able to interpret the intervention as a re-
duction of one unit in the standard deviation of Ks. Finally, the effect is again proportional
to the labor share, as the externality depends on the endogeneity of risk.
2.2.4 Extensions
In Appendix B.2.1, we consider three extensions that evaluate the robustness of our main
results and offer generalizations. First, we consider an economy with intermediate goods.
This extension illustrates how the idiosyncratic risk externality does not exclusively rely
on movements in labor costs, but on any variation of marginal costs. The volatility of
returns then depends on the relative price of intermediate goods and the externality is
present as long as this price moves with the business cycle. If intermediate goods are
inelastically supplied, then the expression for the externality is identical to the derived
in the baseline model. A positive elasticity of intermediate goods tends to dampen the
effect, as part of the adjustment is now coming through quantities instead of prices.
We then consider the case of a constant elasticity of substitution production function.
The elasticity of substitution between capital and labor controls how much variations
in the capital stock affect firms’ marginal costs and ultimately returns. A elasticity of
substitution larger than one dampens the effect of the intervention, while low values of
the elasticity tends to amplify our effects. The empirical literature typically finds values
for the elasticity below one (e.g. Oberfield and Raval, 2014, reports an elasticity of 0.7),
suggesting that the gains for the proposed intervention may be actually higher than what
the baseline Cobb-Douglas case indicates.
Last, we consider the case in which the participation sets are endogenous, along the
lines of Gârleanu et al. (2015). Investors can choose the share of firms φ on their partic-
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ipation set subject to paying an increasing and convex utility cost. These costs can be
interpreted, for instance, as a cognitive costs related to paying attention to a larger set of
firms. We find that our idiosyncratic risk externality is present even in this economy with
endogenous participation. The intuition for this result is similar to the one in an enve-
lope theorem. Even though changes in the capital stock may now affect the participation
choice, the impact on welfare of these changes in participation is only second-order, given
that we start from an optimal participation decision.
2.3 Measuring Risk Externalities
In this section, we perform the quantification of the risk externalities identified in Propo-
sitions 3 and 4. Our goal is to show how asset-pricing data can be used to assess the
degree of inefficiency in investment decisions and, therefore, the potential gains of reg-
ulation. To perform this exercise, we need to obtain the empirical counterparts of the
objects in our expressions for the idiosyncratic risk externalities. To measure the degree
of underinvestment, as indicated by the welfare gains represented in expression (2.12), it
is necessary to decompose the idiosyncratic risk premium into the price of idiosyncratic
risk, γφu, and the magnitude of idiosyncratic risk, E[σ2s ]. We also need a measure of the
idiosyncratic variance risk premium and the value of the labor share 1− α. To measure the
degree of excessive risk-taking, as shown in expression (2.13), it is necessary to identify
the risk-neutral probabilities.
We proceed as follows: the price of idiosyncratic risk is obtained by applying standard
cross-sectional asset-pricing techniques. In particular, this will allow us to uncover the
degree of under-diversification in the economy, φu, given an estimate of the risk aversion
γ. The magnitude of risk is estimated using an EGARCH model for the idiosyncratic
variance. The idiosyncratic variance risk premium can be obtained by comparing the
corresponding firm-level and market-level premia. Given these quantities, we are able to
compute the magnitude of the welfare gains of our proposed interventions.
2.3.1 Measuring underinvestment
The idiosyncratic risk premium and the variance risk premium
From equation (2.9), we know that γφu captures the impact of variations in idiosyncratic
risk on expected returns, controlling for exposure to aggregate factors. This motivates the
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following empirical specification:
rei,t+1 = λ0 + λidEt[σ
2
i,t+1] +λ
′ X i,t + εi,t+1, i = 1, ..., N, t = 1, ..., T − 1, (2.14)
where rei,t+1 is the realized excess return on stock i in period t+ 1, Et[σ
2
i,t+1] is the expected
variance of the idiosyncratic return in t + 1 conditional on information in t, and X i,t is a
vector of other characteristics that are well-known proxies for a stock’s exposure to stan-
dard aggregate risk factors. Our primary interest is the slope coefficient λid for Et[σ2i,t+1],
which we refer to as the price of idiosyncratic risk. The theory predicts that λid = γφu
should be positive, which means that a higher expected idiosyncratic risk is associated
with a higher expected excess return. Given a value for γ, we can then use the estimate
of λid to back out the value of the under-diversification parameter φu.
Addressing the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle. In an influential article, Ang et al. (2006)
studied the cross-sectional relationship between idiosyncratic risk and expected returns
and found a negative price of risk. From the perspective of theory, this result could be a
reflection of either not fully controlling for an exposure to aggregate factors or a conse-
quence of mismeasurement in the expected idiosyncratic variance. Consider the issue of
measuring future expected volatility.31 Fu (2009) points out the importance of account-
ing for the fact that volatility is mean-reverting. Assuming mean-reversion, the lagged
realized volatility used by Ang et al. (2006) may be an imprecise measure of future ex-
pected volatility, biasing the results. Fu (2009) estimates expected future volatility using
an EGARCH model and finds a positive price of idiosyncratic risk. Mehra et al. (2019)
has recently extended this methodology to allow for time-variation in risk compensation
and also finds a positive premium.32 We follow Fu (2009) and estimate future expected
idiosyncratic variance using an EGARCH model.
Sample and variables. Following the convention, we test specification (2.14) on the cross
section of CRSP stocks. Our sample includes stocks that are ordinary common shares is-
sued by companies incorporated in the U.S. and listed on the NYSE, the AMEX, or NAS-
DAQ. We obtain from the CRSP database these stocks’ monthly returns as well as other
relevant information for the period running from 1963M07 through 2018M12. We mea-
sure the expected level of idiosyncratic risk for a stock-month by the conditional variance
31For studies exploring the other possibility, that idiosyncratic volatility may be correlated with factors
omitted in the standard return regressions, see e.g. Boyer et al. (2009), Chen and Petkova (2012), and Duarte
et al. (2014).
32Similarly, Spiegel and Wang (2007) and Eiling (2013) also use the EGARCH methodology and find a
positive price of idiosyncratic risk.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics. This table summarizes monthly stock returns (ri,t) and a se-
lection of salient characteristics for a sample of CRSP stocks that are ordinary common shares
issued by companies incorporated in the U.S. and listed on the NYSE, the AMEX, or NASDAQ.
The sample spans the period running from 1963M07 through 2018M12. The selected characteris-
tics include: Et−1[σ2i,t], expected idiosyncratic variance estimated by EGARCH models; β
W , Welch
(2019) market beta; ME, market capitalization of the issuing firm (converted into real terms using
the CPI); BM, book-to-market ratio of the issuing firm; Rt−7→t−2, six-month cumulative gross re-
turn in the recent past (skip one adjacent month); TURN, average monthly turnover; CVTURN,
coefficient of variation for monthly turnover. Note that some variables are logarithmized follow-
ing the literature. A 99% winsorization is applied to reduce the influence of outliers.
Percentiles
Characteristics Mean S.D. 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
ri,t (%) 1.060 14.010 -13.905 -6.015 0.000 6.977 16.129
Et−1[σ
2
i,t] (%) 1.844 3.080 0.253 0.458 0.944 2.032 4.053
βW 0.801 0.454 0.235 0.455 0.761 1.102 1.418
ln(ME) 3.901 2.130 1.194 2.347 3.823 5.384 6.684
ln(BM) -0.493 0.867 -1.569 -0.965 -0.411 0.068 0.493
Rt−7→t−2 1.067 0.368 0.680 0.862 1.033 1.213 1.450
ln(TURN(%)) 1.649 1.132 0.194 0.853 1.653 2.468 3.118
ln(CVTURN(%)) 4.088 0.478 3.475 3.757 4.083 4.395 4.692
of the idiosyncratic return; we define the idiosyncratic return as the residual excess return
that is unexplained by Fama and French’s (1993) three factors. Specifically, we postulate
the following representation of excess returns:
rei,t =αi + βi,mktr
e
m,t + βi,smbSMBt + βi,hml HMLt + εi,t, where εi,t ∼ N(0, σ̂2i,t)























in which the conditional variance of εi,t is our measure of expected idiosyncratic risk;
it is represented by an EGARCH model. Following Fu’s (2009) procedure, we estimate,
for each stock, nine versions of the model with various combinations of p and q as the
EGARCH parameters, and we pick the one with the lowest Akaike Information Crite-
rion (AIC). Then for each month we use the selected model to provide a prediction of
the idiosyncratic risk conditional on information from the recent past. As shown in Table
2.1, the median expected idiosyncratic variance in our sample is 0.94% (that is, 9.72% in
volatility), similar to that reported in Fu (2009). In Figure 2.2, we plot, month by month,
the cross-sectional averages of expected idiosyncratic variance. One can clearly see evi-
dence of countercyclicality in this series: there are sizeable spikes in almost every reces-
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Figure 2.2: Average expected idiosyncratic variance. This figure displays the month-by-
month cross-sectional averages of expected idiosyncratic variance. For each stock, the expected
idiosyncratic variance for a month is estimated by an EGARCH model. Shaded areas indicate U.S.
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sion.
Besides the expected idiosyncratic variance, we also compute a selection of other char-
acteristics for each stock, which include: βW , the market beta computed via Welch’s (2019)
approach; ME, the market capitalization of the issuing firm (converted into real terms us-
ing the CPI); BM, the book-to-market ratio of the issuing firm; Rt−7→t−2, the six-month
cumulative gross return in the recent past (skip one adjacent month); TURN, the average
monthly share turnover; and CVTURN, the coefficient of variation for monthly turnover.
Detailed definitions of these variables are provided in Appendix B.3.1.
Fama-MacBeth regressions. Within this sample of stocks, we estimate (2.14) via a stan-
dard Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure. Specifically, we perform, month by month,
cross-sectional regressions of excess stock returns on expected idiosyncratic variance as
well as other characteristics. We then compute time-series averages of the slope coeffi-
cients obtained from these cross-sectional regressions, as well as the corresponding Fama-
MacBeth t-statistics with Newey and West (1987) correction (one lag). We report these
results in Table 2.2.
We start by replicating some well-documented results in the literature. The results we
report in column 1 of Table 2.2 confirm Fama and French’s (1992) finding that market beta
alone does not have much explanatory power for average stock returns. In this case the
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Table 2.2: Fama-MacBeth regressions. This table reports the estimation results of Fama-
MacBeth regressions specified as rei,t+1 = a + λivarEt[σ
2
i,t+1] + λ
′ X i,t + εi,t+1, where rei,t+1(≡
ri,t+1 − r f ,t) is the return on stock i in excess of the one-month Treasury bill rate in month t + 1,
and Et[σ2i,t+1] is the expected idiosyncratic variance in month t + 1 based on EGARCH prediction.
X i,t is a vector of other characteristics that are known in month t; they include: βW , Welch (2019)
market beta; ln(ME), log market capitalization of the issuing firm; ln(BM), log book-to-market
ratio of the issuing firm; Rt−6→t−1, past cumulative gross return; ln(TURN), log average monthly
turnover; and ln(CVTURN), log coefficient of variation for monthly turnover. In square brackets
are Fama and MacBeth (1973) t-statistics with Newey and West (1987) correction (one lag). The
sample period is 1963M07 to 2018M12.
rei,t+1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Et[σ2i,t+1] 0.35 0.38 0.46 0.45 0.52
[13.50] [14.80] [20.38] [20.88] [20.33]
βW -0.27 -0.09 0.11 -0.39 -0.57 -0.58 -0.22
[-1.52] [-0.44] [0.71] [-2.29] [-3.02] [-3.28] [-1.48]
ln(ME) -0.01 -0.13 0.24 0.21 0.09
[-0.19] [-3.31] [6.57] [6.23] [2.57]
ln(BM) 0.31 0.20 0.49 0.46 0.35
[6.72] [4.71] [11.11] [10.43] [8.34]






a (constant) 0.81 0.87 2.75 -0.07 0.22 -0.36 -1.31 2.51
[4.87] [3.52] [7.52] [-0.32] [1.48] [-1.66] [-4.77] [6.91]
average slope for market beta is negative, contrary to the prediction of standard asset-
pricing theory. Column 2 indicates that, when we add size and the book-to-market ratio
as explanatory variables, we observe a strong value effect (that is, stocks with high book
value of equity relative to their market value tend to bring higher average returns), yet
we also observe a weak size effect (that is, big firms tend to have lower stock returns). The
slope for market beta remains negative and insignificant. To obtain the results reported in
column 3, we further include a measure of past performance as well as two measures of
liquidity and its variability. Now we observe a strong size effect: the slope for ln(ME) is
negative and significant. In addition, we also see strong momentum and liquidity effects,
as documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) and Chordia et al. (2001), among others.
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Stocks bringing high returns in the past, displaying low liquidity, or featuring low vari-
ability of liquidity tend to bring higher returns. The slope for market beta turns positive
but is still insignificant.
Next we turn to the main results. To obtain the results reported in column 4 of Table
2.2, we use expected idiosyncratic variance alone to explain the cross section of average
stock returns. We find that idiosyncratic risk has strong explanatory power for average
returns: the slope for Et[σ2i,t+1] is positive and 13.50 standard errors away from zero; its
magnitude suggests that a one percentage point increase in expected idiosyncratic vari-
ance is associated with a 35 basis point increase in average stock return. In the remaining
columns, we include other characteristic variables to control for exposure to common risk
factors. We find that the explanatory power of idiosyncratic risk becomes even stronger:
the slopes for Et[σ2i,t+1] are always more than 10 standard errors from zero, and their mag-
nitudes suggest that a one percentage point increase in expected idiosyncratic variance is
associated with a 38 to 52 basis point increase in average stock return. In Appendix B.3.1,
we report additional robustness tests. We consider the issue of time variation in the id-
iosyncratic risk premium. We show that, especially since the 1980s, there is no indication
of cyclical variation in the price of risk. This is consistent with our model, in which the
price of idiosyncratic risk is equal to the product of γ and φu, both of which are constant.
In sum, our empirical investigation reveals a strong positive relationship between id-
iosyncratic risk and average returns. The estimates suggest that a one percentage point
increase in expected idiosyncratic variance is associated with a roughly 35-50 basis point
increase in average return. Our estimates also suggest that the price of risk for expected
idiosyncratic variance is stable and mostly acyclical.
Idiosyncratic variance risk premium. The analysis so far has allowed us to obtain the
idiosyncratic risk premium and its decomposition into the price and the magnitude of
idiosyncratic risk. To measure the welfare gain in (2.12), it remains to specify the idiosyn-
cratic variance risk premium. Most of the work on this topic, however, focuses on the
variance risk premium for a market index, while it is the variance risk premium asso-
ciated with the idiosyncratic component that is relevant to our welfare calculation. To
isolate this component, we rely on the work of Han and Zhou (2012), who estimated the
variance risk premium using stock-level variance (including both aggregate and idiosyn-
cratic components) as well as the market variance risk premium. It turns out that this is
all that is necessary to compute the idiosyncratic variance risk premium. To show this,
we use the following return decomposition proposed in Campbell et al. (2001), which
delivers an additive decomposition of total variance.
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Lemma 1 (Variance decomposition) Let rj,t and rm,t denote the return on firm j and the return






where σ2t is the cross-sectional average of individual stock variance, σ2m,t is the market variance,
and σ2id,t is the cross-sectional average of the variance of the idiosyncratic component vj,t.
Define the (average) idiosyncratic variance risk premium as VRPid,t ≡ EQt [σ2id,t+1]−
Et[σ
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Han and Zhou (2012) report that the average value of VRPt over their sample is 5.88%,
annualized, while the average of VRPm,t is 2.83%. Therefore, our estimate of the idiosyn-
cratic variance risk premium is VRPid = 5.88%− 2.83% ≈ 3.05%.
The investment externality
Table 2.3 contains all the elements necessary to compute the idiosyncratic risk externality
on riskless investment, IRE0 = (1− α) [IRP + γφuVRP], where IRP is the idiosyncratic
risk premium and VRP is the variance risk premium. From our empirical analysis, we
found that the price of idiosyncratic risk falls within a range running from 0.35 through
0.5. To be conservative, we choose at lower range of the interval and set γφu = 0.35. Even
though the price of risk is all we need for this calculation, we can back out φu using an
estimate of the risk aversion γ. Bansal et al. (2016) estimates a value of γ = 9.7, which
we round up to 10. This implies a diversification parameter of φu = 3.5%, meaning that,
on average, investors bear only 3.5% of the idiosyncratic variance on stock markets.33 As
our estimate of the idiosyncratic variance, we consider the median idiosyncratic variance
reported in Table 2.1 annualized, that is, E[σ2s ] = 11.3%. The idiosyncratic variance risk
premium is VRP = 3.0%. The value of the idiosyncratic risk externality on investment is
33Using φu = (1− φ)3, we can back out the value of φ ≈ 67%, which implies that investors have access
to roughly two-thirds of the universe of assets.
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Table 2.3: Investment externality parameters.
γφu E[σ2s ] IRP VRP γ φu α
0.35 11.3% 1.8% 3.0% 10 3.5% 0.33
then




× [0.35× 11.3% + 0.35× 3.0%] ≈ 3.3%. (2.16)
Interpretation. We consider three distinct interpretations of the above number. First, in
terms of equivalent wealth gains. An increase in initial wealth of one unit generates a
welfare gain of u′(C0), which, after dividing by the period 0 marginal utility, generates
a welfare gain of exactly one unit of consumption. Hence, investors do not internalize a
gain worth three cents of wealth for each dollar invested.34
The second interpretation of the above number is as a value of insurance. Notice that
expression (2.12) can be written as
































The first term captures the private trade-off which, by the Euler equation, is equal to
zero. The planner internalizes an additional effect that acts as insurance: it is negative if
the firm’s profitability is above average and positive otherwise. The planner effectively
perceives the return risk as only a fraction α of what private investors perceive. The
externality value of 3% can then be interpreted as a price of three cents for an "insurance
policy" of 1− α for each dollar of notional value.
The third interpretation is that the social cost of capital is smaller than the private cost.











1+ IRE0. A high social value of capital implies an expected return on the investment per-
ceived by the planner that is smaller than the private return. As the expected return on the
firm, or equivalently its cost of capital, is related to the amount of capital in the economy,
34The value of the capital stock in the US is around $50 trillion. This means that an increase in capital of
one percent, $560 billion, generates an additional welfare gain of $16.8 billion.
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the capital stock seems too low from a planner’s perspective. Assuming for simplicity
there is no aggregate risk, we can relate the capital stock to the cost of capital using (2.9):
αΘαKα−1 ≈ r f + γφuσ2︸ ︷︷ ︸








The above expression signifies the impact on capital stock of a reduction in the cost of
capital. Using the estimate of 18% for the user cost rcc + δ by Barro and Furman (2018),
a reduction of 3% in rcc would imply an increase in aggregate output of 8%.35 Impor-
tantly, this calculation should be interpreted only as indicative of the level of inefficiency
at the margin, as our estimate of the externality is local. Nevertheless, the result suggests
that frictions related to idiosyncratic risk have important implications for the aggregate
economy.
2.3.2 Measuring excessive risk-taking
We now consider the externality associated with aggregate risk-taking. To quantify ex-
pression (2.13), it remains only to determine ζ =
√
qhql
ql−pl , that is, we need to determine the
physical and risk-neutral probabilities of the aggregate states. Given that σ2l > σ
2
h , we
associate the low state with periods in which idiosyncratic volatility is above the median
and the high state with periods in which the idiosyncratic volatility is below the median.36
Hence, by definition of the states, we know that pl = 0.5. Using the average idiosyncratic
variance, conditional on being above the median value, to estimate σ2l , and similarly for
σ2h , we can back out ql using the expression for the variance risk premium:
VRP = (ql − pl)(σ2l − σ2h).
From the estimated σ2l and σ
2
h and the value of the idiosyncratic variance risk pre-
mium, we obtain ql ≈ 0.75. Given ql and pl, we can solve for the remaining parameter
ζ ≈ 1.7. The value of the idiosyncratic risk externality is then given by














× 0.35× 3.0%× 1.7 ≈ 1.2%. (2.17)
35To put these numbers in perspective, Barro and Furman (2018) expected, as a consequence of the 2017
tax reform, if the provision were made permanent, an expansion of aggregate output of roughly 5%.
36Recall that the subscript l denotes the state with the low level of capital, which implies, in contrast, a
high level of idiosyncratic volatility.
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Interpretation. To understand the intuition behind the above number, notice that we




























The term capturing the private trade-off is equal to zero. Expanding the first term to
account for covariances, we obtain, after some rearrangements, an expression represent-




















Analogous to the financial portfolio decisions studied in Merton (1973), we can di-
vide the share invested in the risky technology into a myopic and a hedging component.
The myopic component captures the usual (static) risk-return trade-off, while the second
component captures the fact that the ROA varies across states. Importantly, the covari-
ance between idiosyncratic variance and the payoff of the risky technology is negative,
consistent with the result expressed in Proposition 2, where we found that the presence
of idiosyncratic risk reduces aggregate risk-taking relative to a first-best economy.
In contrast to private agents, a social planner internalizes the fact that an increase in
aggregate risk-taking would raise idiosyncratic volatility in bad times and reduce it in
good times. This makes Cov(σ2s , ϕ2s ) effectively more negative, indicating that the planner
would choose a smaller share χ than the one chosen by private agents.
Here the externality can be interpreted as reducing the effective Sharpe ratio perceived
by the planner. The planner values the risky investment as if the Sharpe ratio on the risky




− IREχ. Given an externality value of 1.2% and Sharpe ratio
of, say, 0.30, the social Sharpe ratio is 0.0120.30 = 4% below the private one.
2.3.3 The dynamics of risk externalities
We have so far considered risk externalities in the context of a two-period model, which
has allowed us to derive expressions for the inefficiencies in the simplest possible setting,
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assessing the importance of these frictions from an unconditional perspective. As the im-
portance of the frictions may vary with the state of the economy, we consider a dynamic
extension of our sufficient statistic formulas. Our goal is not to provide the most general
dynamic model, but instead a model with the minimal deviation from the environment
we have considered so far. For this reason, we consider an overlapping generations ver-
sion of the two-period model described in Section 2.1.
Dynamic model. The economy is now populated by a continuum of investors and firms
located on the circle of circumference one. Firms are identical to the those described in
the baseline model. The payoff of the risky technology ϕ1s follows a two-state Markov-
chain, where the probability of transitioning from state s to state s′ is pss′ , for s, s′ ∈ {l, h}.
Investors live for two periods, leave no bequests, and start with no wealth.
Our two-period model can then be considered a snapshot of the dynamic economy
described above. The endowment of the investor in period 0 is now equal to the labor
income Es(t) = (1− α)(ΘKs(t))α, where s ∈ {l, h} denotes the aggregate state in period
t. As in the baseline model, we can consider an intervention that changes investment in
period t, but keeps the income of the next generation constant. Hence, the new generation
plays the role that workers played in the baseline model. We now focus on the welfare of
























where Iks (∆) denotes the perturbation of investment in technology k analogous to the
perturbations discussed in Section 2.2, and τs′(∆) denotes the tax required to maintain
the same income for the next generation of investors as was the case in the laissez-faire
economy.
Proposition 5 (Conditional risk externalities) Consider the effects of regulating investment


















id. variance risk premium
 .
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Risk Externality (Excessive Risk Taking)
Note: The left panel shows the time series of the conditional risk externality for aggregate investment in





















qsl−psl , and qss′ denotes the risk-neutral probability of state s
′ ∈ S , conditional
on s ∈ S .
The expressions comprising Proposition 5 are conditional versions of our risk-externality
formulas. The significance of these expressions is that they allow us to address the ques-
tion of how fluctuations in idiosyncratic uncertainty affect the efficiency of the economy.
The degree of inefficiency fluctuates to the extent that the idiosyncratic risk premium and
the variance risk premium vary over time. As can be seen in figure 2.2, the magnitude
of idiosyncratic risk varies substantially over the cycle. Given the stability of the price
of idiosyncratic risk, this implies significant variation in the idiosyncratic risk premium
over the business cycle. Similarly, the variance risk premium is also time-varying.
Figures 2.3 and 2.4 show the time series of the conditional risk externality for invest-
ment and aggregate risk-taking. There is substantial variation in the level of the risk ex-
ternalities, indicating that the inefficiencies are especially more severe in bad times, when
idiosyncratic uncertainty is high. In particular, the two externality measures spike during
the recent financial crisis, indicating that those are periods in which the discrepancy be-
tween the social planner and the private agents in the incentive to invest and take risk is
highest.
77
The time-variation found in the level of externalities suggests the need for counter-
cyclical regulation to address the inefficiencies created by uncertainty risk. An example
of such a regulation would be countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) included in Basel III.
We show next that a form of (risk-weighted) capital requirement can be used to address
risk externalities.
2.4 Risk Externalities and Financial Regulation
In this section, we address two questions related to the regulation of risk externalities:
implementation and optimal policy. When deriving the sufficient statistic for the externality
discussed in Section 2.2, we assumed that the planner could directly control investment
and risk-taking decisions. In practice, however, these outcomes must be achieved indi-
rectly through regulation. We show that two standard regulatory instruments, a tax shield
on debt and risk-weighted capital requirements on financial intermediaries, are capable
of implementing the desired allocation. We also consider the optimal level of regulation.
We solve the optimal policy problem and show how to relate the optimal level of the
regulatory instruments to risk externalities and, ultimately, asset prices.
2.4.1 Implementation and financial regulation
We assume that the planner controls investment and risk-taking through financial regula-
tion. We introduce a continuum of (local) financial intermediaries that raise funds from
investors to finance firms. These intermediaries are subject to regulatory constraints, is-
sue debt and equity, and use the proceeds to finance the firm at their own locations. We
assume that the intermediary j is in a bilateral relationship with firm j and the terms of
the lending contract are determined through bargaining. For the sake of simplicity, we
assume that the financial intermediary has all the bargaining power, so firms make no
profits in equilibrium, as the rents earned by the firm are extracted entirely by the in-
termediary. Given that firms make no profits, we simply assume that they are entirely
bank-financed and that the investors then choose a portfolio of financial firms that is sub-
ject to the limited-participation constraint (2.4).37
Financial intermediaries’ problem. Each intermediary j ∈ [0, 1) maximizes the value
37The assumption that the intermediary has all the bargaining power simplifies the exposition, but it is
not essential for the argument. We could have assumed instead that firms have some bargaining power,
so they would make profits. This would require, however, to characterize the capital structure of both
intermediaries and non-financial firms. As this additional layer of complexity is not necessary for our
implementation result, we abstract from these features.
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of equity. It also issues (riskless) deposits to investors, in quantity Dj. Intermediaries
receive a subsidy on deposits of τd, which can be interpreted as a tax shield. Let Pd denote
the price investors pay on the deposit (implying an interest rate of 1/Pd), so that the
intermediary receives Pd(1 + τd) for each unit of deposit.
As intermediaries have all the bargaining power, they maximize the surplus of the
relationship with the firm. Hence, the intermediary chooses the level of investment to
maximize the operational profit generated by the firm, net of the intermediaries’ borrow-






























Ikj − PdDj ≥∑
k
ωk Ikj . (2.19)
In the objective function, the difference between the first two terms represents the
amount of equity raised by the intermediary in the first period. The last term corresponds
to the surplus generated by the firms, net of deposits, discounted by the shareholder’s
SDF. The first constraint in (2.19) guarantees that deposits are riskless. The second one is
a regulatory constraint, a risk-weighted capital requirement, according to which equity must
exceed risk-weighted assets, given weights ωk for k = 0, 1.
Investment and risk-taking wedges. Consider the capital structure choice of the in-
termediary. Suppose initially that the regulatory constraint is not binding. Given our
assumption that deposits are riskless, there is no cost of default, unlike in the standard
trade-off theory of capital structure. As a consequence, the intermediary would choose
the maximum amount of debt to obtain the benefits of the tax shield. However, as we
introduce the capital requirement, another trade-off emerges: one between the tax benefit
and the tightening of the capital requirement constraint. We show in the appendix that,









The tax benefit essentially reduces the cost of investment, creating a wedge in the
investment Euler equation. Note that the risk weight does not directly affect the equation
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Imposing an additional risk weight on risky assets, ω1 > ω0, tends to reduce the
intensity of risk-taking in the economy. By reducing risk-taking, intermediaries increase
the covariance of ϕes with the SDF, as it becomes less negative, until it matches with the
right-hand side. The term Pdτd captures the shadow cost of the regulatory constraint, as the
intermediary optimally balances this shadow cost with the tax benefit.
We show in Appendix B.4 that a planner can use the tax shield, τd, and the risk
weights, (ω0, ω1), to solve the implementation problem. In particular, this result es-
tablishes that any allocation that is feasible, constrained in its risk-sharing by limited
participation, and features both implicit subsidies to investment and implicit taxes on
risk-taking can be implemented as an equilibrium of an economy in which debt is sub-
sidized by a tax shield and a risk-weighted capital requirement constraint is imposed on
intermediaries.
2.4.2 Optimal policy
We turn now to the design of the optimal policy. We seek first to characterize the proper-
ties of the (constrained) optimal allocation and then build on the implementation results
from the previous section to characterize how a tax shield and a risk-weighted capital
requirement can support this allocation in equilibrium. Relative to an unregulated econ-
omy, the planner internalizes changes in idiosyncratic risk that would be ignored by pri-
vate agents, and the magnitude of these external effects are related to the optimal level of
the policy instruments.38
The key constraint imposed on the planner is limited participation in idiosyncratic
risk-sharing. Moreover, we assume that the planner has no instrument with which to
distort the portfolio allocation of investors, even among the assets satisfying the limited
participation condition. We show, however, this is not a relevant constraint. We consider
a relaxed version of the planner’s problem, where only the participation constraint is
imposed, and then show that it is not optimal to distort portfolio decisions.
38The optimal allocation emerging in this section deviates from private optimization in ways that are
reminiscent of the perturbation arguments in Section 2.2.
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(1− α) (ΘKs)α − Tws
)]
≥ uw, (2.21)
where Raj,s = 1− δ + αθj (ΘKs)
α−1, and Ks = (1 + χϕes) I.
In the above relaxed planning problem, all constraints on feasibility and the distribu-
tion of consumption across agents are taken into account. Additionally, Equation (2.4)
imposes the same limited participation in idiosyncratic risk-sharing as before, while Con-
straint (2.21) guarantees that workers receive some arbitrary utility level, given by the
parameter uw. By varying this parameter, along with the lump-sum transfer Tws , one can
trace out a (constrained) Pareto frontier between workers’ and investors’ expected utility.
The solution to this problem is characterized in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 (Optimal Policy) The necessary first-order conditions of Problem (2.20) can be
summarized as:











where IREI ≈ (1− α)γφu
[
(1− χ)EQ[σ2s ] + χEQ[σ2s ϕ1s ]
]
.











where IREχ ≈ −(1− α)γφuCovQ(σ2s , ϕes).




















Proposition 6 provides a characterization of the optimal allocation. The main feature
of the solution is that the wedges in the Euler equations for investment and for the share
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invested in the risky technology depend on terms capturing idiosyncratic risk external-
ities, analogous to those in Propositions 3 and 4. The intuition for those terms is the
same as before: the planner internalizes the impact of investment decisions on the level
of idiosyncratic risk. The third condition gives the planner’s optimal portfolio condition,
which coincides with the condition for private investors (2.7). Therefore, the optimal pol-
icy consists of correcting the investment decisions instead of distorting investors’ trading
behavior.
An important feature of the solution is that the wedges can be directly related to the
two regulatory instruments available to the planner, the tax shield and the risk weights.
Comparing the investment Euler equation for the financial intermediary with the corre-
sponding one for the planner, we obtain




Hence, the tax benefit, per unit of investment, should equal the risk externality on in-
vestment, which is given by the weighted average of the externality on the two technolo-
gies. By matching the tax benefit to the risk externality, the planner induces the financial
intermediaries to internalize the effects that private agents do not take into account in the
laissez-faire equilibrium. Moreover, all the elements required to estimate the tax benefit
can be recovered directly from the data, as was illustrated in Section 2.3. This aspect con-
trasts with alternative approaches to the analysis of financial regulation, which typically
rely more heavily on the calibration and numerical solution of an economic model.
Comparing the Euler equation for the share invested in the risky technology for the
financial intermediary and for the planner, we obtain
(ω1 −ω0)τdPd = IREχ.
The above expression connects the risk weights, the tax benefit on debt, and the risk
externality on aggregate risk-taking. The term on the left-hand side captures the effect of
the regulation on the risk-taking decision. The term ω1 −ω0 corresponds to the extent to
which an increase in the share of the risky technology tightens the regulatory constraint,
and τdPd captures the shadow cost of the regulatory constraint. Given that the regula-
tory cost is an important part of the choice of capital structure, the shadow cost of the
regulatory constraint must equalize the tax benefit of debt. The right-hand side captures
the externality perceived by the social planner. By matching the effective regulatory cost
of the risky technology with the corresponding externality, the planner induces financial
intermediaries to take the appropriate degree of risk from a social perspective.
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An advantage of our expression for the risk weight is again the fact that it can be
estimated directly from the data. In our empirical exercise in Section 2.3, we connected the
risk externality to the idiosyncratic variance risk premium, in the context of our simple
two-state model. Our formulas hold more generally, though, and one could apply the
same expressions on environments with several assets and aggregate states. In particular,












for k, k′ = 1, 2, . . . , K, where K is the number of risky assets.
The expression above provides a tight connection between data on asset prices and
the optimal regulatory risk weight, which can be used to guide financial regulation.
2.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the impact of portfolio diversification frictions on asset prices,
investment, and welfare. We consider a production asset-pricing model where investors
hold under-diversified portfolios and idiosyncratic return risk is endogenous and coun-
tercyclical. We show that, absent intervention, this economy is constrained inefficient, fea-
turing underinvestment and excessive aggregate risk-taking. Our main contribution lies
in identifying these inefficiencies and connecting their magnitudes to sufficient statistics,
whcih can be measured directly in the data. In particular, these statistics are derived
from two risk premia: an idiosyncratic risk premium and an idiosyncratic variance risk
premium.
We find a significant impact of idiosyncratic uncertainty on welfare and also consider
the optimal financial regulation. The optimal allocation can be implemented using two
instruments: a tax shield on debt and risk-weighted capital requirements on financial
intermediaries. Intuitively, the tax shield on debt stimulates an increase in investment
levels, while the appropriate risk weights control risk-taking. The time-varying behavior
of these inefficiency measures can provide further guidance to regulators. For instance,
given that the measures of inefficiencies are countercyclical, they can be used to inform
the implementation of a countercyclical capital buffer.
Our model can be extended in several other directions in future research. For instance,
there is extensive work on limited international risk-sharing. Imperfect diversification
across international markets may lead to risk externalities and inefficiencies similar to the
ones we found in this paper. Additionally, the financial intermediary considered here is
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not subject to any friction, other than the one imposed by regulation. An interesting re-
search direction is to consider the role of risk externalities in a setting where the balance
sheets of intermediaries play an important role, as in the recent intermediary asset-pricing
literature (see, e.g., He and Krishnamurthy 2013). Given the importance of financial inter-
mediaries in determining asset prices, this could be another example of how asset-pricing
information may be directly relevant to the design of financial regulation.
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Chapter 3
Designated Market Makers Still Matter:
Evidence from Two Natural Experiments
In decades past, designated market makers (DMMs) were central fixtures of the equities
trading landscape in the United States. However, since the advent of Reg. NMS and
electronic trading, voluntary “de facto” market makers have supplanted DMMs as the
primary providers of liquidity. In contrast to DMMs, voluntary liquidity providers have
no formal obligations to maintain market-quality in their stocks. Nevertheless, modern
electronic markets rely almost entirely on voluntary liquidity provision, and the mar-
kets generally seem to function well. Although the 2010 Flash Crash rekindled interest
in market-maker obligations at times of extreme market turmoil, it is not obvious that
DMMs remain relevant in ordinary times. In U.S. markets, modern DMMs’ obligations
seem too small to clearly differentiate them from voluntary liquidity providers. However,
using a pair of natural experiments, we find strong evidence consistent with the notion
that these DMMs continue to exert an economically significant influence on U.S. markets.
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is the only major exchange in the U.S. that still
has DMMs, and these DMMs face relatively light obligations. The NYSE DMMs’ mild
obligations contrast sharply with those of, for example, some European DMMs who are
required to keep the spread within contractually prescribed limits that many times bind.1
Rigid obligations such as these “maximum spread rules” can certainly induce changes in
various dimensions of market quality. The scope for mild obligations to produce changes
in market quality is less obvious.
The bulk of the obligations that the NYSE DMMs face are somewhat subjective. These
DMMs are required, “insofar as reasonably practicable,” to maintain a “fair and orderly”
1See, for example, Venkataraman and Waisburd (2007), Anand et al. (2009), Menkveld and Wang (2013),
and Bessembinder et al. (2015).
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market in their stocks, which implies maintaining price continuity with reasonable depth,
and minimizing of the effects of temporary disparity between supply and demand. They
have no obligation to narrow the bid-ask spread. The DMMs’ explicitly quantified obliga-
tions, even in the most restrictive cases, are quite mild: DMMs must quote at the national
best bid and offer (NBBO) at least 15% of the time, and maintain quotes not more than 8%
away from the NBB/NBO. For context, the average proportional quoted spread among
the NYSE stocks that we study is roughly 18 basis points. Although NYSE DMMs can po-
tentially face disciplinary action and fines if they fail to maintain a fair and orderly market
insofar as reasonably practicable, the extent to which the loosely worded fair-and-orderly
obligations have independent “bite” is unclear.
To investigate the causal impact of NYSE DMMs’ presence in the market, we begin
by exploiting a natural experiment that arose on July 8, 2015, when a computer glitch
forced the NYSE to halt trading from 11:32 a.m. to 3:10 p.m. This unexpected, exoge-
nous event provides a unique opportunity to examine the impact of DMMs on market
quality, since the trading halt exogenously removed all DMMs from the market.2 More-
over, non-NYSE-listed stocks do not trade on the NYSE, so they were not directly affected
by the exchange’s trading halt. For the first stage of our analysis, NYSE-listed stocks
serve as our treatment group, and non-NYSE-listed stocks serve as our control group. A
difference-in-differences test reveals that the liquidity of NYSE-listed stocks fell signifi-
cantly relative to that of non-NYSE-listed stocks after the trading halt began. Compared
to the control group, the average NBBO proportional quoted spreads for the NYSE-listed
stocks widened by a factor of 1.22 during the halt, and the proportional effective spreads
widened by a factor of 1.17. Almost immediately after trading resumed on the NYSE,
spreads for the NYSE-listed stocks narrowed to their pre-halt values.
The basis on which stocks were assigned to the control vs. treatment groups was not
random, so we can’t dismiss, ex ante, the possibility that the non-NYSE-listed stocks in
our control group might differ systematically from the NYSE-listed stocks in our treat-
ment group. In particular, the fundamental concern is that our treatment stocks might be
more sensitive to an arbitrary “shutdown shock” than are the control stocks. However,
a second exogenous exchange-shutdown helps us to alleviate this concern. On July 6,
2015, two days before the NYSE event, the Direct Edge X platform (EDGX) experienced
an unrelated technological difficulty that forced the exchange to halt trading for part of
the day. Both the control-group stocks and the treatment-group stocks trade on EDGX, so
we can directly observe the impact of a trading-venue shutdown that affects both groups
2NYSE MKT, the former American Stock Exchange, also has DMMs, but its market share is less than 1%
in our sample, and it, too, closed during the NYSE shutdown.
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of stocks simultaneously. We find that this impact for stocks in both groups is negligible
and insignificant, as is the difference in impact between the two groups.
The reduction of liquidity observed during the NYSE shutdown therefore presents
a puzzle. The trading halt closed down only one exchange out of eleven. Liquidity
providers and demanders in equities markets are not directly affected by a technology
glitch at a single exchange, in that they can still submit orders to ten other exchanges
and off-exchange trading venues. As we witness during the EDGX shutdown, remov-
ing a trading venue without DMMs has essentially no effect. So why would the NYSE
shutdown have any meaningful effects? Mechanical explanations based on stock hetero-
geneity or intraday seasonality are readily ruled out by placebo tests using adjacent days’
data. We’re lead to the inevitable conclusion that the NYSE is not redundant: it has some
important distinguishing feature that causes improvement in liquidity.
The presence of DMMs is unambiguously one of the NYSE’s distinctive features, but
attributing liquidity effects to DMMs requires additional analysis. To explicitly investi-
gate whether our results reflect effects that may be attributable to the presence/absence of
DMMs, we analyze a proprietary NYSE dataset that documents the participation rate of
the DMM for each NYSE-listed stock. This dataset enables us to isolate the trading on the
NYSE where DMMs, as opposed to non-DMMs, participated. For each stock, we compute
the average fraction of total trading volume, across all exchanges and off-exchange trad-
ing venues, that executes on the NYSE on days prior to July 8, 2015. We then decompose
this NYSE market-share into a DMM component and a non-DMM component.
We find that higher DMM participation before the NYSE trading halt predicts larger
increases in quoted and effective spread during the halt, but we find no evidence that
the non-DMM participation rate has such predictive power. In other words, the NYSE
market-share does not appear to explain any additional cross-sectional variation beyond
what is explained by the share of DMM participation alone. These findings are consistent
with the notion that DMM participation drives the liquidity results.
Our study contributes to the literature by examining an exogenous loss of DMMs,
thereby avoiding the problem of self-selection bias pervasive in empirical studies on the
impact of DMMs. The extant empirical literature on DMMs focuses on the introduction of
the voluntary DMM contracts in France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden. 3 Menkveld
and Wang (2013), however, point out the self-selection bias across DMM and non-DMM
stocks that unavoidably becomes a pivotal element of such studies; Skjeltorp and Ode-
gaard (2015) find that firms that sign the DMM contract differ substantially from firms
3See Venkataraman and Waisburd (2007), Nimalendran and Petrella (2003) and Perroti and Rindi (2010),
Menkveld and Wang (2013), and Anand et al. (2009), respectively.
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that do not.
Our results also connect and contribute to the literature on high-frequency trading. In
particular, our paper suggests the relevance of preserving market-making obligations in a
world of fast trading. The large majority of the six DMMs in our sample meet the defini-
tion of “high-frequency trader” (HFT) set forth in the U.S. Securities and Exchanges Com-
mission’s 2010 Concept Release.4 HFTs who do not have any market-making obligations
also trade on the NYSE. We find no evidence that the loss of voluntary HFT liquidity-
providers in the NYSE harms liquidity, whereas we find evidence consistent with the
theory that the loss of DMMs causes spreads to widen substantially. Our empirical re-
sults complement the theory work of Bessembinder et al. (2011), who identify underlying
economic mechanisms that explain how and why DMMs’ maintenance of narrow spreads
can improve market efficiency and social welfare.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 3.1 describes the insti-
tutional details, data, and our methodology for addressing intraday-seasonality effects.
Section 3.2 presents difference-in-differences analyses, placebo tests from the days before
and the day after the NYSE glitch, and compares effects of the NYSE shutdown to those
of the EDGX shutdown. Section 3.3 uses the proprietary dataset to examine the cross-
sectional relationship between pre-halt DMM participation rates and changes in liquid-
ity during the halt. Section 3.4 exploits the exogenous variation provided by the NYSE
halt, in conjunction with the proprietary dataset, to analyze cross-sectional patterns in the
participation and impact of DMMs. Section 3.5 discusses the issue of why NYSE DMMs
might improve liquidity to the extent that empirical results suggest. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.1 Data and institutional details
In this Section, we provide an overview of key institutional details of the NYSE’s DMM
system, describe our data and measure of liquidity, and explain the technique we use to
correct for intraday seasonality in our data.
3.1.1 Institutional details
According to the NYSE, its designated market-makers are the cornerstone of the ex-
change’s market model. Each stock has one DMM, whom the issuer selects. DMMs are
the successors of the so-called “specialists” on the NYSE.
4The six DMM firms are Barclays, Brendan E. Cryan & Co., IMC Financial Markets, J Streicher & Co.
LLC, KCG, and Virtu Financial Capital Markets LLC.
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Like the specialists, DMMs have affirmative obligations to maintain a fair and orderly
market in their stocks, quote at the NBBO a specified percentage of the time, and facil-
itate price discovery throughout the day as well as at the open, close, and in periods of
significant imbalances and high volatility. However, DMMs’ affirmative obligations are
not identical to those of the specialists. For example, DMMs do not face the formal Price
Continuity Rule that applied to the specialists.5 Also, DMMs do not face the negative
obligations that the specialists once did. The NYSE removed the “public order prece-
dence rule,” and thereby allowed DMMs to compete for order-priority on parity with
floor traders and electronic limit order books. In 2008, the NYSE also exempted DMMs
from the “public liquidity preservation principle,” that had discouraged specialists from
taking liquidity from the public limit order book. DMMs also receive privileges, as the
specialists did, but those privileges are now quite modest.
In Section 3.5 we discuss DMMs’ privileges and their (ir)relevance to our results. Ap-
pendix A provides a detailed discussion of DMMs’ privileges. Appendix B provides the
direct text of selected NYSE rules that describe DMMs’ precise obligations.
3.1.2 Data and sample
Our data are drawn from the Trade and Quote (TAQ), Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP), and Institutional Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) databases. We also
use a set of proprietary data on NYSE DMM participation that we describe in detail in
Section 3.3, where the data enter our analysis. Our preliminary sample of stocks consists
of all common stocks that are present in the Daily TAQ (DTAQ) master file for both July 6,
2015 and July 8, 2015, and that are listed in the CRSP database on December 31, 2014. We
then restrict attention to only those stocks whose monthly share volume for December
2014 exceeded 10,000 shares, and whose closing price on December 31, 2014 exceeded
$5.00.
We divide this sample of stocks into a treatment group and a control group, based on
the data field “TradedOnNYSE” in the DTAQ Master File Data for July 8, 2015. The treat-
ment group consists of sample stocks that are traded on the NYSE (TradedOnNYSE = 1),
and the control group consists of stocks that are not traded on the NYSE (TradedOnNYSE = 0).
We obtain 980 treated stocks, and 922 control stocks. Table 3.1 presents the summary
statistics for the two groups of stocks.
We use TAQ data to construct the NBBO prices, and we calculate liquidity measures
5Panayides (2007) discusses the specialists’ affirmative obligations, and the particular importance of the
Price Continuity Rule.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics for treated and control stocks
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics describing the stocks in our sample for July of 2015. July 6,
the day of the EDGX halt, and July 8, the day of the NYSE halt, are not used in computing these
summary statistics. The “treated” group consists of 980 stocks that are traded on the NYSE. The






Quoted Spread (cent) 5.24 7.46 7.87 11.83
Proportional Quoted Spread (bps) 17.80 19.67 20.97 20.64
Effective Spread (cent) 3.62 5.13 5.84 13.53
Proportional Effective Spread (bps) 12.76 13.96 18.41 59.70
Dollar Depth (thousand) 22.80 42.61 23.86 39.31
Daily Dollar Volume (million) 23.31 51.55 26.68 91.43
Price (dollars) 32.51 22.61 34.67 26.11
Market Capitalization (billion) 2.77 8.47 2.87 9.88
following Holden and Jacobsen (2014).6 The quoted spread is the difference between the
best bid and best ask prices. The effective spread measures the cost of trading against the
actual supply of liquidity; the effective spread is defined for a buy as twice the difference
between the trade price and the midpoint of the NBBO price, and for a sell as twice the
difference between the midpoints of the NBBO and the trade price. A proportional spread
(quoted, effective) is the spread divided by the midpoint of the best bid and best ask
prices. Measures of quoted spread and proportional quoted spread are weighted by the
time, while measures of effective spread and proportional effective spread are weighted
by trade-size. We measure depth as the time-weighted average of displayed depth at the
NBBO.
6DTAQ provides two files that contain official NBBO quotes. If a single exchange has both best bid
and offer, then the official NBBO quotes will be recorded in the DTAQ Quotes File. Otherwise, the NBBO
quotes will be recorded in the DTAQ NBBO file. We combine the NBBO quotes from both files to construct
the complete official NBBO. We exclude quotes with abnormal quote conditions (A, B, H, O, R, and W). We
delete quote whose bid is greater than or equal to ask. We also delete cases in which the quoted spread is
greater than $5.00.
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3.1.3 Intraday seasonality correction and normalizations
McInish and Wood (1992) find that liquidity has a reverse J-shaped intraday pattern:
spreads are much higher at the beginning of the day relative to mid-day, and moderately
higher at the end of the day relative to mid-day. Since the NYSE trading halt occurred in
the middle of the trading day, time-of-day artifacts contaminate direct comparisons of liq-
uidity during the halt to liquidity before and/or after the halt. We correct for intraday sea-
sonality using multiplicative seasonal adjustment, following Harvey (1993). This method
divides each value of the time series by a seasonal index that represents the long-run av-
erage value typically observed in each season. In our application, we split the trading day
into ten-minute intervals (39 intervals in total) and compute the liquidity measures dur-
ing each interval. To adjust for intraday seasonality, we calculate the monthly average of
the indicated measure for each stock during each of the 39 time intervals, then divide the
values measured on the day of interest by the corresponding interval-stock monthly av-
erages. The averages are taken over all trading days in July 2015, except for the two event
dates (July 6 and 8). We refer to the resulting adjusted measures as the “normalized”
measures.
Figure 3.1 provides a concrete illustration of how this intraday-seasonality adjustment
normalizes the data, here in the case of proportional effective spreads on the day of the
NYSE shutdown, July 8. For a given ten-minute interval, the vertical axis represents the
ratio of the spread in that interval on July 8 to the average spread in that interval during
the rest of of the month. The solid black line reflects the cross-sectional average among the
980 treatment stocks, while the dashed line reflects the cross-sectional average among the
922 control stocks. So, for example, during the interval 12:00:00 p.m. - 12:09:59 p.m. on
July 8, proportional effective spreads on the control stocks were roughly 10% above their
(respective) typical levels, while effective spreads on the treatment stocks were roughly
35% above their (respective) typical levels.
To a first approximation, for both quoted spreads and effective spreads, the normal-
ized spread and the normalized proportional spread will be equal. Algebraically, the di-
vision by the midpoint price approximately washes out in the normalization, provided
that the price doesn’t vary too wildly over the course of the month. For brevity, we omit
results on non-proportional spreads, but the results are nearly identical to those reported
for the proportional spreads.
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Figure 3.1: Normalized proportional effective spreads on July 8th (NYSE halt)
Figure 3.1 depicts the time-series of normalized proportional effective spreads during July 8, 2015.
The gray shaded region indicates the period during which the NYSE was shut down on July 8.
The solid black line reflects the cross-sectional average among the 980 treatment stocks (stocks
ordinarily traded on the NYSE), while the dashed line reflects the cross-sectional average among
the 922 control stocks (stocks never traded on the NYSE). The horizontal axis represents time
throughout the trading day, and the vertical axis represents the ratio of the spread on July 8 to
the average spread at the same time of day on the other trading days in July 2015. For example,
during the interval 12:00:00 p.m. - 12:09:59 p.m. on July 8, proportional effective spreads on the
control stocks were roughly 10% above their (respective) typical levels, while effective spreads on
the treatment stocks were roughly 35% above their (respective) typical levels.
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3.2 Difference-in-differences tests
As an initial analysis, we perform a difference-in-differences test around the NYSE trad-
ing halt. We compute the measures of liquidity for each stock on July 8, 2015 before the
NYSE trading halt, during the halt, and after the halt, and then calculate the inter-period
differences. For each of these inter-period differences, we compare the average among
the treatment stocks to the corresponding average among the control stocks. This basic
diff-in-diffs procedure sets up the framework for our subsequent refinements and elabo-
rations. Subsection 3.2.1 presents and discusses the primary diff-in-diffs results. Subsec-
tion 3.2.2 considers the limitations of the control group as a fully suitable “control,” and
presents placebo-test results as a partial remedy. Subsection 3.2.3 uses the shutdown of
EDGX on July 6 to directly address remaining concerns about systematic differences be-
tween the treatment-group stocks and the control-group stocks that might produce spu-
rious diff-in-diffs results.
3.2.1 Diff-in-diffs tests using the NYSE halt
For each stock, we calculate the average normalized measures of liquidity in the periods
before the NYSE trading halt (9:30:00 a.m. - 11:29:59 a.m.), during the halt (11:30:00 a.m.
- 3:09:59 p.m.), after the halt (3:10:00 p.m. - 4:00:00 p.m.), and not during the halt (com-
bining “before” with “after”). We then compute, on a stock-by-stock basis, the difference
in liquidity across different time-periods: “during” minus “before,” “during” minus “af-
ter,” and “during” minus “not during.” We average each inter-period difference across
the 980 treatment stocks, and across the 922 control stocks, then we compare the treatment
average to the control average.
To assess statistical significance, we construct bootstrap distributions using data from
the entire month of July 2015, excluding July 6 and July 8. For each draw in the bootstrap
distributions, a sample of 980 treatment stocks is selected randomly (with replacement),
and a sample of 922 control stocks is selected randomly (with replacement); one trading
day is randomly selected (with replacement) as the source of data for the “during halt”
period, and a second trading day is randomly selected as the source of data for the other
period (i.e., “before,” “after,” or “not during”). We use twenty million draws to construct
each bootstrap distribution.
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Table 3.2: Normalized spread differences and diffs-in-diffs on July 8th (NYSE Halt)
Table 3.2 summarizes difference and diff-in-diffs results for normalized proportional quoted
spreads (Panel A) and normalized proportional effective spreads (Panel B) on July 8, the day
of the NYSE trading halt. NYSE-listed stocks’ spreads increased during the halt, and increased
significantly more than did those of non-NYSE-listed stocks. Quoted spreads are computed as
time-weighted averages, while effective spreads are computed as trade-size-weighted averages.
To normalize for intraday seasonality, we calculate the monthly average of the indicated measure
for each stock during each of the 39 ten-minute time intervals in a trading day, then divide the val-
ues measured on July 8th by the corresponding interval-stock monthly averages. For each stock,
we calculate the average normalized measures of spreads in the period before the NYSE trading
halt (9:30 a.m. - 11:30 a.m.), during the halt (11:30 a.m. - 3:10 p.m.), and after the halt (3:10 p.m. -
4:00 p.m.). The “not during” period combines the “before” and “after” periods. The first column
in Table 3.2 reports the averages among the 980 NYSE-listed treatment stocks of the difference
in liquidity across the indicated time-periods; the second column reports the analogous average
among the 922 non-NYSE-listed control stocks. The third column reports the difference in these
averages between the treatment group and the control group. The fourth column reports the p-
value associated with the null hypothesis that this diff-in-diffs equals zero. The p-values are based
on bootstrap distributions generated using data from the month of July 2015, excluding July 6 and
July 8.
Panel A: Proportional quoted spreads
Diff Across Periods Treat Diff minus Control Diff
Treatment Control Diff-in-Diffs p-Value
During minus Not 0.256 0.037 0.219 <1E-7
During minus Before 0.287 0.070 0.217 <1E-7
During minus After 0.181 -0.042 0.223 <1E-7
Panel B: Proportional effective spreads
Diff Across Periods Treat Diff minus Control Diff
Treatment Control Diff-in-Diffs p-Value
During minus Not 0.228 0.054 0.175 <1E-7
During minus Before 0.250 0.084 0.166 <1E-7
During minus After 0.177 -0.018 0.195 <1E-7
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Spreads
The diff-in-diffs analysis reveals that the NYSE shutdown led to a large, significant in-
crease in the treatment stocks’ spreads, relative to the controls’. Table 3.2 reports the main
results. For the treatment-group stocks, normalized proportional quoted spreads were
approximately 29% higher during the NYSE shutdown than they were before the shut-
down. By comparison, normalized proportional quoted spreads for the control-group
stocks were approximately 7% higher during the NYSE shutdown than they were before
the shutdown. These results indicate that the NYSE halt caused the proportional quoted
spread for a typical treated stock to increase by nearly 22% relative to its baseline. Unsur-
prisingly, the statistical significance of this large increase is overwhelming.
Proportional effective spreads displayed a pattern very similar to that of proportional
quoted spreads. The diff-in-diffs results show that the NYSE halt caused the proportional
effective spread for a typical treated stock to increase by roughly 17% relative to its base-
line. Although the difference-in-differences for proportional effective spreads is slightly
smaller than that for proportional quoted spreads, the increase is still highly significant,
both statistically and economically.
Depth
In contrast to spreads, depth does not change in any discernible way for the treatment-
group stocks during the NYSE shutdown. Table 3.3 reports full results from our diff-
in-diffs analysis of depth and dollar depth, but the concise summary is that we find no
significant effects. This is not entirely surprising. Because quoted spreads widened (for
the treatment-group stocks) during the NYSE shutdown, comparing depth at the NBBO
during the shutdown to depth at the NBBO before or after the shutdown is not an apples-
to-apples comparison. An increase in spread implies that depth at top of the book is
currently at price levels that would have been considered inferior previously, when the
spread was tighter.
3.2.2 Placebo tests
To address the possibility that the results in Section 3.2.1 are driven by heterogeneity be-
tween treatment and control stocks, or by mechanical time-of-day effects that are not ad-
equately corrected by our intraday-seasonality adjustments, we repeat the analysis from
Section 3.2.1 using data from July 7 (the day before the NYSE shutdown), and from July 9
(the day after the NYSE shutdown). Figure 3.2 illustrates the placebo analysis in the case
of proportional effective spreads. Both panels of Figure 3.2 are analogues of Figure 3.1.
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Table 3.3: Normalized depth differences and diffs-in-diffs on July 8th (NYSE Halt)
Table 3.3 summarizes results from difference-in-differences tests around the NYSE trading halt
on July 8, 2015, for depth (Panel A) and dollar depth (Panel B). We find no significant difference
between changes in NYSE-listed stocks’ and non-NYSE-listed stocks’ depth or dollar depth. Both
depth and dollar depth are computed as time-weighted averages. To normalize for intraday sea-
sonality, we calculate the monthly average of the indicated measure for each stock during each
of the 39 ten-minute time intervals in a trading day, then divide the values measured on July
8th by the corresponding interval-stock monthly averages. For each stock, we calculate the aver-
age normalized measures of depth in the period before the NYSE trading halt (9:30 a.m. - 11:30
a.m.), during the halt (11:30a.m. - 3:10 p.m.), and after the halt (3:10 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.). The “not
during” period combines the “before” and “after” periods. The first column of the table reports
the averages among the 980 NYSE-listed treatment stocks of the difference in liquidity across the
indicated time-periods, and the second column reports the analogous average among the 922 non-
NYSE-listed control stocks. The third column reports the difference in these averages between the
treatment group and the control group. The fourth column reports the p-value associated with
the null hypothesis that this diff-in-diffs equals zero. The p-values are based on bootstrap distri-
butions generated using data from the month of July 2015, excluding July 6 and July 8.
Panel A: Depth
Diff. Across Periods Treat Diff. minus Control Diff.
Treatment Control Diff-in-Diffs p-Value
During minus Not 0.036 0.023 0.013 0.598
During minus Before 0.011 -0.007 0.018 0.514
During minus After 0.096 0.093 0.003 0.926
Panel B: Dollar depth
Diff. Across Periods Treat Diff. minus Control Diff.
Treatment Control Diff-in-Diffs p-Value
During minus Not 0.034 0.019 0.015 0.554
During minus Before 0.007 -0.012 0.019 0.477
During minus After 0.097 0.093 0.004 0.884
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Figure 3.2: Normalized proportional effective spread placebos for the NYSE halt
Panel A: July 7th Panel B: July 9th
Figure 3.2 depicts the time-series of normalized proportional effective spreads during July 7th
(Panel A) and July 9th (Panel B). The gray shaded region indicates the period during which the
NYSE was shut down on July 8; the NYSE was not shut down during this period on July 7 or
July 9. The solid black line reflects the cross-sectional average among the 980 treatment stocks
(stocks ordinarily traded on the NYSE), while the dashed line reflects the cross-sectional average
among the 922 control stocks (stocks never traded on the NYSE). The horizontal axis represents
time throughout the trading day, and the vertical axis represents the ratio of the spread on July 8
to the average spread at the same time of day on the other trading days in July 2015.
As in Figure 3.1, the gray shaded region indicates the period during which the NYSE was
shut down on July 8; however, the NYSE remained open and operational during those
times on July 7 and July 9.
Table 3.4 reports the placebo-test results for normalized spreads. On the placebo days,
the diffs-in-diffs are not significantly different from zero. In other words, the placebo-
test results suggest that the bulk of the effects documented in Section 3.2.1 could not be
driven by intraday seasonality, nor could they be driven by stock heterogeneity, unless
the treatment-group stocks differ systematically from the control-group stocks in their
sensitivity to a generic “trading-venue shutdown” event. We address this remaining pos-
sibility in the next subsection.
3.2.3 EDGX shutdown
The preceding Sections establish that during the NYSE trading halt on July 8, the NYSE-
listed stocks that comprise our treatment group exhibited a significant reduction in liquid-
ity relative to non-NYSE-listed stocks that comprise our control group. However, stocks
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Table 3.4: Placebo diff-in-diff results for normalized spreads on July 7th and July 9th
Table 3.4 reports the placebo-test diff-in-diff results for normalized proportional quoted and ef-
fective spreads. The significant diff-in-diffs spread results from the NYSE halt are not mechanical
artifacts; applying identical diff-in-diffs analysis to data from days adjacent to the NYSE halt does
not produce significant results. Using data from July 7th, and then July 9th, we repeat the anal-
ysis from Section 3.2.1: For each stock, we calculate the average normalized measures of depth
in the period before the NYSE trading halt (9:30 a.m. - 11:30 a.m.), during the halt (11:30 a.m.
- 3:10 p.m.), and after the halt (3:10 p.m. - 4:00 p.m.). The “not during” period combines the
“before” and “after” periods. The first column of the table reports the averages among the 980
NYSE-listed treatment stocks of the difference in liquidity across the indicated time-periods, and
the second column reports the analogous average among the 922 non-NYSE-listed control stocks.
The third column reports the difference in these averages between the treatment group and the
control group. The fourth column reports the p-value associated with the null hypothesis that this
diff-in-diffs equals zero. The p-values are based on bootstrap distributions generated using data
from the month of July 2015, excluding July 6 and July 8.
Panel A: Normalized proportional quoted spread





During minus Not 0.086 0.069 0.017 0.401
During minus Before 0.097 0.075 0.022 0.337
During minus After 0.059 0.054 0.005 0.796
July 9th
During minus Not -0.030 -0.034 0.004 0.844
During minus Before -0.040 -0.053 0.013 0.566
During minus After -0.005 0.013 -0.018 0.357
Panel B: Normalized proportional effective spread





During minus Not 0.095 0.089 0.006 0.765
During minus Before 0.106 0.096 0.010 0.686
During minus After 0.069 0.072 -0.003 0.900
July 9th
During minus Not -0.027 -0.031 0.004 0.852
During minus Before -0.037 -0.049 0.012 0.640
During minus After -0.003 0.011 -0.014 0.512
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were assigned to the control-group or treatment-group on the basis of their listing ex-
change, and firms’ choice of listing exchange is not random. The fundamental concern,
therefore, is that our treatment stocks might be more sensitive to a general “shutdown
shock” than are our control stocks. We address this concern by examining a separate ex-
ogenous technology-related trading halt that occurred on the EDGX platform two days
prior to the NYSE glitch. The EDGX halt allows us to directly observe how a trading-
venue shutdown affects the stocks in our sample. All of the stocks in both our treatment
group and our control group trade on EDGX, so both groups were exposed to the EDGX
shutdown.
On July 6, 2015 at 9:41 a.m., EDGX suspended trading, saying in a note to customers
that it was investigating “an issue related to platform modifications rolled out today.”
EDGX resumed trading at 10:20 a.m.7 EDGX is the fourth largest stock exchange in the
United States. In the last week of September 2015, EDGX covered 8.08% of consolidated
trading volume, whereas NYSE covered 13.02% trading volume in the same period. A
shutdown of EDGX is a non-trivial event (although we find that the effects of the July 6th
shutdown were trivial).
We apply the same general methodology used in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 to analyze the
effects of the EDGX shutdown. However, we now calculate the average normalized mea-
sures of liquidity in the time period during the EDGX shutdown (9:40:00 a.m. - 10:19:59
a.m.), and in the complementary portion of the trading day. Because the EDGX shut-
down occurred so early in the day, we do not separately examine the pre-shutdown and
post-shutdown periods, but instead combine them into a single “not during the EDGX
shutdown” period.
As shown in Panel A of Table 3.5, we neither find evidence that spreads for the treatment-
group stocks increased more during the EDGX shutdown than did spreads for the control-
group stocks, nor do we find evidence that depth for the treatment-group stocks de-
creased more during the EDGX shutdown than did depth for the control-group stocks.8
As shown in Panel B of Table 3.5, repeating the EDGX analysis on placebo data from July
9th delivers increases in average spreads comparable to the increases observed during the
actual EDGX shutdown, for both control-group stocks and treatment-group stocks, inde-
pendently. Results for depth and dollar depth (not reported) are analogous. The EDGX
shutdown seems to have had almost no effect on the market as a whole.
7Source: https://www.batstrading.com/alerts/72398/status/
8Since the fraction of trading on EDGX is generally higher among the control-group stocks than among
the treatment-group stocks, we run a cross-sectional regression to explicitly control for the typical fraction
of each stock’s trading that takes place on EDGX. We find no evidence that our results in this section are
driven by differences in the fraction of trading on EDGX.
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Table 3.5: Liquidity differences and diffs-in-diffs from the EDGX halt
Table 3.5 summarizes the results for diffs-in-diffs of various liquidity measures on July 6, 2015, the
day of the EDGX halt. Unlike the NYSE halt, the EDGX halt did not produce significant differ-
ences in liquidity. To normalize for intraday seasonality, we calculate the monthly average of the
indicated measure for each stock during each of the 39 ten-minute time intervals of the trading
day, then divide the values measured on July 6th by the corresponding interval-stock monthly av-
erages. We calculate the average normalized liquidity measures for the period during the EDGX
shutdown (9:40 a.m. - 10:20 a.m.), and for the complementary portion of the trading day. The
first column reports the averages among the treatment stocks of the difference in the indicated liq-
uidity measure between the “during-shutdown” and “not-during-shutdown” periods; the second
column reports the analogous averages among the control stocks. The third column reports the
difference in these averages between the treatment group and the control group. For spreads, we
test the null hypothesis that the diff-in-diffs is less than or equal to zero, while for depths, we test
the null hypothesis that the diff-in-diffs is greater than or equal to zero. The fourth and fifth columns
report the p-values associated with the indicated null hypothesis. The p-values are based on boot-
strap distributions generated using data from the month of July 2015, excluding July 6 and July 8.
Panel A reports results for the actual day of the EDGX halt, July 6th. To provide context, Panel B
compares the results from July 6 against placebo-test results from July 7 and July 9.
Panel A: EDGX halt
During minus Not During Treatment Diff minus Control Diff
Treatment Control Mean p-Value p-Value
H0 : DiD ≤ 0 H0 : DiD ≥ 0
Proport. Qtd Spread -0.0045 0.0349 -0.0394 0.951 -
Proport. Eff Spread 0.0006 0.0445 -0.0438 0.956 -
Depth 0.0383 0.0584 -0.0201 - 0.384
Dollar Depth 0.0366 0.0530 -0.0164 - 0.315
Panel B: EDGX halt vs. placebos
During minus Not During Treatment Diff minus Control Diff
Treatment Control Mean p-Value
(H0 : DiD ≤ 0)
Proport. Qtd Spread
Placebo, July 7 -0.1410 -0.1242 -0.0168 0.763
EDGX Halt, July 6 -0.0045 0.0349 -0.0394 0.951
Placebo, July 9 0.0012 0.0223 -0.0211 0.817
Proport. Eff Spread
Placebo, July 7 -0.1330 -0.1200 -0.0130 0.691
EDGX Halt, July 6 0.0006 0.0445 -0.0438 0.956
Placebo, July 9 0.0082 0.0192 -0.0110 0.666
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The evidence from the EDGX shutdown indicates that the results in Section 3.2.1 are
not driven by some systematic difference in how the treatment-group and control-group
stocks react to a generic trading-venue shutdown, but rather are driven by some effect
unique to the shutdown of the NYSE.
3.3 Distinguishing a DMM effect from a general NYSE ef-
fect
In the case of the EDGX trading halt, shutting down one exchange out of eleven had no
significant effect. By contrast, in the case of the NYSE trading halt, shutting down one
exchange out of eleven had a significant effect: the NYSE shutdown impaired liquidity
for the treatment-group stocks. However, this result could be driven by the fact that the
NYSE is the listing market for the treatment stocks. Despite consistently losing market
share to competing exchanges, the NYSE remains the largest market center for its listed
stocks. The reduction of liquidity during the NYSE trading halt might simply have been
the consequence of losing the listing market. More generally, the decrease in liquidity
during the NYSE shutdown might reflect a consequence of removing from the market
some NYSE-specific feature other than DMMs. Were that true, we would expect stocks
that ordinarily have a higher market share in the NYSE to exhibit larger reduction in
liquidity during the halt, but holding fixed NYSE market-share, the level of DMM partic-
ipation would not matter. Conversely, if DMMs are responsible (in part or in whole) for
the observed liquidity effects, those effects should be stronger among stocks where DMM
participation was ordinarily higher, ceteris paribus.
We use a proprietary dataset obtained from the NYSE to determine DMM partici-
pation rates for each of the NYSE-listed stocks in our sample. The proprietary dataset
reports the daily share-volume and dollar-volume traded by the DMM for each NYSE-
listed stock. We also know the stock-level total daily volumes that execute on the NYSE,
so we can isolate the component of trading on the NYSE where DMMs, as opposed to
non-DMMs, participated.
3.3.1 Explanatory power of cross-sectional variation in DMM partici-
pation rates
For each stock, we compute the average fraction of total trading volume, in shares, (across
all exchanges and off-exchange trading venues) that executed on the NYSE in the three
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trading days preceding July 8. For stock i, we denote this fraction by NYSEsharei. We de-
compose NYSEsharei into a DMM component (DMMsharei) and a non-DMM component
(NonDMMsharei), then examine these two components’ power to explain cross-sectional
variation in the reductions of liquidity that occurred during the July 8 trading halt.
As before, we focus on normalized proportional quoted spread and normalized pro-
portional effective spread as our measures of liquidity. For each stock, we construct the
“during-halt minus before-halt” difference in the liquidity measure, now denoting this
difference generically by ∆i for stock i. We estimate the following equation:
∆i = β0 + β1DMMsharei + β2NonDMMsharei + εi (3.1)
If the reduction in liquidity during the NYSE shutdown was caused by the removal of
DMMs from the market, rather than the removal of some other NYSE-specific element,
then the coefficient β1 on DMMshare should be significant and positive, and the coeffi-
cient β2 on NonDMMshare should not be significant. This is precisely what we find in
the data.
Table 3.6 reports the regression results. Column 1 shows that stocks with higher DMM
participation rates in the days preceding the NYSE halt experienced larger increases in
proportional quoted spreads during the halt. However, the non-DMM participation rate
on the NYSE, pre-halt, is not a significant predictor of spread increases during the halt.
Column 4 shows that the results for effective spreads are analogous.
3.3.2 Robustness checks
To verify the robustness of the preceding regression results, we re-run regression (3.1)
with additional control variables that have been indicated previously to correlate with
DMM participation. Specifically, we include the following for each stock: its price, the
logarithm of its market capitalization, the number of analysts who follow it, and its
information-share on the NYSE relative to all other exchanges combined. We include
these extra variables to better distinguish the effects of cross-sectional variation in DMMshare
from the effects of cross-sectional variation along other dimensions. We estimate:
∆i = β0 + β1DMMsharei + β2NonDMMsharei + x′iβ3 + εi, (3.2)
where xi denotes the vector of stock-specific controls, and β3 denotes the associated vector
of coefficients.9
9We thank Hank Bessembinder for suggesting this approach.
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Table 3.6: Explanatory power of DMM vs. Non-DMM participation rates for liquidity
reduction during NYSE Halt
Table 3.6 reports results from cross-sectional regressions of “during-NYSE-halt minus before-
NYSE-halt” differences in spread, on stock-by-stock measures of DMM and non-DMM partici-
pation prior to the NYSE trading halt, along with a variety of additional control variables. The
sample consists of the 980 treatment-group stocks. The variable DMMshare measures the ratio
of DMM volume in a given stock to total consolidated volume in that stock, and the variable
NonDMMshare measures the analogous ratio for the remainder of volume on the NYSE. Both of
these measures are calculated using data from the three trading days preceding July 8, 2015. The
variable price is the stock’s average closing price; logmktcap is the logarithm of the stock’s mar-
ket capitalization; Analystcover is the number of analysts following the stock; InfoShrNYSE is the
NYSE’s information share for the stock (the average of the estimated minimum and maximum
bounds). Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance at the
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Diff in Normalized Qtd Spread Diff in Normalized Eff Spread
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DMMshare 1.931*** 2.032*** 1.353*** 1.458***
(0.197) (0.192) (0.263) (0.261)
NonDMMshare -0.675 0.589 -0.482 0.679
(0.656) (0.668) (0.876) (0.907)
NYSEshare 1.853*** 1.362***
(0.170) (0.230)
price 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002***
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
logmktcap -0.006 -0.008 -0.018 -0.019
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013)
Analystcover -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
InfoShrNYSE -0.188** -0.176* -0.162 -0.155
(0.091) (0.091) (0.124) (0.124)
Constant -0.057 -0.016 -0.015 0.009 0.135 0.135
(0.038) (0.087) (0.087) (0.050) (0.118) (0.118)
Adjusted R2 0.092 0.139 0.137 0.027 0.048 0.048
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We include price because the DMMs that we consider would generally be classified
as HFTs, and both O’Hara et al. (2015) and Yao and Ye (2015) find that HFTs are more
likely to provide liquidity to low-priced stocks. Bessembinder et al. (2015) find that small
firms and firms with greater information asymmetry would be more likely to benefit from
DMMs; we therefore include firm size (i.e. log market cap) and, following Anand et al.
(2009), include number of analysts as a proxy for information asymmetry.
Hasbrouck (1995) finds that the majority of price discovery among NYSE-listed stocks
occurred on the NYSE, and a valid concern is that liquidity providers might have held
back during the NYSE halt if they thought that price discovery were compromised. To
address this possibility, we include the NYSE information share for each stock as a stock-
specific measure of the NYSE’s importance to price discovery. Appendix C presents full
implementation details. The Hasbrouck (1995) methodology for computing information
share produces estimates of the upper and lower bounds on the NYSE information share
for each stock. Following Baillie et al. (2002), and Chakravarty et al. (2004), we use
the average of the upper and lower bounds. In unreported results, we verify that the
coefficients on DMMshare and NonDMMshare are not sensitive to the choice of upper
bound vs. lower bound vs. average.
Table 3.6 displays the estimates from these expanded regressions. The results for
quoted spreads (Column 2) are comparable to those for effective spreads (Column 5). Al-
though the additional control variables add significant explanatory power, the key results
from our earlier regressions are unchanged. The coefficient on DMMshare remains pos-
itive and highly statistically significant, while the coefficient on NonDMMshare remains
statistically insignificant by a wide margin.
We also run the following regressions:
∆i = α0 + α1NYSEsharei + x′iα2 + εi, (3.3)
where xi again denotes the vector of stock-specific controls, and α2 denotes the associated
vector of coefficients. That is, we regress the changes in liquidity during the NYSE shut-
down on pre-halt NYSE market-share in each stock. Columns 3 and 6 of Table 3.6 report
the results for Equation (3.3). Absent further decomposition, pre-halt NYSE market-share
appears to be a significant predictor for increases in quoted and effective spreads during
the NYSE halt. However, the results for Equation (3.2), displayed in Columns 2 and 5, re-
veal that the DMM component of pre-halt NYSE market-share subsumes this predictive
power. Pre-halt NYSE market-share appears to matter only to the extent that it proxies
for pre-halt DMM participation.
Collectively, the findings in this Section are consistent with the idea that the liquidity
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effects observed during the NYSE shutdown were driven by the removal of DMMs, rather
than by the removal of the NYSE per se.
3.4 Additional cross-sectional results
Sections 3 and 4 present our central findings, namely evidence consistent with the notion
that DMMs cause a substantial improvement in liquidity. In this section we broaden the
scope of our analysis, using the exogenous variation from the NYSE glitch in combination
with the proprietary dataset to document new stylized facts about cross-sectional patterns
of modern DMMs’ participation, and to obtain new empirical evidence concerning the
types of stocks for which DMM participation appears to matter most.
3.4.1 Cross-sectional patterns in DMM participation
The six current NYSE DMMs, based on their firm identity, would typically be categorized
as HFTs. In the context of the NASDAQ market for common stocks (where no traders,
HFTs included, face market-making obligations), Yao and Ye (2015) and Brogaard et al.
(2014) find that the HFT participation rate is higher for large stocks; Yao and Ye (2015)
also find that HFT liquidity provision is higher for low-priced securities. We investigate
whether DMMs’ pattern of participation differs from that of “normal” HFTs, and whether
the differential liquidity outcomes caused by DMMs versus other liquidity providers can
be well-explained by the cross-sectional pattern of DMMs’ participation.
Table 3.7 presents the results from regressions of DMM participation rate on price,
market cap, and analyst coverage. Analyst coverage is included to help control for vari-
ation in informational asymmetry. We use logarithms so that the regression coefficients
can be interpreted as elasticities or semi-elasticities:
log (participationi) = η0 + η1 log (pricei) + η2 log (marketcapi) + η3Analystcoveri + εi
(3.4)
In the first column of Table 3.7, the dependent variable is the logarithm of the ratio of






our previous notation. In the second column, the dependent variable is the logarithm of
the ratio DMM volume in a given stock to total consolidated volume in that stock, i.e., the
logarithm of the variable DMMsharei considered in Section 3.3. Both of these measures
are calculated using data from the three trading days preceding July 8, 2015.
The regression reveals two interesting facts. The first column of Table 3.7 shows that
105
within the microcosm of the NYSE, DMMs’ pattern of participation appears to run op-
posite to that of typical HFTs. Relative to other traders on the NYSE, DMMs participate
more heavily in stocks with higher prices and smaller market-caps. However, for the pur-
poses of understanding the changes in liquidity during the NYSE shutdown, the relevant
measure is DMMs’ participation relative to that of traders in the market as a whole. As
shown in the second column of Table 3.7, the picture flips when we consider this latter
measure. In this more comprehensive context, DMMs’ participation pattern actually ap-
pears analogous to that of “normal” HFTs, in that DMMs participate proportionally more
in larger stocks, and in stocks with lower prices. At least by this broad-brush measure, the
stocks for which DMMs participate in greater fractions of total trading are generally the
same sorts of stocks that one would expect to have high levels of voluntary HFT liquidity
provision.
3.4.2 Cross-sectional patterns in DMM importance
In a recent theoretical analysis, Bessembinder et al. (2015) demonstrate that competitive
market liquidity provision can be suboptimal when fundamental uncertainty and infor-
mation asymmetry are large. They suggest that DMMs are more important for small
firms and firms with high informational asymmetry. Anand and Venkataraman (2105) ar-
gue that voluntary liquidity provision suffices when it is adequately profitable, and that
DMMs provide comparatively more liquidity when profitability is lower. These results
on liquidity do not align cleanly with our findings concerning cross-sectional patterns
of DMM participation. We find that DMMs tend to participate in a greater fraction of
market-wide trading for large-cap stocks than for small-cap stocks, we find no signifi-
cant variation in DMM participation rates as a function of analyst coverage, and we find
DMM participation to be higher relative to total volume for lower-priced stocks (which
have larger relative tick-sizes and therefore offer greater potential for liquidity providers
to earn rents). In this subsection, we directly examine cross-sectional patterns in the im-
portance of DMMs for liquidity, more specifically for spreads, and compare the results to
those in the literature.
To analyze the cross-sectional patterns in the effect of DMM participation on spreads,
controlling for the amount of DMM participation, we run regressions of “during-NYSE-
halt minus before-NYSE-halt” differences in normalized proportional quoted spreads
(∆i), on DMMshare, price, log market cap, analyst coverage, and the interaction terms
price × DMMshare, logmktcap × DMMshare, and Analystcover × DMMshare. Results
for normalized proportional effective spreads are comparable to those for normalized
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Table 3.7: Patterns of cross-sectional variation in DMM liquidity provision
Table 3.7 reports regression results concerning factors that explain cross-sectional variation in the
DMM participation rate. The variable DMMshareNYSEshare measures the ratio of DMM volume in a given
stock to the NYSE volume in that stock. The sample consists of the 980 treatment-group stocks.
The variable DMMshare measures the ratio of DMM volume in a given stock to total consolidated
volume in that stock. Both of these measures are calculated using data from the three trading days
preceding July 8, 2015. (The logarithms of these measures are used as the dependent variables
in the regressions, so that the regression coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities or semi-
elasticities.) The variable log_price is the logarithm of the stock’s average closing price; logmktcap is
the logarithm of the stock’s market capitalization; Analystcover is the number of analysts following
the stock. Standard errors are given in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance
















Adjusted R2 0.1678 0.0128
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proportional quoted spreads, so we omit the former for brevity.
Table 3.8 reports results from these regressions. Column 1 of Table 3.8 displays results
from the regression with no interaction terms or DMMshare,
∆i = φ0 + φ1pricei + φ2logmktcapi + φ3Analystcoveri + εi, (3.5)
which serves as a benchmark. The coefficient φ2 on log market-cap is not significant.
The coefficients φ1 on price and φ3 on analyst coverage, respectively, are significant, but
this significance vanishes when we include DMMshare and the interaction term price×
DMMshare in the regression, as shown in Column 2 of Table 3.8.
Given these indications that price, log market-cap, and analyst coverage (not inter-
acted with DMMshare) do not significantly affect the regressions when DMMshare and
price × DMMshare are present, for expositional clarity we focus our main analysis on
specifications with just DMMshare and interaction terms:
∆i = ϕ0 + ϕ1DMMsharei + ϕ2 (price×DMMshare)i + εi (3.6)
∆i = θ0 + θ1DMMsharei + θ2 (price×DMMshare)i (3.7)
+θ3 (logmktcap×DMMshare)i + εi
∆i = ϑ0 + ϑ1DMMsharei + ϑ2 (price×DMMshare)i (3.8)
+ϑ3 (Analystcover×DMMshare)i + εi
Columns 3, 4, and 5 of Table 3.8 report the results for these interaction-term specifica-
tions. The coefficient ϕ2 on the interaction price× DMMshare is positive and significant,
while the respective coefficients θ3 and ϑ3 on the interactions logmktcap×DMMshare and
Analystcover×DMMshare are each negative and significant. These findings suggest that
after controlling for the level of pre-halt DMM participation, DMMs’ effect on spreads
is stronger for higher-priced stocks, smaller stocks, and stocks with more informational
asymmetry (less analyst coverage).
The findings regarding market-cap and analyst coverage support the conclusions of
Bessembinder et al. (2015). Our finding regarding price likewise supports the conclusions
of Anand and Venkataraman (2015). Even though the DMMs tend to be less prominent
liquidity providers in terms of volume-share among higher-priced stocks and smaller
stocks, DMMs’ participation has stronger impact on spreads in those stocks. A natu-
ral explanation for this effect would be time-series variation in DMMs’ participation, for
example, providing tighter quotes on the occasions when voluntary liquidity providers
temporarily withdraw from the market. Anand and Venkataraman (2105) find precisely
this sort of behavior in the context of the Toronto Stock Exchange.
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Table 3.8: NYSE-halt liquidity reduction: effects of market cap, price, analyst coverage,
DMM participation, and interactions
Table 3.8 reports results from cross-sectional regressions of “during-NYSE-halt minus before-
NYSE-halt” differences in normalized proportional quoted spreads, on a measure of DMM partici-
pation prior to the NYSE trading halt (DMMshare), the logarithm of stock market-cap (logmktcap),
average closing stock price (price), the number of analysts following the stock (Analystcover) and
the interaction terms of DMMshare with each of the other three variables. The sample consists of
the 980 treatment-group stocks. The variable DMMsharei represents the average ratio of DMM
volume in stock i to total consolidated volume in stock i during the three trading days preceding
July 8th, 2015. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate the statistical significance
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.







DMMshare 1.254∗∗∗ 1.618∗∗∗ 2.257∗∗∗ 1.751∗∗∗
(0.296) (0.188) (0.360) (0.196)
price× 0.017∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗





Constant 0.265∗∗∗ 0.084 −0.100∗∗∗ −0.106∗∗∗ −0.099∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.091) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Adjusted
R2
0.031 0.146 0.139 0.142 0.143
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More broadly, the results in this subsection again underscore the notion that, despite
superficial similarities, DMMs and voluntary liquidity providers do not play interchange-
able roles in modern markets.
3.5 Why do DMMs Matter to the Extent that They do?
Although the loss of DMMs during the NYSE halt may have caused a degradation of liq-
uidity among NYSE-listed stocks, the loss did not obliterate the markets for those stocks,
as it likely would have done a decade ago. DMMs may not be irrelevant, but neither
are they indispensable under ordinary conditions. During the period that we examine,
DMMs’ quantifiable obligations with respect to maintaining “reasonable quotes” would
not have been remotely binding.10 Why then could DMMs cause spreads to narrow sig-
nificantly?
We begin by ruling out the two most obvious potential explanations, namely the for-
mal pressure on DMMs to quote at the NBBO a specified percentage of the time, and the
liquidity rebates that DMMs receive from the NYSE.
The NYSE uses the following measures to monitor a DMM’s performance: the frac-
tion of time that the DMM quotes at the NBBO, the DMM’s average size at the NBBO
relative to combined NYSE size, and the DMM’s executed liquidity-providing volume.
However, DMMs’ obligations and inducements to quote at the NBBO a specified percent-
age of the time fail to provide a satisfactory explanation for the significant reduction of
liquidity during the NYSE trading halt. The same holds true for obligations to quote some
particular minimum size at the NBBO. Quoting at the NBBO does not, in itself, narrow
the spread, but rather increases depth at the NBBO prices. Had we observed negligible
increases in spreads but a reduction in depth during the NYSE shutdown, those effects
could have been explained in terms of DMMs’ obligations to post quotes at the NBBO.
However, during the shutdown, the reduction of liquidity took a very different form,
namely a widening of spreads.
Next, although the NYSE offers higher liquidity rebates to DMMs than to non-DMMs,
the magnitudes involved are far too small to directly explain the spread results. At the
time of the NYSE shutdown, DMMs could earn liquidity rebates as high as 34 cents
per 100 shares, while the highest rebate that non-DMMs could earn was 29 cents per
100 shares.11 The mean quoted spread among treatment-group stocks between 11:30
a.m. and 3:10 p.m. on days other than July 8th was roughly 3.8 cents, so the ≈ 22%
10See NYSE Rule 104(a)(1)(B) in Appendix B.
11Source: New York Stock Exchange Price List, July 1, 2015.
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increase in spreads during the NYSE halt translates to an average increase of approxi-
mately 0.85 cents. Even in the extreme hypothetical scenario where DMMs earned the
maximum liquidity rebate on every trade, and liquidity suppliers on other exchanges
earned the standard 0.305-cent-per-share liquidity rebate offered on NASDAQ,the ob-
served spread-increase exceeds by a factor of nearly ten the (0.34− 0.305)× (2 sides) =
0.07 cents per share that could be mechanically explained through rebates.12 Still less can
be explained if we relax the implausible assumption that DMMs earn the maximum re-
bate on every trade.
The inadequacy out these two obvious potential explanations suggests the legitimate
significance of DMMs’ more nebulous obligations, such as maintaining a fair and orderly
market in their stocks. Since these obligations are rather subjective, their strong apparent
influence on DMMs’ behavior is somewhat surprising. Maintaining high market-quality
entails some cost, and the broad wording of these DMM obligations seems to leave con-
siderable scope for shirking, as does the narrowly circumscribed set of quantitative crite-
ria on which the NYSE evaluates DMMs’ performance.
The manner in which NYSE DMMs compete with one another might contribute to
giving the DMMs’ broadly worded obligations some independent bite. There is only
ever one DMM per NYSE stock, so DMMs do not compete directly with each other in
any single stock. Nevertheless, DMMs do compete. Securities are allocated to a DMM
when a security is to be initially listed on the NYSE, and DMMs compete to obtain these
allocations. Because DMMs can’t explicitly compete on price, they must instead compete
on their record and reputation for maintaining high market-quality in the stocks assigned
to them.13 Consequently, to the extent that winning additional allocations is valuable, a
DMM could obtain “reputational” benefits from improving market-quality for its stocks,
above and beyond any immediate benefits such as rebates. This could give DMMs an
incentive to improve market-quality in their stocks, even if doing so reduces the DMMs’
respective profits in those stocks. The reduction in a DMM’s profits per stock could be
offset by an increase in the expected number of allocations that the DMM will receive in
the future.
While the reputation/competition channel sketched above is just one of many pos-
sibilities, it illustrates that unexpectedly significant effects arising from DMMs’ broadly
worded obligations might be explicable through familiar economic mechanisms. Anal-
12Source: SR-NASDAQ-2014-124
13FINRA Rule 5250 states, “No member or person associated with a member shall accept any payment or
other consideration, directly or indirectly, from an issuer of a security, or any affiliate or promoter thereof,
for publishing a quotation, acting as market maker in a security, or submitting an application in connection
therewith.”
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yses of how and why apparently mild and difficult-to-monitor DMM obligations could
improve market quality may offer fruitful avenues for future investigation.
3.6 Conclusion
The NYSE trading-halt on July 8, 2015 caused substantial reductions in liquidity among
stocks that would ordinarily trade on the NYSE relative to stocks that never trade on
the NYSE. This result is unusual because ten other exchanges remained open during the
NYSE halt. Indeed, an unrelated technological glitch forced the temporary shutdown of
EDGX just two days before the NYSE halt, and there was no analogous loss of liquidity
then. Despite being just one exchange among eleven, the NYSE is not redundant. It has a
distinctive element that significantly improves liquidity.
To distinguish the effect of DMMs from that of other features unique to the NYSE,
we examine determinants of the cross-sectional variation in liquidity reduction among
NYSE-listed stocks during the NYSE shutdown. For each stock, we compute the NYSE’s
market-share of trading volume during the days leading up to July 8, then use proprietary
data to separate the NYSE market-share into a DMM component and a non-DMM com-
ponent. We find that stocks with higher DMM participation experience larger increases in
quoted and effective spreads during the NYSE trading halt; after controlling for the DMM
component, the remainder of NYSE market-share does not help to explain cross-sectional
variation. The result is robust to the inclusion of a variety of stock-specific controls. These
findings are consistent with the idea that the liquidity effects can be attributed to DMM
participation.
Our results provide evidence consistent with the continued significance of DMMs in
modern U.S. markets, despite the proliferation of voluntary liquidity-providers. The pres-
ence of traders with formal market-making obligations, even seemingly small and mild
obligations, may cause meaningful improvements in liquidity.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
In this appendix, I present expressions omitted in the main text. I also provide details on
the calibration of the two-sector general equilibrium model.
A.1 Omitted expressions



























































































The law of motion of the pricing kernel can be derived using Ito’s lemma
dΛt
Λt
= uV(Ct, Vt)dt +
duC(Ct, Vt)
uC(Ct, Vt)
= −rtdt− ηKt dZt − ησt dZσt − η
χ
t dWt.
One can easily verify that when 1/ψ = γ, these three expressions collapse to those de-
rived from a standard continuous-time Lucas (1978) economy with power utility.
A.2 Model calibration
Table A.1: Baseline calibration
Parameter Variable Value
Capital accumulation:
Capital depreciation rate δ 0.05
Capital adjustment costs* $ 1.07
Size of PUB shocks ς 0.05
Uncertainty dynamics:
Mean-reversion parameter κ 0.16
Long-run mean of uncertainty* σ̄ 0.02
Volatility parameter* ν 0.07
Correlation with aggregate shocks* ρKσ -0.23
Preferences:
Subjective time discount β 0.01
Relative risk aversion γ 9
Elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS) ψ 2
Aggregate production:
Scale parameter* m 0.215
Share parameter* α 0.34
Substitutability parameter* s 3.2
In this online appendix, I provide a heuristic derivation of the HJB equation associated
with the utility maximization problem of an agent with recursive preferences. I also em-
pirically examine the relationships between the public sector investment share, the real
risk-free rate, and economic uncertainty, which turn out to be consistent with the model
predictions. In addition, I provide details on the numerical solution of the two-sector GE
model. Lastly, I elaborate on the construction of the government contractor sample and
the calculations of related variables. Additional empirical results, tables and figures, are
also presented here.
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A.3 Derivation of the HJB Equation with Recursive Prefer-
ences
I start from a discrete-time setting and derive the continuous-time limit, following a sim-
ilar route as Obstfeld (1994); technical details are addressed by Duffie and Epstein (1992).
Consider the utility maximization problem of an agent with recursive preferences:
Vt = max
[






where the time length per period is ∆, and other parameters are defined as usual. Define
a new value function Vt ≡ V
1−γ
t











Define another function G(X) ≡ [(1− γ)X]
1−1/ψ











1−1/ψ is a monotonic transformation of X, maximizing G(Vt)
1
1−1/ψ and G(Vt)1−1/ψ are
equivalent; so (A.2) is equivalent to
G(Vt)










Subtract e−β∆ G(Vt)1−1/ψ from both sides:
(1− e−β∆) G(Vt)




































































From (A.4), I obtain equation (1.11) in the main text.
A.4 Testing model predictions
The GE model presented in the paper predicts that, when facing greater uncertainty, the
public sector investment share rises while the risk-free rate declines; but controlling for
uncertainty, it predicts a positive association between these two variables. Here I take this
prediction to the U.S. data.
A.4.1 Specifications
I start by examining the role of uncertainty as a predictor of the public sector investment
share and the real risk-free rate. I use a standard predictive regression specified as
Ah(Yt) = α + β×UNCt + εt+h, (A.5)
where Ah(Yt) ≡ 1h+1 ∑
h
τ=0 Yt+τ is the average value of a predicted variable Y over a fore-
cast horizon of h periods (e.g., A1(Yt) = (Yt + Yt+1)/2), UNCt is an uncertainty index
from Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng (2015), and εt+h is the forecast error. The predicted vari-
ables include PubIScyct , the cyclical component of the public sector investment share, and
rt, the real risk-free rate. All variables are already defined in Section 1.3 and Appendix A.
I then test the relation between the public sector investment share and the real risk-free
rate controlling for uncertainty. Specifically, I estimate the following regression:
Ah(rt) = α + β1 ×Ah(PubIS
cyc
t ) + β2 ×UNCt + εt. (A.6)
My main interest is the slope coefficient β1, which is predicted to be positive according
to my model. I run this regression under different horizons because, in practice, both the
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public sector investment share and the risk-free rate may not respond instantaneously to
changes in economic conditions. Allowing some flexibility in the time frame may help
identify the correlation implied by the model.
A.4.2 Results
Table A.2 presents the estimation results based on a sample from 1960Q3 to 2018Q4; the
first observation is dictated by the start of the uncertainty measure. I trimmed the 1979Q4
to 1982Q4 episode to avoid a spell of drastic movements in interest rates caused by a well-
documented monetary policy shock. 1 My model does not incorporate monetary policy
risk, so it cannot speak to changes in that period.
Conforming to the model prediction, panel (a) in Table A.2 shows that the public sec-
tor investment share and the real risk-free rate react differently to higher uncertainty: the
former goes up, whereas the latter goes down. The estimated slope coefficients are sta-
tistically significant for all horizons, and their magnitudes increase in horizon. As for
the economic significance, at the two-year horizon, a one-standard-deviation (≈ 0.075)
increase in the JLN uncertainty index is associated with a 66 basis point (bps) decrease
in the (annualized) real risk-free rate and a 0.67 percentage point increase in the public
sector investment share. The adjusted R2 also increases in horizon, ranging from 0.08 to
0.14 for the real risk-free rate and 0.08 to 0.17 for the public sector investment share.
Panel (b) examines the relation between the real risk-free rate and the public sector
investment share. As shown, without any control, the real risk-free rate is barely related
to the contemporaneous public sector investment share for all horizons. But controlling
for uncertainty, the real risk-free rate displays a positive association with the public sector
investment share. In particular, at the two-year horizon, a one-standard-deviation (≈
2.2%) increase in the public sector investment share is associated with a 88 bps higher
real risk-free rate. This is again consistent with the model prediction.
A.4.3 Numerical Methods
The two-sector general equilibrium model presented in the paper is numerically solved
using an iterative method. The procedure is as follows. I start by putting together a sys-
tem of partial differential equations (PDEs) that characterizes a Markov equilibrium. It
1Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) point out that this episode was characterized by a sharp, one-shot
“Volcker shock” that brought inflation down by more than 5 percent in a relatively short period of time.
Also, the operating procedures of the Federal Reserve briefly changed to targeting non-borrowed reserves
in lieu of the usual instrument, Federal Funds rate. These monetary factors caused exceptional disturbances
to the real interest rates. Also see Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (1999) and Romer (2016).
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Table A.2: Interest rate, public sector investment share, and economic uncertainty.
Panel (a) reports the estimation results of a predictive regression (A.5). The dependent
variable is Ah(Yt), the average value of a predicted variable Y over a forecast horizon
of h periods; Y is either the (annualized) real risk-free rate or the cyclical component
of the public sector investment share, and h equals 2, 4, or 8 quarters. The regressor
(UNC) is an economic uncertainty index from Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng (2015). Panel
(b) reports the estimation results of another regression (A.6). The t-statistics are based
on heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) standard errors (Newey and
West, 1987, 1994). The sample is from 1960Q3 to 2018Q4 with the period from 1979Q4 to
1982Q4 trimmed due to a significant monetary policy shock.
(a) Economic uncertainty as a predictor
Real risk-free rate (annualized, %)
Forecast horizon (h) 2-quarter 4-quarter 8-quarter
UNC -7.46 -7.97 -8.76
[t] [-2.23] [-2.32] [-3.00]
Adj. R2 0.08 0.10 0.14
Public sector inv. share (cyc., %)
Forecast horizon (h) 2-quarter 4-quarter 8-quarter
UNC 7.89 9.89 9.03
[t] [3.20] [4.96] [4.98]
Adj. R2 0.08 0.15 0.18
(b) The relation between the risk-free rate and the public sector investment share
Real risk-free rate (annualized, %)
Forecast horizon (h) 2-quarter 4-quarter 8-quarter
Ah(PubIScyc) 0.09 0.19 0.09 0.26 0.15 0.40
[t] [0.69] [1.41] [0.64] [1.81] [0.82] [2.59]
UNC -8.93 -10.48 -12.36
[t] [-3.37] [-3.62] [-4.22]
Adj. R2 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.15 0.01 0.25
Interpretation: Greater uncertainty precedes a lower risk-free rate but a higher public sec-
tor investment share. Controlling for uncertainty, a higher public sector investment share
coincides with a higher risk-free rate.
consists of the HJB equation associated with the central planning problem and the corre-
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sponding first-order conditions (FOCs):
β






+ µK,t + µξ,t −
γ
2
[σ2 + (1− χt)2ς2t + σ2ξ,t + ς2ξ,t]





















ξt + (1− χt)∂χξt
(A.8)
where ct ≡ [M(χt)− ιpt χt− ι
g
t (1− χt)] is the consumption-capital ratio, and ξt ≡ ξ(χt, ςt)
is the unknown function to be obtained. Ideally, with the state of this system determined
by χt and ςt, one should seek the true solution—that is, a well-behaved analytical function
ξ∗(χt, ςt) that satisfies (A.7) and (A.8). But in this case such a solution is difficult to find,
if not impossible. Thus my goal instead is to find a numerical solution that approximates
the true solution as close as possible.
Discretization. The first step is to choose a set of grid points in the state space. Specifi-
cally, I choose I × J grid points from the state space; each point, denoted by (i, j), repre-





I3 , i = 1, ..., I , ς(j) =
j2
J 2 , j = 1, ...,J .
This scheme construct a nonuniform grid that is denser near boundaries where function
ξ is expected to have more curvature. 2 Alternatively, one can also use uniform grids that
are simpler to construct but lend less accuracy.
Iterative method. The next step is to find the approximate values of function ξ at these
grid points. I adapt an iterative method from Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2016b) and
Achdou et al. (2017); the key idea is to add a pseudo time dimension to the system and
iterate it until convergence. Specifically, I assume that ξ is directly dependent on time,
that is, ξt equals ξ(χt, ςt, t) instead of ξ(χt, ςt). Then I modify equation (A.7) accordingly
and write it as a linear combination of the first- and second-order partial derivatives of ξ:
2See Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2016a) for another example of using this scheme. There is a whole
area of research concentrated on the optimal grid generation (see, e.g., Thompson, Warsi and Mastin, 1985).
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The core step is to design an algorithm that takes in some guessed values of ξ and gener-
ates updated ones, for which there are two options: the explicit and implicit methods.
The explicit method is relatively easy to implement. Specifically, I evaluate the revised
HJB equation (A.9) at every grid point, transforming it into a set of difference equations.
For a given grid point (i, j), I substitute χ(i), ς(j), and the guessed value of ξ(i, j) into




































χ(i+1)−χ(i) , i = 1
ξ(i+1,j)−ξ(i−1,j)
χ(i+1)−χ(i−1) , 1 < i < I
ξ(i,j)−ξ(i−1,j)








ς(j+1)−ς(j) , j = 1
ξ(i,j+1)−ξ(i,j−1)
ς(j+1)−ς(j−1) , 1 < j < J
ξ(i,j)−ξ(i,j−1)
ς(j)−ς(j−1) , j = J
3I mainly used central differences in this paper. But I also tried the “upwind scheme”, a method that
is widely considered as the most reliable one (in terms of stability) when it comes to this type of problems
(Achdou et al., 2017). Since in the context of my model the central differences perform reasonably well, I










































≈ ξ(i, j)− ξ
u(i, j)
∆
, ∆ is the step size4
I first use (A.8) to attain the values of ιp(i, j) and ιg(i, j), which then are used to compute
(A.10). Plugging (A.10) into (A.9) gives (A.11), in which the updated value—denoted by
ξu(i, j)—is the only unknown and hence can be “explicitly” computed. Repeating this cal-
culation for all grid points gives a full set of updated values, {ξu(i, j); i = 1, ..., I and j =
1, ...,J }.
Another approach to attain updates is the implicit method. Compared with the ex-
plicit method, the only difference here is that four of the partial derivatives in (A.11) are



























Such changes result in interdependence among the corresponding difference equations,
which makes it impossible to calculate ξu(i, j) point by point. Instead I stack all difference
equations together and treat them as a system that can be written in matrix form
Aξu = B, (A.13)
where A is an (I × J )× (I × J ) sparse matrix, and B is an (I × J )× 1 vector. (A.13)
can be solved efficiently by taking advantage of the sparse matrix operations in Matlab.
The solution ξu ≡ [ξu(1, 1), ..., ξu(I ,J )] is a vector of updated values.
4It can be shown that the explicit method converges only if ∆ is sufficiently small, while the implicit
method is not subject to this constraint.
5Note that ξ is replaced by ξu at four places. Strictly speaking, the presented method is only “semi-
implicit”. A fully implicit method requires the partial derivatives in (A.10) to be calculated using the up-
dated values as well. But that would produce a nonlinear optimization problem instead of the linear one
presented here.
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Summary. Put together, an algorithm to find the numerical solution to (A.7) and (A.8) is
summarized below.
Start with an initial guess of ξ, follow these steps:
1. For all i = 1, ..., I and j = 1, ...,J , compute ιp and ιg using (A.8), and H0 to H4 using
(A.10). Replace partial derivatives with finite differences.
2. Find ξu(i, j) for every grid point using either the explicit method (A.11) or the im-
plicit method (A.12).
3. If ξu is close enough to the guessed ξ, then stop. Otherwise, use ξu as the new guess
and go back to step 1.
Several implementation notes are in order. First, although this algorithm is not rig-
orously validated (e.g., convergence, stability, etc.), it demonstrates smooth and stable
convergence when confronted with a wide range of parameter configurations. This is
especially true for the implicit method. (In comparison, the explicit method fails to con-
verge for some parameter values.) Hence, based on my experience, the implicit method is
preferred over the explicit method for its better stability as well as higher efficiency (since
a larger step size can be used). But these advantages come with some cost: the implicit
method is much less penetrable and harder to code and debug. So probably a better strat-
egy is to carry out the explicit method first to help one think through the whole process.
And with that as a foundation, it becomes more straightforward to modify the code and
apply the implicit method.
Second, the accuracy of the numerical approximation of partial derivatives is essential
to the success of this algorithm. In particular, both the implicit and explicit methods need
to calculate (A.8) and (A.10) using the guessed ξ, in which the evaluations of its partial
derivatives are involved. I experiment two schemes to reduce the approximation errors.
The first scheme is to fit a polynomial to the guessed ξ, and then use that polynomial as a
proxy to compute derivatives at any given point. The advantage of this scheme is that the
derivatives are perfectly calculated with no approximation whatsoever. But it only works
as well as the fitting, the performance of which drops drastically outside of the region
where ξ has mild curvature. The second scheme is to apply a sophisticated interpolation
method (like spline) to the guessed ξ, and then calculate derivatives numerically with
ultra-fine grids. This scheme works reasonably well even when ξ has extreme curvature.
Given the properties of these two schemes, my strategy is to start with the former (that is,
when the guessed ξ is far from the exact solution) and use a small grid that only covers
the region where ξ has mild curvature. Then I switch to the latter scheme, using the result
132
from the former one as a start point and a broader grid that includes more points from
uncovered region. This strategy leverages the strengths of both schemes and fares very
well in my application.
A.5 Additional Details on Government Contractor Sample
This section complements my portfolio-based analysis in the main text, which uses a sam-
ple of U.S. government contractors. I provide more details on the sample construction and
variable calculations.
Constructing the government contractor sample. To identify firms with sales to the U.S.
government, I source accounting data from the Compustat database. I begin by selecting
firms that meet standard criteria in the literature: that is, firms incorporated in the U.S.
and with common stocks listed on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ; firms involved in
significant mergers/acquisitions or seriously affected by the 1988 accounting change are
excluded; 6 firms in the finance or utilities industry, with SIC ∈ [6000, 7000)∪ [4900, 4950),
are also dropped. 7 For selected firms I obtain their annual accounting records 8 from the
fundamental annual file (funda) as well as the segment customer file (seg_customer); the
latter provides information on firms’ sales to the U.S. government (federal, state, and lo-
cal). 9 These accounting data allow me to compute for each firm-year the fraction of
sales accounted for by government (denoted by StG). 10 Every year I define government
contractors as firms that reported positive StG at least once over the past three years; ac-
cording to this definition I find about 2,400 firms. However, transactions between these
firms and government may stem from various types of government expenditures that are
hardly related to public sector investment. So to be more specific, I exclude firms in the
healthcare and pharmaceutical industries, personal and business services industries, and
the defense industry (as defined by the Fama-French 48-industry classification). I also
exclude firms in the consumer goods industry (as defined by the Fama-French 5-industry
classification). Government contractors in these industries are least relevant with respect
to public sector investment. The resulting sample consists of 1,242 government contrac-
6If a firm experienced a significant merger or acquisition in a fiscal year, it would be assigned a footnote
code of AB, FD, FE, or FF. According to Covas and Den Haan (2011), firms that were most affected by the
1988 accounting change (i.e., FAS94) include GM, GE, Ford, and Chrysler (also see Bernanke et al., 1990).
7I obtain the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code from the fundamental annual file (funda), or
the name file (names) if the former is not available.
8I only consider records showing positive total assets (item at) and net sales (item sale).
9Data on government customers start from 1978.
10If no transaction with government is reported, then StG is set to zero.
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tors with 9,944 firm-year observations spanning 1980 to 2017.
Calculating related variables. Using the Compustat data, I calculate a selection of firm
characteristics for these government contractors; the following explains the calculations
in detail. StG ratio, as already mentioned, is sales to government divided by total sales
(item sale). StG−2,0 is a 3-year trailing average of StG and serves as my measure of
government dependency. The book-to-market ratio is the book value of equity divided
by the market value of equity. The book value of equity is stockholders’ equity (item
seq) plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit (item txditc) minus preferred stock
redemption/liquidation/par value (item pstkrv/pstkl/pstk). 11 The market value of
equity is market price per share times number of shares outstanding; I obtain these two
items from the Compustat fundamental annual file (funda), or the security monthly file
(secm), or the CRSP monthly stock file (msf), based on availability in that order. The
market value of equity is also referred to as market capitalization, a measure of firm size.
Market leverage is the book value of debt divided by the sum of the book value of debt
and the market value of equity; the book value of debt is the sum of short-term and
long-term debt (item dlc plus item dltt). Asset growth is the annual relative change in
total assets (item at). Sales growth is the annual relative change in net sales (item sale).
Operating profitability is measured by the ratio of total revenue (item revt) or sales (item
sale) minus cost of goods sold (item cogs) minus selling, general and administrative
expense (item xsga) minus interest and related expense (item xint) to the book value of
equity. Return on assets is the ratio of income before extraordinary items (item ib) to
lagged total assets.
11To minimize the instances of missing value, I impute missing items using other related items based on
accounting identities whenever possible. For example, if item seq is missing, I use item ceq plus item pstk,
or item at minus item lt minus item mib instead.
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(a) StG (b) Market capitalization
(c) Book-to-market (d) Market leverage
Figure A.1: Firm characteristics across government dependency portfolios. This figure
compares via box plots the distributional properties of a selection of firm characteristics
across portfolios formed on government dependency. In each panel, diamonds mark the
medians of the corresponding characteristic, boxes span from the first to third quartiles,
whiskers extend to the upper and lower adjacent values as defined by Tukey (1977). De-
tailed sample construction and variable calculations are in Appendix A.
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(e) Asset growth (f) Sales growth
(g) Operating profitability (h) Return on assets
Figure A.1: (Continued)
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(a) Seven-factor alphas (v.w., 1981-1999) (b) Seven-factor alphas (v.w., 2000-2018)
(c) Seven-factor alphas (e.w., 1981-1999) (d) Seven-factor alphas (e.w., 2000-2018)
Figure A.2: Government dependency portfolios: controlling for more risk factors. This
figure displays the alphas estimated by regressing the excess returns on government de-
pendency portfolios as well as the return on a zero-investment portfolio that is long
stocks in the highest-dependency quintile and short stocks in the lowest-dependency
quintile on seven classic risk factors including the market, size, and value factors from
Fama and French (1993); the momentum factor from Carhart (1997); the liquidity fac-
tor from Pastor and Stambaugh (2003); and the profitability and investment factors from
Fama and French (2015). Also displayed are 90% and 95% confidence intervals (indicated
by the grey bar and the whiskers, respectively) computed with heteroskedasticity- and
autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) standard errors following the routine of Newey and
West (1987, 1994). Returns are monthly. Portfolios are value-weighted in panel (a) and
(b), and equal-weighted in panel (c) and (d). The sample period is 1981 to 1999 in panel
(a) and (c), and 2000 to 2018 in panel (b) and (d). The first portfolio formation was at the
end of June in 1981, and it was based on government dependency (StG−2,0) computed for
1980; the same procedure are repeated every year thereafter until 2018.
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Table A.3: Government dependency portfolios: controlling for more risk factors; value-
weighted portfolios. This table presents the estimation results of regressing the excess
returns on government dependency portfolios as well as the return on a zero-investment
portfolio that is long stocks in the highest-dependency quintile and short stocks in the
lowest-dependency quintile on seven classic risk factors including the market, size, and
value factors (MKT, SMB, HML) from Fama and French (1993); the momentum fac-
tor (MOM) from Carhart (1997); the liquidity factor (LIQ) from Pastor and Stambaugh
(2003); and the profitability and investment factors (RMW, CMA) from Fama and French
(2015). Panel (a) reports the alphas estimated separately for two subperiods, 1981-1999
and 2000-2018. Panel (b) reports the betas estimated for the full sample period, 1981-2018.
Portfolios are value-weighted. Other specifics are the same as in Table 1.6.








α (1981-1999) 0.23 0.06 -0.15 0.38 0.33 0.10
[1.05] [0.24] [-0.60] [1.31] [1.08] [0.25]
α (2000-2018) -0.47 0.24 -0.21 0.81 0.34 0.81
[-2.33] [1.50] [-0.64] [2.99] [1.21] [2.06]
(b) Betas
βMKT 1.14 1.13 1.25 0.88 0.94 -0.20
[22.82] [21.92] [20.53] [12.89] [19.16] [-3.53]
βSMB 0.21 0.18 0.22 0.27 0.33 0.12
[2.30] [2.20] [3.13] [2.49] [3.13] [1.00]
βHML 0.09 -0.09 -0.05 -0.11 0.14 0.06
[1.13] [-0.78] [-0.53] [-0.66] [1.16] [0.39]
βMOM 0.00 -0.19 -0.16 -0.03 0.04 0.04
[-0.06] [-2.99] [-3.06] [-0.59] [0.56] [0.46]
βLIQ 0.19 0.01 0.13 0.00 -0.10 -0.28
[2.13] [0.19] [1.46] [-0.00] [-1.22] [-2.45]
βRMW -0.26 0.04 0.25 -0.53 0.44 0.70
[-2.48] [0.29] [2.30] [-2.22] [3.78] [6.17]
βCMA -0.24 0.20 0.44 -0.12 0.09 0.33
[-2.07] [1.04] [2.60] [-0.68] [0.58] [1.71]
Adj. R2 0.67 0.68 0.67 0.53 0.49 0.18
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Table A.4: Government dependency portfolios: controlling for more risk factors; equal-
weighted portfolios. This table presents the estimation results of regressing the excess
returns on government dependency portfolios as well as the return on a zero-investment
portfolio that is long stocks in the highest-dependency quintile and short stocks in the
lowest-dependency quintile on seven classic risk factors including the market, size, and
value factors (MKT, SMB, HML) from Fama and French (1993); the momentum fac-
tor (MOM) from Carhart (1997); the liquidity factor (LIQ) from Pastor and Stambaugh
(2003); and the profitability and investment factors (RMW, CMA) from Fama and French
(2015). Panel (a) reports the alphas estimated separately for two subperiods, 1981-1999
and 2000-2018. Panel (b) reports the betas estimated for the full sample period, 1981-2018.
Portfolios are equal-weighted. Other specifics are the same as in Table 1.6.








α (1981-1999) 0.11 0.09 0.03 -0.07 0.02 -0.09
[0.64] [0.50] [0.12] [-0.53] [0.08] [-0.54]
α (2000-2018) -0.36 0.19 0.30 0.32 0.46 0.82
[-2.22] [0.98] [1.37] [1.19] [1.60] [2.41]
(b) Betas
βMKT 1.01 0.91 0.95 0.86 0.83 -0.18
[28.71] [23.58] [28.91] [19.62] [15.89] [-3.68]
βSMB 0.80 0.84 0.79 1.00 0.82 0.03
[12.11] [9.59] [10.35] [17.19] [10.52] [0.47]
βHML 0.10 -0.01 -0.07 -0.05 -0.07 -0.17
[1.24] [-0.15] [-1.00] [-0.57] [-0.51] [-1.75]
βMOM -0.13 -0.25 -0.17 -0.15 -0.11 0.03
[-2.78] [-5.97] [-2.86] [-5.18] [-1.86] [0.72]
βLIQ 0.09 -0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.08 -0.17
[1.54] [-0.75] [-0.48] [0.83] [-1.71] [-3.08]
βRMW -0.07 -0.13 -0.08 -0.06 0.20 0.27
[-0.97] [-2.03] [-1.38] [-0.85] [2.31] [3.32]
βCMA -0.14 -0.02 0.13 0.02 0.01 0.15
[-1.28] [-0.20] [1.60] [0.20] [0.05] [1.01]
Adj. R2 0.80 0.79 0.80 0.78 0.67 0.11
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A.6 Additional tables and figures
Figure A.3: Public sector investment share: relative to GDP. The solid line represents an
alternative definition of the public sector investment share, which is the ratio of public sector
investment to GDP; it is compared with the original definition denoted by the dashed line. Shaded
areas indicate U.S. recessions identified by NBER.
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Figure A.4: Public sector investment growth. The solid line represents the average growth
rate of public sector investment over the past 5 years. it is compared with the public sector in-
vestment share denoted by the dashed line. Shaded areas indicate U.S. recessions identified by
NBER.
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Table A.5: Mean excess returns and βPub for 25 Size-(Inv/OP/Mom) equity portfolios.
This table reports the test assets’ mean excess returns (rei ) and estimated βPub. The latter are ob-
tained by running a time-series regression specified as rei,t = ai + f
′
t β i + ξi,t for each asset i, where
rei,t is the asset’s excess return, f t represents a vector of risk factors including PubFac, UncFac and
the market excess return, and β i denotes a vector of beta estimates. The test assets include 25
size and investment (Inv) or profitability (OP) or momentum (Mom) sorted equity portfolios. The
sample is quarterly and spans the period 1960Q4 to 2018Q4.
Size
Small Big Small Big
rei βPub
Inv
Low 2.75 2.58 2.53 2.26 2.06 0.72 0.76 0.20 0.05 0.61
2.79 2.63 2.65 2.16 1.61 0.76 0.22 0.38 0.56 0.05
2.86 2.66 2.35 2.19 1.48 0.61 0.55 0.39 0.32 -0.32
2.51 2.62 2.36 2.22 1.48 0.67 0.85 0.31 0.09 -0.48
High 1.02 1.42 1.48 1.65 1.43 1.22 0.75 0.43 0.17 -0.03
rei βPub
OP
Low 1.55 1.74 1.61 1.63 1.05 0.83 0.44 0.10 0.26 -0.58
2.74 2.33 2.19 2.00 1.06 0.44 0.47 -0.18 0.09 0.23
2.53 2.38 2.15 1.95 1.52 0.78 0.42 0.56 0.24 -0.12
2.81 2.29 2.16 2.13 1.43 0.91 1.07 0.55 0.40 -0.17
High 2.37 2.75 2.64 2.36 1.78 1.35 0.81 0.77 0.37 -0.18
rei βPub
Mom
Low 0.08 0.48 0.73 0.57 0.49 1.56 1.07 1.02 0.85 0.13
1.96 2.00 1.78 1.74 1.39 0.77 0.69 0.51 0.72 0.35
2.80 2.44 2.11 2.00 1.34 0.39 0.58 0.55 0.46 0.02
3.19 2.95 2.23 2.38 1.69 0.42 0.44 0.03 0.03 -0.07
High 3.92 3.57 3.41 3.06 2.40 0.79 0.14 0.01 -0.17 -0.03
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Appendix for Section 2.1
B.1.1 Modeling the correlation structure using Brownian bridges
We now describe in detail the definition of the productivity shocks and the corresponding
correlation structure. The results presented in this subsection follow closely the work of
Gârleanu et al. (2015) and are presented for the sake of completeness. Let Zi ∼ N(0, i)
denote a Brownian motion on [0, 1], where Z0 = 0. A Brownian bridge Bi is defined as
Bi ≡ Zi − iZ1. (B.1)
Hence, this implies that B0 = B1 = 0 and Bi has continuous sample paths (a.s.). Equiv-
alently, a Brownian bridge can be defined as a process distributed as a Brownian motion
Zi conditional on Z1 = 0. As shown below, the variance of the Brownian bridge is larger
for intermediate values of i. To obtain an identical distribution for all points i ∈ [0, 1), we











The following proposition summarizes the basic properties of Bi and εi.
Proposition 7 Let Bi be a Brownian bridge and εi the standardized shock, then
1. Brownian bridge:
E[Bi] = 0, Var[Bi] = i(1− i), Cov(Bi, Bj) = min{i, j} − ij. (B.3)
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2. Standardized shock:







Proof. Brownian bridge. The expected value is
E[Bi] = E[Zi]− iE[Z1] = 0. (B.5)
The variance is given by
Var[Bi] = Var[Zi(1− i)− i(Z1 − Zi)]
= (1− i)2i + i2(1− i)
= i(1− i). (B.6)
Without loss of generality, suppose 0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ 1, so min{i, j} = i; then the covariance
is
Cov(Bi, Bj) = Cov(Zi − iZ1, Zj − jZ1)
= Cov(Zi, Zj)− jCov(Zi, Z1)− iCov(Z1, Zj) + ijVar(Z1)
= i− ji− ij + ij
= i− ij. (B.7)
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Suppose 0 ≤ i ≤ k ≤ 1. The covariance between εi and εk is given by







































= 1− 6i(k− i)− 6(k− i)(1− k)
= 1− 6(k− i)(1− (k− i)). (B.12)





















(j− i− (j− i)2)di− 6
∫ 1
j
















Because the vector [Bi1 , Bi2 , . . . , BiK ]
′, for indices i1, . . . , iK ∈ [0, 1], follows a multivari-
ate normal distribution, similarly we deduce that [εi1 , εi2 , . . . , εiK ]
′ follows a multivariate
normal distribution with vector of means and variance-covariance matrix as described in
the previous proposition.
B.1.2 Asymptotic analysis
We consider an approximation of the equilibrium around σθ = 0. In particular, we solve
for an approximation of the investors’ consumption and portfolio decisions (C0, Cis, Ωij),
firms’ investment decisions (I0, I1), and return on assets Ras,j. More explicitly, for the
variables without exposure to idiosyncratic risk, we consider the expansion





Ik = Ik,∗ + Îkσ2θ + o(σ
2
θ ), (B.15)
for k = 0, 1.
In the above expression, C∗0 and I
k,∗ denote, respectively, the level of initial consump-
146
tion and investment in technology k in the economy without idiosyncratic risk, i.e. σ2θ = 0.
Our main interest lies in determining how these variables respond to the presence of id-
iosyncratic risk, i.e. to solve for the first-order impact of the idiosyncratic variance σ2θ on
these variables, given by the terms Ĉ0 and Îk.
Regarding the variables exposed to idiosyncratic risk, their expansion in terms of σθ















s εjσθ + o(σ
2
θ ), (B.17)
where εi,∗ is an average over εj to be discussed below.
The term R̂as now captures the impact of idiosyncratic risk on the average value of Ras,j,
while R̃as captures the magnitude of idiosyncratic risk in Ras,j in state s, i.e. Vars(R
a
sj) =
(R̃as)2σ2θ , where the variance is conditional on the aggregate state s.










Importantly, the portfolio choice is not determined when σθ = 0, as the investor is
indifferent regarding all firms in the participation set. Hence, Ωi,∗j is not the solution
when there is no idiosyncratic risk, insofar as the solution is indeterminate in that case,
but the limit of the portfolio choice, Ωij, as σ
2
θ goes to zero. In contrast to C
∗
s or C∗0 , for
instance, which are considered as given when computing the perturbation coefficients,
we need to solve for Ωi,∗j jointly with the remaining perturbation coefficients.
1
B.1.3 Ito-like formulas
Given the expansion for a variable, we may be interested in computing the expansion
for functions of such a variable. For instance, given the coefficients in the expansions for
Cis, we may want to compute the expansion for cis ≡ log Cis. The next lemma, a slight
generalization of the Ito-like result discussed in Section 2.1, allows us to compute these
expansions.
Lemma 2 (Ito-like) Let F(·) denote a twice-differentiable function and Xs,j = X∗s + X̂sσ2θ +
1Formally, the fact that the portfolio choice is indeterminate at σθ implies that the conditions on applying
the implicit function theorem do not hold. The approximation procedure is then based on a bifurcation
theorem; see Judd and Guu (2001) for a discussion of these issues.
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X̃sεjσθ. Then,























and all the higher-order central moments are of order o(σ2θ ).
Moreover, the covariance between a function of two shocks satisfies
Covs(F(Xs,i), F(Xs,j)) = F′(X∗s )
2X̃2s σ
2
θ Cov(εi, εj) + o(σ
2
θ ). (B.20)
Proof. Expanding F(Xs,j) in σθ, we obtain





























j − 1) + o(σθ)2. (B.22)
The expected value of the expression above is










using E[ε2j ] = 1.

















































Finally, the covariance between F(Xs,i) and F(Xs,j) is given by








A corollary of the lemma above is that averaging a function of the shocks over [0, 1)




































up to the first-order in σ2θ .
An implication of this result is that aggregate productivity equals Θ and it is not ex-
posed to idiosyncratic risk. By choosing F(X) = ΘeX and Xj = −12 σ2θ + σθεj, we deduce
that θj = F(Xj), then E[
∫ 1






0 θjdj = Θ, almost surely.
B.1.4 Portfolio choice: proof of Proposition 1
The next lemma characterizes the minimal-variance portfolio and shows that, in the small
risk approximation, the optimal portfolio equals the minimal-variance portfolio.









0, if j < i− 0.5φ
1−φ
2 + j, if i− 0.5φ ≤ j < i + 0.5φ
1, if j ≥ i + 0.5φ
. (B.26)
2Following Gârleanu et al. (2015), we identify the index j with j− bjc, where bxc is the largest integer
weakly smaller than x, e.g. the indices −0.1 and 1.9 represent the same firm j = 0.9.
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= (1− φ)3. (B.27)
Proof. To ease the notation, we focus on the case in which i = 0.5φ, so the investor
is allowed to choose among the assets in the interval [0, φ]. We can obtain the solution
to any other value of i by properly shifting the solution. The problem of minimizing the










subject to ∫ φ
0−
dΩi = 1. (B.29)
The first-order condition is given by
∫ φ
0−
Cov(εi, εj)dΩi = λ, (B.30)
for all j ∈ [0, φ].
From the expression for the covariance of two shocks, we obtain
∫ φ
0−




















Ωi(1 + 2(j− i))di, (B.31)
where we applied integration by parts in the second equality and used Ωφ = 1 and Ω0− =
0.
Because the expression above does not vary across assets j, its derivative with respect







− φ + j = 0. (B.32)
Hence, we must have Ωj = CΩ + j for some constant CΩ. Plugging this functional
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The Lagrange multiplier is then given by
λ = 1− 6CΩ j(1− j)− 3j2(1− 2j)− 4j3 − 6[(φ− j)− (φ− j)2]
+ 6CΩ
[
(φ− j)(1 + 2j)− (φ2 − j2)
]
+ 3(φ2 − j2)(1 + 2j)− 12φ
3 − j3
3
= 1− 6φ(1− φ) + 6CΩφ (1− φ) + 3φ2 − 4φ3
= 1− 3φ + 3φ2 − φ3
= (1− φ)3. (B.34)








λdΩj = (1− φ)3. (B.35)
Given the characterization of the minimal-variance portfolio, we can now prove propo-
sition 1.
Proof. We begin by establishing the necessity of the Euler condition (2.7). Let Ωij
denote a (candidate) solution and consider the alternative (1− ω)Ωij + ωΩ
j′
j , where Ω
j′
j
is a cdf of a distribution giving all the weight to firm j′ ∈ P i, i.e. Ωj
′




j = 1 if j ≥ j
′. If Ωij is optimal, then the derivative of the objective function with respect



































Combining the expression above with (2.6), we obtain (2.7). We now derive an asymp-








We can write capital as follows






K∗s ≡ (1 + χ∗ϕes)I∗
K̂s ≡ ϕes I∗χ̂ + (1 + χ∗ϕes) Î.











where Ra,∗s = 1− δ + αΘα(K∗s )α−1.

































Ĉs = −α(1− α)Θα(K∗s )α−1K̂s + Ra,∗s K̂s
C̃s = α(ΘK∗s )
α.




−γ − γ(C∗s )−γ−1α(ΘK∗s )αεi,∗σθ +O(σ2θ ). (B.43)
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for any two firms j and j′ in the participation set.









+ o(σ2θ ) = 0. (B.45)









⇒ Cov(εi,∗, εj) = Cov(εi,∗, εj′). (B.46)
Hence, all assets in the participation set have the same covariance with the payoff
Ωi,∗j , which implies that Ω
i,∗





j ] = (1 − φ)
3. Since the minimal-variance portfolio equal-
izes the covariance of the portfolio with any asset in the participation set, we have that
Cov(εi,∗, εj) = (1− φ)3 for any j ∈ P i.
B.1.5 Idiosyncratic risk premium
Define the log stochastic discount factor for investor i
mis ≡ log β− γ(cis − c0).





1− δ + αΘα(K∗s )α−1
εi,∗σθ +O(σ2θ ). (B.47)







≈ 1 + E[mis] +
1
2
Var[mis] + r f .
This implies that





Notice that, because cis is identically distributed across investors i, the risk-free rate
displayed above does not depend on i.
We now consider the expected return on the firms. In a symmetric equilibrium, we
have that Pj = ∑1k=0 I









= Ras,j(1 + ϕ
e
sχ), (B.49)




s − ϕ0s is the
excess payoff of the risky technology.
The log return on firm j is then defined as
rs,j = ras,j + r
I
s , (B.50)
where rs,j ≡ log Rs,j, ras,j ≡ log Ras,j, and rIs ≡ log(1 + ϕesχ).
We can write the excess return for firm j as follows
rs,j = r∗s +
αΘα(K∗s )α−1
1− δ + αΘα(K∗s )α−1
εjσθ +O(σ2θ ). (B.51)




≈ 1 + E[mis + rs,j] +
1
2
Var[mis + rs,j], (B.52)
where firm j belongs to the participation set of firm i.
Rearranging the expression above, we obtain












where we applied the law of total covariance, used the definition of the log stochastic
discount factor mis, and defined c
i
s ≡ Es[cis] and rs,j ≡ Es[rj] as the expectation over
the idiosyncratic state, conditional on the aggregate state s for consumption and excess
return.
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We can then write the previous expression as
E[rj]− r f +
1
2
Var[rj] = γCov(c, rj) + γE
[(
αΘα(K∗s )α−1







From the properties of the optimal portfolio allocation, we deduce that
Cov(εi,∗, εj) = (1− φ)3. (B.55)




Var[rej ] = γCov(c, r
e









B.1.6 Investment and aggregate risk-taking: proof of Proposition 2












where j ∈ P i.








for k = 0, 1.








given a cdf satisfying
∫
{i:d(i,j)≤0.5φ} dFi,j.
We first assume that the Fji gives all the weight to a single investor i and then show
that the identity of this investor does not matter, so we obtain the same results for any





































+ o(σ2θ ), (B.61)













+ o(σ2θ ). (B.62)































Notice that the above expression does not depend on i, so we would obtain the same








































+ o(σ2θ ). (B.65)
where
Ĉ∗0 = E0 − I∗
Ĉ0 = − Î. (B.66)
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1− (1− α) αΘ
α(K∗s )α−1






= −(1− α) αΘ
α(K∗s )α−1
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1− δ + αΘα(K∗s )α−1
)
+ (1− α) αΘ
α(K∗s )α−1












1− (1− α) αΘ
α(K∗s )α−1
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Assuming γ > 1, we can show that aχχ > 0, aχI > 0, aIχ < 0, aI I > 0.3 The remaining

















= 0 to write the expression as a covariance.
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coefficients satisfy bχ < 0 and bI > 0. Solving the system above, we deduce that
χ̂ =
aI Ibχ − aχIbI
aχχaI I − aχIaIχ
Î =
aχχbI − aIχbχ
aχχaI I − aχIaIχ
. (B.70)
The response of aggregate risk-taking satisfies χ̂ < 0, but the sign of the coefficient Î is
ambiguous. Suppose now that χ̂ = 0. The solution in this case can be obtained by simply





Pricing kernel for aggregate payoffs
We now derive expression (2.11). From the expansion for the marginal utility of consump-





















s = (C∗s )−γR
a,∗



















































B.2 Appendix for Section 2.2
For a given pair (κ0, κ1), the derivative of V with respect to ∆, at ∆ = 0, is






















where the second equality uses the Euler equations for investors and firms.





= −(1− α)αθjΘα−1Kα−2s (κ0 + κ1ϕ1s ). (B.75)





= α(1− α)ΘαKα−2s (κ0 + κ1ϕ1s ). (B.76)
Taking averages over the portfolio of the first expression and combining these aver-












Θα−1Kα−2s (κ0 + κ1ϕ
1
s ). (B.77)
Plugging the expression above into the expression for V′(0), we obtain





















The covariance above can be written as
Covs(u′(Cis), R
a,i




























+ o(σ2θ ). (B.80)














+ o(σ2θ ). (B.81)










Finally, define the risk-neutral probabilities as follows4








for any random variable Xs.









+ o(σ2θ ). (B.84)
We can use these equations to derive both propositions and the corollary, as below.








We now show that the idiosyncratic variance risk premium is positive.



















where the inequality follows from Cis being increasing in Ks, σ2s being decreasing in Ks,
and the assumption γ ≥ 1.
Proof of Corollary 1. Immediately following from (B.84) after imposing α = 1.
Proof of Proposition 4. Taking κ0 =
EQ[ϕ1]√
VarQ[ϕ1]



























) [(qhqlσ2h (ϕ1h − ϕ1l )− qhqlσ2l (ϕ1h − ϕ1l ))]







4Note that β u
′(Cis)
u′(C0)
Ra,is is the relevant pricing kernel for payoffs in terms of capital in period, i.e. before
production takes place. Since the expectation of this pricing kernel is one, there is no risk-free rate dividing
the expression.
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where the probabilities are to be interpreted as risk-neutral probabilities.
The idiosyncratic variance risk premium can be written as
EQ[σ2s ]−E[σ2s ] = (ql − pl)(σ2l − σ2h) (B.86)
Combining the previous two equations, we obtain the expression in the proposition.
B.2.1 Extensions
Intermediate goods
Environment. We now consider an environment in which final goods are produced us-
ing capital and intermediate goods as inputs. For simplicity, labor is no longer a factor of
production. In place of workers consuming the labor share, there are intermediate-goods
entrepreneurs who consume their profits in period 1. The production of final goods is
given by the production function (θjKs,j)αX1−αs,j , where Xs,j denotes the use of intermedi-
ate goods by firm j in state s. Let Q denote the price of intermediate goods, then we obtain
expressions for the demand for intermediates and final goods producers profits that are














Intermediate goods are produced using a decreasing returns to scale technology. In
particular, to produce Xs units of the intermediate good, X
1+φ
s
1+φ units of the final good are












Notice that if φ = 0 the price of intermediate goods is fixed, while the quantity of
intermediate goods is fixed if φ → ∞. The market clearing condition for intermediate
goods is given by
∫ 1
0 Xs,jdj = Xs. Plugging the demand and supply for intermediate
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goods into the market clearing condition, we obtain


















The ROA of a final-goods producer can be written as





Notice that as φ → ∞, we recover the expression we obtained for the case with la-
bor. We assume that a fraction ωXI of the profits of the intermediate-goods sector goes to
investors and the fraction 1− ωXI remains with intermediate-goods entrepreneurs. The
setting with φ → ∞ and ωXI = 0 basically corresponds to the one discussed in the main
text. The main distinction between this setup and the baseline model is that the variable
input has a positive elasticity, whether it is an intermediate input or labor is not crucial
for our results.





























Ts = (1−ωXI )πXs − CXs , (B.94)
and CXs denotes the consumption of intermediate-goods entrepreneurs in laissez-faire.







































α+φ (κ0 + κ1ϕ
1
s ). (B.97)
Hence, we can write the derivative of the value function as











The expression above is analogous to the one we derived in the case with labor. The
only difference is the constant of proportionality which is not 1− α but instead φ(1−α)α+φ .
Hence, allowing for an elastic response of the variable input dampens the effect. For
instance, if we set φ = 1 and α = 0.3, this implies a reduction in the effect in the order of
20%.
CES production function
We now assume that capital and labor are combined according to a CES production func-






ε + (1− α)L ε−1ε
] ε
ε−1 −WsL. (B.99)
The demand for labor is given by










The (effective) capital-labor is then equalized across firms. Profit per unit of capital for





1− α . (B.101)
The wage and profit per unit of capital can be written as




ε + 1− α
] 1
ε−1


























and the derivative of πs,j is given by
∂πs,j
∂Ks












Following similar steps to the case with Cobb-Douglas production function, we find



























ε + 1− α
]−1
is the labor share in state s.
We obtain two differences with respect to the formula in the baseline model. First,
the labor share varies across states in the CES case. Second, the welfare impact of the
intervention is amplified if the elasticity of substitution ε is less than one, and the effect is
dampened if ε > 1. For instance, Oberfield and Raval (2014) estimates an elasticity of 0.7,
which gives an amplification of around 40%.
Endogenous participation choice
We consider next the case in which the participation parameter φ is endogenous. In-
vestors can now choose the optimal level of φ subject to a cognitive cost. This cost
could reflect costs related to acquisition and processing of information or simply a disu-
tility associated with having to pay attention to a larger number of firms. Formally, we
introduce a cognitive cost I(φ)σ2θ , where I(·) is convex and satisfies I ′(0) = 0 and
limφ→1 I ′(φ) = ∞. The cognitive cost then increases with the fraction of firms the in-
vestors has to pay attention to as well as the amount of uncertainty on each firm, so the
cost to learn about the firms vanishes when there is no uncertainty about them.
The investor’s problem can now be written in two steps. First, the optimal portfolio
choice for a given φ. Denote the value function obtained at this stage by W(φ). Second, a
market participation choice, which consists of maximizing W(φ)− I(φ)σ2θ .
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The asymptotic expansion of W(φ) is given by












where W∗ = u(C∗0 ) + βE [u(C
∗
s )].








(1− φ)2 = I ′(φ), (B.108)
where there exists a unique solution 0 < φ∗ < 1 for the first-order condition above, given
the assumptions on I(·).


























Applying an envelope argument on φ, the derivative V′(0) is identical to the one in
the case where φ is exogenous. Hence, our results apply directly to this case as well.
Moreover, the value of φ that solves the problem above for ∆ = 0 coincides with the
one in laissez-faire. Hence, starting from the laissez-faire allocation, the planner has no
incentives at the margin to distort the investor’s participation decision.
B.3 Appendix for Section 2.3
B.3.1 Data description
Variable definitions. We follow Welch (2019) in calculating market betas. Specifically,
for each stock-month, we obtain daily return data for the previous 60 months and we
winsorize the stock’s daily excess return at (1± 3)× market excess return. Then we run
a weighted-least-squares (WLS) univariate regression of this stock’s winsorized excess
return on the market excess return; the weight is computed according to a decay rate
of 2/252 per day (that is, older observations are given lower weights). The WLS slope
coefficient is our estimate of market beta (βW). The average βW in our sample is 0.8,
consistent with Welch (2019).
We compute the market capitalization (ME) for a company by aggregating the market
value of all its outstanding shares (which is equal to the product of the price per share
and the number of shares outstanding—both variables come from the CRSP data). Then
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we assign a firm’s ME to its stocks. 5 We convert ME into real terms using the CPI index
to make it more comparable across time. The median stock in our sample has a ME of
around 46 million real dollars.
We follow Fama and French (1992) in calculating the book-to-market (BM) ratio, which
is the book value of equity divided by the market value of equity; both variables are cal-
culated using fiscal yearend information from the Compustat database.6 For each firm,
we match the BM ratio for a fiscal year ending in year t− 1 to its monthly stock returns
from July of year t through June of year t + 1; this is to ensure that a BM ratio is known
before the returns it predicts. In our sample, the median stock has a BM ratio of 0.66.
We measure a stock’s past performance by a six-month cumulative gross return. For
each month t, we compute, stock by stock, the buy-and-hold compound gross return
from month t− 7 through t− 2; the adjacent month t− 1 is excluded to avoid short-term
reversals that are likely caused by trading frictions. Holding a median stock in our sample
for six months provides a total return of around 3.3%.
Lastly, we compute two measures of liquidity and its variability following Chordia,
Subrahmanyam and Anshuman (2001). For each stock-month, we calculate the average
of the monthly share turnovers (that is, the share volume divided by the total shares out-
standing) over the previous 36 months (TURN) as well as the coefficient of variation for
share turnovers over that period (CVTURN). In our sample, the median stock experi-
ences average monthly turnover of 5.22%, and the corresponding coefficient of variation
is 59.32%.
Stability of the price of risk estimation
We plot, in Figure B.1, the first-stage Fama-MacBeth slope coefficients for expected id-
iosyncratic variance (λid), which can be construed as a measure of idiosyncratic risk pre-
mium; all the other characteristics are also included to control for standard risks. As
shown, the idiosyncratic risk premium witnessed significant variations in the 1960s and
1970s, but has become fairly stable ever since. There is no discernible cyclical pattern
whatsoever. This is consistent with our model in which the idiosyncratic risk premium is
equal to the product of γ and φ, both of which are constant.
5Note that, for stocks whose issuing firms have multiple share classes, they are assigned the ME of their
issuing firms, which are not equal to their own market values.
6For the market value of equity, if it is not available from an annual accounting record, we calculate it



































Price of Idiosyncratic Risk
Figure B.1: Price of idiosyncratic risk. This figure displays month-by-month estimates of the
price of idiosyncratic risk as measured by first-stage Fama-MacBeth slope coefficients for expected
idiosyncratic variance (λivar). A selection of other characteristics is also included in the Fama-
MacBeth regressions to control for standard risks. Shaded areas indicate U.S. recessions identified
by NBER.
B.3.2 Proof of lemma 1
Proof. This derivation follows Campbell et al. (2001) closely and it is provided for com-
pleteness. Let rj,t denote the return on firm j, rm,t = ∑i wm,iri,t the return on the mar-
ket, where wm denote the market portfolio weights, and β j,t firm j’s (conditional) mar-
ket beta. By definition of market beta, we obtain that rj,t+1 = β j,trm,t+1 + ṽj,t+1, where
Cov(rm,t+1, ṽj,t+1) = 0. Finally, define vj,t+1 ≡ rj,t+1 − rm,t+1 = (β j,t − 1)rm,t+1 + ṽj,t+1.
The variance of returns can be written as
Vart[rj,t+1] = Vart[rm,t+1] + Vart[vj,t+1] + 2Covt(rm,t, vj,t)
= Vart[rm,t+1] + Vart[vj,t+1] + 2(β j,t − 1)Vart(rm,t+1) (B.109)






where σ2m,t = Vart[rm,t+1] and we used ∑j ωm,jβ j,t = 1.
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B.3.3 Derivation of the share invested in the risky technology






















From equation (2.11) and Cs = R
a
s Ks, we obtain the approximate expression
E[ϕes] ≈ Cov
(












Using ks = log(1 + χϕes) + log I ≈ χϕes + log I, we obtain
E[ϕes] = χγσ
2





























B.4 Appendix for Section 2.4
B.4.1 Appendix for Subsection 2.4.1
In this appendix, we provide the remaining elements necessary for a description of the
economy subject to financial regulation, its equilibrium, and the proof of Proposition 8,
which establishes the condition for implementation of an allocation with financial regu-
lation.




















1 , and budget constraint
Cis = R
i














is the return on the investor’s portfolio, Ψi is the portfolio weight on risky assets, Ωij is
the equity portfolio distribution, T is a lump-sum levy used to finance the debt tax shield,
and Tws is a lump-sum transfer from workers.
The modified equilibrium definition – An allocation is given by consumption and







for i ∈ [0, 1), investment and




j , Ll,j, Lh,j
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for j ∈ [0, 1), and workers’ consump-
tion, (Cwl , C
w




for each firm j, and wages Ws for each state s such that:





, solve Problem (B.115)
for each i ∈ [0, 1).






di, and labor demand is given by 2.2.
3. Asset markets for equity and debt clear.
4. The goverment’s budget at t = 0 is balanced, with T = τdD.
5. Worker consumption in each state s ∈ S is given by Cws = Ws − Tws .
6. The labor market clears at each s ∈ S , i.e.
∫ 1
0 Ls,jdj = 1.
7. Consumption goods markets clear, i.e., C0 + ∑1k=0 I












(θjKs,j)αL1−αs,j dj + (1− δ)Ks,
where Ks,j = ∑1k=0 ϕ
k
s Ikj and Ks =
∫ 1
0 Ks,jdj.















































k=0,1 whenever it satisfies:
1. Feasibility with E0 = ∑k Ik + C0 and Ks = ∑k ϕks Ik.




























Cws = (1− α)ΘαKαs − Tws ,
for some Tws .
Furthermore, τd > 0 and ω1 > ω0.
Proof of Proposition 8. Take an allocation that satisfies the requirements of the
proposition. Define I = ∑k Ik and χ = I1/I. Let d =
D







. We verify that we can find a system of subsidies and risk weights
that satisfies all the conditions for an equilibrium.



























































Firm optimality. As discussed in Section 2.4, investment and capital structure deci-
sions are made to maximize the joint surplus of the intermediary-firm relationship. We
seek to construct an allocation in which the debt constraint in (2.19) is not binding in the


















1− Pdd ≥ ω0 (1− χ) + ω1χ.





































Additionally, it is required that









Labor market equilibrium and worker consumption. Similarly to laissez-faire, op-
timality and labor market clearing can be ensured under Ws = (1− α)ΘαKαs . In the
presence of the lump-sum tax, we have
Cws = (1− α)ΘαKαs − Tws . (B.123)
Market-clearing for equity and debt. Market clearing for equity requires that, for
aggregates,
Ψ(E0 − T − C0) = Pe, (B.124)
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and
(1−Ψ) (E0 − T − C0) = IPdd. (B.125)





candidate allocation and d > 0 as an equilibrium. Notice first that, from (B.116) and
(B.117), asset prices are given as a function of the allocation. Equation (B.117) together














which pins down τd. Notice that, because the allocation features an implicit investment
subsidy, τd > 0. Equation (B.120) implies that µ
rw
I = τ
dPd ≥ 0. Then, we can use Equation










Lastly, we can obtain ω0 from Equation (B.121). Set T = Iτdd and use Equation (B.124) to
solve for Ψ. It then follows that, adding (B.124) and (B.125), we obtain
(E0 − T − C0) = Pe + IPdd.
Using feasibity at date t = 0 and (B.126), we verify that this equation holds, proving
equality in Equation B.125.
B.4.2 Appendix for Subsection 2.4.2



















(1− α) (ΘKs)α − Tws
)]
≥ uw, (B.128)







j, and Ks = (1 + χϕ
e
s)I.



















































































The second term in the above expression is the risk externality for investment






















From the optimality condition for the portfolio allocation, we can replace Ra,is by Ras,j,








































= −(1− α)αθiΘα−1Kα−2s ϕes I. (B.138)



























Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Designated market makers’ privileges
Historically, specialists could observe an order first, before the market could do so. There-
fore, the specialists had the ability to handle some portion of the order prior to the market.
In 2008, NYSE removed the first-look advantage. DMMs now have three privileges. First,
the NYSE provides more generous rebates to DMMs for providing liquidity. At the time of
the NYSE shutdown on July 8, 2015, DMMs could earn rebates as high as 34 cents per 100
shares, while the highest rebate that non-DMMs could earn was 29 cents per 100 shares.
Second, DMMs also receive market data quote revenue and flat monthly fees per symbol
in less-active securities, based on market-quality performance. Third, instead of yielding
to public limit orders at the same price, as specialists were obligated to do prior to 2008,
DMMs currently have slightly more priority than each individual limit-order submitter
on the book. The privilege comes from the NYSE priority-parity allocation rule for orders
at the same price. This rule first divided traders into three types: the DMM for the stock,
floor brokers, and electronic book. Each single floor broker and the DMM constitute in-
dividual participants, whereas all orders represented in the limit-order book in aggregate
constitute a single participant. The orders submitted to the limit-order book are executed
by means of time priority with respect to entry. If a participant is the unique provider of
the best bid and offer (BBO), the participant is awarded the priority and obtains 15% of
incoming market orders or a minimum of one round lot, whichever is greater. After that,
the remainder size of the market order shall be allocated to each participant on parity.
Therefore, DMMs do not need to yield to public limit orders that were entered earlier,
unless the public limit order was the first one to set BBO, whereas a public limit order
needs to yield to other limit orders with time priority.
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C.2 Selected NYSE Rules1
NYSE Rule 104. Dealings and Responsibilities of DMMs
104(a) DMMs registered in one or more securities traded on the Exchange must engage in a course
of dealings for their own account to assist in the maintenance of a fair and orderly market insofar
as reasonably practicable. The responsibilities and duties of a DMM specifically include, but are
not limited to, the following:
(1) Assist the Exchange by providing liquidity as needed to provide a reasonable quotation and
by maintaining a continuous two-sided quote with a displayed size of at least one round lot.
(A) With respect to maintaining a continuous two-sided quote with reasonable size, DMM
units must maintain a bid or an offer at the National Best Bid and National Best Offer ("inside") at
least 15% of the trading day for securities in which the DMM unit is registered with a consolidated
average daily volume of less than one million shares, and at least 10% for securities in which the
DMM unit is registered with a consolidated average daily volume equal to or greater than one
million shares. Time at the inside is calculated as the average of the percentage of time the DMM
unit has a bid or offer at the inside. In calculating whether a DMM is meeting the 15% and 10%
measure, credit will be given for executions for the liquidity provided by the DMM. Reserve or
other hidden orders entered by the DMM will not be included in the inside quote calculations.
(B) Pricing Obligations. For NMS stocks (as defined in Rule 600 under Regulation NMS) a
DMM shall adhere to the pricing obligations established by this Rule during the trading day; pro-
vided, however, that such pricing obligations (i) shall not commence during any trading day until
after the first regular way transaction on the primary listing market in the security, as reported
by the responsible single plan processor, and (ii) shall be suspended during a trading halt, sus-
pension, or pause, and shall not re-commence until after the first regular way transaction on the
primary listing market in the security following such halt, suspension, or pause, as reported by
the responsible single plan processor.
(i) Bid and Offer Quotations. At the time of entry of the DMM’s bid (offer) interest,
the price of the bid (offer) interest shall be not more than the Designated Percentage away from
the then current National Best Bid (Offer), or if no National Best Bid (Offer), not more than the
Designated Percentage away from the last reported sale from the responsible single plan processor.
In the event that the National Best Bid (Offer) (or if no National Best Bid (Offer), the last reported
sale) increases (decreases) to a level that would cause the bid (offer) interest to be more than the
Defined Limit away from the National Best Bid (Offer) (or if no National Best Bid (Offer), the
last reported sale), or if the bid (offer) is executed or cancelled, the DMM shall enter new bid
(offer) interest at a price not more than the Designated Percentage away from the then current
National Best Bid (Offer) (or if no National Best Bid (Offer), the last reported sale), or identify to
the Exchange current resting interest that satisfies the DMM’s obligation according to paragraph
(1)(A), above.
(ii) The National Best Bid and Offer shall be determined by the Exchange in accordance
with its procedures for determining protected quotations under Rule 600 under Regulation NMS.
(iii) For purposes of this Rule, the "Designated Percentage" shall be 8% for securities
subject to Rule 80C(a)(i), 28% for securities subject to Rule 80C(a)(ii), and 30% for securities subject
1The text in this Appendix, including labeling of rule subsections, is quoted directly from the NYSE
Rules, available at the time of this writing at http://nyserules.nyse.com/NYSE/Rules/. All rights belong
to the copyright holder.
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to Rule 80C(a)(iii), except that between 9:30 a.m. and 9:45 a.m. and between 3:35 p.m. and the close
of trading, when Rule 80C is not in effect, the Designated Percentage shall be 20% for securities
subject to Rule 80C(a)(i), 28% for securities subject to Rule 80C(a)(ii), and 30% for securities subject
to Rule 80C(a)(iii).
(iv) For purposes of this Rule, the "Defined Limit" shall be 9.5% for securities subject to
Rule 80C(a)(i), 29.5% for securities subject to Rule 80C(a)(ii), and 31.5% for securities subject to
Rule 80C(a)(iii), except that between 9:30 a.m. and 9:45 a.m. and between 3:35 p.m. and the close
of trading, when Rule 80C is not in effect, the Defined Limit shall be 21.5% for securities subject
to Rule 80C(a)(i), 29.5% for securities subject to Rule 80C(a)(ii), and 31.5% for securities subject to
Rule 80C(a)(iii).
Nothing in this Rule shall preclude a DMM from quoting at price levels that are closer to the Na-
tional Best Bid and Offer than the levels required by this Rule.
(2) Facilitate openings and reopenings, including the Midday Auction, for each of the securities in
which the DMM is registered as required under Exchange rules. This may include supplying liq-
uidity as needed. (See Rule 123D for additional responsibilities of DMMs with respect to openings
and Rule 13 with respect to Reserve Order interest procedures at the opening.) DMM and DMM
unit algorithms will have access to aggregate order information in order to comply with this re-
quirement. (See Supplementary Material .05 of this 104 with respect to odd-lot order information
to the DMM unit algorithm.)
(3) Facilitate the close of trading for each of the securities in which the DMM is registered as
required by Exchange rules. This may include supplying liquidity as needed. (See Rule 123C for
additional responsibilities of DMMs with respect to closes and Rule 13 with respect to Reserve
Order interest procedures at the close.) DMM and DMM unit algorithms will have access to ag-
gregate order information in order to comply with this requirement.
...
104(f) Functions of DMMs
(i) Any member who expects to act as a DMM in any listed stock must be registered as a DMM.
See Rule 103 for registration requirements for DMMs.
(ii) The function of a member acting as a DMM on the Floor of the Exchange includes the main-
tenance, in so far as reasonably practicable, of a fair and orderly market on the Exchange in the
stocks in which he or she is so acting. The maintenance of a fair and orderly market implies the
maintenance of price continuity with reasonable depth, to the extent possible consistent with the
ability of participants to use reserve orders, and the minimizing of the effects of temporary dispar-
ity between supply and demand. In connection with the maintenance of a fair and orderly market,
it is commonly desirable that a member acting as DMM engage to a reasonable degree under ex-
isting circumstances in dealings for the DMM’s own account when lack of price continuity, lack of
depth, or disparity between supply and demand exists or is reasonably to be anticipated.
(iii) The Exchange will supply DMMs with suggested Depth Guidelines for each security in which
a DMM is registered. The administration of the Depth Guidelines will be contained in notices pe-
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riodically issued to all DMMs. In connection with a DMM’s responsibility to maintain a fair and
orderly market, DMMs will be expected to quote and trade with reference to the Depth Guidelines
where necessary.
(iv) DMMs are designated as market maker on the Exchange for all purposes under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and the rules and regulations thereunder.
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C.3 Calculating the NYSE information share
For each stock-day, we build two price series with one-second time resolution, one from
NYSE and the other from all other exchanges as a whole (non-NYSE).2 Based on these
two price series (NYSE and non-NYSE), we estimate the Vector Error Correction Model


















β2,i∆p2,t−i + γ2 (p1,t−1 − p2,t−1 − µ) + ε2,t
where p1,t and p2,t correspond to the two price series. µ is the sample average of (p1,t − p2,t).
Building on the model estimation, we calculate the cumulative impulse response func-
tions by forecasting the evolution of these two price series 600 seconds ahead after a unit
shock. Then with cumulative impulse response functions and the covariance matrix of
perturbations, the lower and upper bounds of information share can be calculated by
considering the Cholesky factorizations of all the permutations of the disturbances.
2To confirm robustness, we use two different types of price series: the first consists of the last available
trade prices at each one-second time interval, and the second consists of the midpoints from best prevailing
quotes at the end of each second. The information regarding trades and quotes comes from Daily TAQ data.
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